Edwards v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. , 63 F. App'x 674 ( 2003 )


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  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    SALLY F. EDWARDS, Individually and       
    Executrix of the Estate of Captain
    Robert Francis Edwards, Deceased;
    ROBERT FRANCIS EDWARDS, Sally F.
    Edwards, Executrix of the Estate of
    Captain Robert Francis Edwards;
    IAN ROBERT EDWARDS, Sally F.
    Edwards, as next friend and
    guardian of a minor under the age
    of 18 years; BRUCE NICOLAS
    EDWARDS, Sally F. Edwards, as next               No. 02-1343
    friend and guardian of a minor
    under the age of 18 years,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON,
    INCORPORATED, a Delaware
    corporation,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.
    Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., District Judge.
    (CA-98-18)
    Argued: January 23, 2003
    Decided: May 1, 2003
    Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    2               EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: William Blakely, PIPER RUDNICK, L.L.P., Washing-
    ton, D.C., for Appellants. Stephen K. Brunk, LAW OFFICES OF
    STEPHEN K. BRUNK, La Jolla, California, for Appellee. ON
    BRIEF: Philip L. Cohan, Cathy A. Hinger, PIPER RUDNICK,
    L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; James T. Crouse, MINEO & CROUSE,
    Raleigh, North Carolina; Arden J. Curry, II, PAULEY, CURRY,
    STURGEON & VANDERFORD, Charleston, West Virginia, for
    Appellants. Stephen M. LaCagnin, JACKSON & KELLY, P.L.L.C.,
    Morgantown, West Virginia; Gretchen M. Callas, JACKSON &
    KELLY, P.L.L.C., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Sally Edwards ("Mrs. Edwards"), individually and as executrix of
    the estate of Captain Robert Francis Edwards, and on behalf of her
    two minor children, brought this wrongful death action in the North-
    ern District of West Virginia against Bell Helicopter Textron, Incor-
    porated ("Bell"). Captain Edwards, an officer in the Marine Corps,
    was killed in a 1996 helicopter crash in Georgia. The trial jury
    returned its verdict in favor of Bell, and Mrs. Edwards has appealed,
    contending that the district court committed reversible error when it
    excluded certain evidence of Bell’s liability. Because we are unable
    to say that the court abused its discretion in its resolution of the con-
    tested evidentiary issues, we affirm the judgment in favor of Bell.
    EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON                         3
    I.
    A.
    On March 1, 1996, Captain Edwards was killed when the Bell AH-
    1W helicopter that he flew as a Marine Corps pilot (the "Edwards
    Helicopter") crashed near Columbus, Georgia. The crash was caused
    by the failure in flight of the craft’s "tail rotor yoke" (the "Yoke").1
    Mrs. Edwards filed this wrongful death action against Bell in the
    Northern District of West Virginia in February of 1998, asserting
    multiple theories of liability.2 Significantly, the parties agree that the
    Yoke failed from metal fatigue, resulting from an unduly low level of
    "compressive residual stresses" ("CRS"),3 which caused the Yoke to
    separate from the Edwards Helicopter. Although Bell designed and
    built its tail rotor yokes for a 2200-flight-hour service life, the Yoke
    failed after only 728 flight hours. In the Joint Pretrial Order, Mrs.
    Edwards asserted that "[t]he material fact at issue in the litigation is
    what caused the low level of CRS[ ] that enabled fatigue to set in and
    destroy the strength of the [Yoke] on [the Edwards Helicopter]."
    B.
    1.
    At trial, the parties offered competing theories on the cause of the
    1
    A "tail rotor yoke" connects the two tail rotor blades of a helicopter
    to the craft’s drive shaft. The tail rotor and its associated components
    serve a vital longitudinal balance function. If any major portion of the
    tail rotor, such as the yoke, is lost in flight, a helicopter’s center of grav-
    ity shifts forward, causing the aircraft to become "nose heavy" and
    uncontrollable.
    2
    When the complaint was filed, Mrs. Edwards resided in New Martins-
    ville, West Virginia. Although the fatal crash occurred in Georgia, venue
    was proper in the Northern District of West Virginia because Bell is sub-
    ject to personal jurisdiction there. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1391
    (c).
    3
    CRS strengthen a tail rotor yoke and enhance its resistance to metal
    fatigue. A layer of CRS is created during a tail rotor yoke’s manufactur-
    ing process, through a controlled bombardment of a yoke’s surface with
    tiny pellets, a process referred to as "shot peening."
    4                EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON
    Yoke’s fatally low CRS level. According to the evidence, there are
    several ways for a tail rotor yoke to lose its CRS, including (1) defec-
    tive shot peening; (2) mishandling; (3) excessive static bending loads;4
    or (4) gradual dynamic relaxation during normal flight.5
    Bell’s theory of defense was that the Yoke’s CRS loss was the fault
    of the Marine Corps. It contended that the Yoke, used previously on
    a different helicopter, had experienced a "static bending load" in 1993
    when that prior helicopter was accidently towed into the blade of a
    larger aircraft (the "Towing Incident"). Following the Towing Inci-
    dent, the Yoke was removed from the prior helicopter, visually
    inspected, and installed on the Edwards Helicopter. In support of its
    contention that the Towing Incident had caused the Yoke’s CRS loss,
    Bell relied on the Marine Corps’ investigation of the fatal crash. That
    investigation found that the Towing Incident had "caused a weak-
    ness/problem to develop over time in the [Y]oke. . . . This weak-
    ness/problem in the [Y]oke went undetected and ultimately resulted
    in the [Y]oke assembly failing/fracturing in flight."6
    Mrs. Edwards presented competing theories for the cause of the
    Yoke’s CRS loss, based upon the opinions of her two experts, Drs.
    Thomas Butler and Oddvar Bendiksen. Dr. Butler testified that the
    Yoke’s CRS loss was caused by either (1) improper shot peening dur-
    ing manufacture, or (2) mishandling. While Dr. Butler was able nei-
    ther to identify the more likely of these two possible causes, nor to
    say whether it was Bell or the Marine Corps that was responsible for
    any mishandling, he ruled out the Towing Incident as a cause of the
    fatal crash. Dr. Bendiksen, by contrast, testified that the Yoke’s CRS
    loss was due to gradual dynamic relaxation. He also testified, consis-
    4
    The term "static bending load" refers to any force applied against a
    tail rotor assembly when a tail rotor blade is not rotating. Examples of
    static bending loads include high wind gusts and static ground strikes
    (such as when a tail rotor yoke is struck by a vehicle).
    5
    "Gradual dynamic relaxation" occurs when high stresses are induced
    in a tail rotor yoke during high-speed forward flight.
    6
    Mrs. Edwards did not sue the Marine Corps. See Feres v. United
    States, 
    340 U.S. 135
    , 146 (1950) (holding that members of military can-
    not maintain tort suits against Government for injuries that "arise out of
    or are in the course of activity incident to service").
    EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON                        5
    tent with Dr. Butler, that the Towing Incident did not cause the
    Yoke’s CRS loss.
    2.
    Prior to trial, Bell moved to exclude from evidence all references
    to a modification that Bell had made in the design of the tail rotor
    yokes of its helicopters. This modification was the introduction of a
    "yielding" version of the craft’s flapping stop,7 and it resulted from
    a Bell study conducted following the 1987 crash of a different model
    of Bell helicopter. In 1992, after the conclusion of the Bell study, the
    company’s Safety Board noted that two types of Bell helicopters, the
    214ST and the AH-1W (both of which used the same tail rotor yoke),
    were vulnerable to CRS loss from unwitnessed static bending loads,
    possibly resulting from improper tie-down procedures for the tail
    rotor assembly. The Safety Board recommended to Bell’s engineering
    department that it redesign the tail rotor’s "flapping stop" on the
    214ST helicopter. The purpose of the redesigned flapping stop was to
    permit it to bend when a sufficient static bending load was placed on
    the tail rotor yoke to produce CRS loss. This yielding flapping stop
    (the "YFS") was to serve as a "visual cue" to maintenance personnel
    of an unwitnessed static bending load. If maintenance personnel dis-
    covered a bent YFS, the tail rotor yoke could be promptly tested for
    CRS loss through a process known as "X-ray diffraction."8 The Safety
    Board’s recommendation for installation of a YFS was limited to the
    Bell model 214ST helicopter. The Safety Board did not recommend
    installation of a YFS on Bell’s model AH-1W (the model of the
    Edwards Helicopter) because it believed that, due to the different
    flight loads9 typically placed on that model, "dimensional inspections"10
    7
    When not rotating, a tail rotor yoke and blade assembly will some-
    times teeter from one side to the other. A tail rotor’s "flapping stop" lim-
    its how far the tail rotor assembly can teeter from side to side when the
    tail rotor is not turning. It serves no purpose while the tail rotor is rotat-
    ing.
    8
    The process of "X-ray diffraction" is the only method by which CRS
    loss can be detected. X-ray diffraction is a technique in which X-rays are
    bombarded onto a tail rotor yoke. The shape of the X-ray pattern is
    dependent upon the level of CRS on the tail rotor yoke.
    9
    Flight loads include, inter alia, the weight of the aircraft, its mission
    profiles, and its maneuvers.
    10
    A "dimensional inspection" consists of the taking of various mea-
    surements of the tail rotor yoke to determine if the yoke has been bent.
    6                EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON
    would adequately detect whether a tail rotor yoke had experienced an
    unwitnessed static bending load that might have caused CRS loss.
    Bell first tested the YFS in November of 1993, and in 1994 it
    obtained approval from the Federal Aviation Administration for YFS
    installation on its 214ST helicopters. Between 1994 and the fatal
    crash of the Edwards Helicopter in 1996, two other Bell helicopters
    crashed due to failed tail rotor yokes.11 Approximately a month after
    the March 1, 1996, crash of the Edwards Helicopter, Bell recom-
    mended to the Marine Corps that it install the YFS on its AH-1W hel-
    icopters.
    Bell’s motion sought to exclude from evidence all information per-
    taining to the YFS (the "YFS evidence"). It contended that the YFS
    evidence was irrelevant to the issues to be considered by the jury. Bell
    maintained that YFSs are useful only in the detection of unwitnessed
    static bending loads, and that both of Mrs. Edwards’s experts had
    opined that a static bending load was not the cause of the Yoke’s CRS
    loss. As such, the failure to install a YFS on the Edwards Helicopter
    could not have been related to the fatal crash.
    Mrs. Edwards responded that her theories of liability were not
    dependent on the particular cause of the Yoke’s CRS loss. Instead,
    she maintained that she intended to prove to the jury that the Edwards
    Helicopter was unreasonably susceptible to metal fatigue because it
    was dependent on CRS. Mrs. Edwards asserted that the YFS evidence
    would show that Bell knew of the unreasonable dangers associated
    with the tail rotor yokes on its CRS-reliant helicopters.
    The district court considered Bell’s motion in limine at a pre-trial
    hearing on May 23 and 24, 2001. In assessing the admissibility of the
    YFS evidence, the court heard from Drs. Butler and Bendiksen
    regarding any relationship between the YFS and their theories of how
    the fatal crash occurred. Dr. Butler testified expressly that the YFS
    would not have detected the Yoke’s CRS loss, whether that loss was
    due to mishandling or to improper shot peening. And Dr. Bendiksen
    11
    These two crashes did not involve the Bell AH-1W or 214ST models,
    but they did involve helicopters with tail rotor yokes similar to the Yoke
    on the Edwards Helicopter.
    EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON                      7
    never suggested that the YFS could have identified CRS loss from
    gradual dynamic relaxation. In short, neither expert testified that
    installation of a YFS on the Edwards Helicopter would have helped
    to prevent the fatal crash. The court then ruled the YFS evidence irrel-
    evant, because it did "not see that the absence of the [YFS] as ulti-
    mately designed was delineated or defined as a use defect giving rise
    to a notice cause of action under a strict liability tort." In so ruling,
    the court excluded the YFS evidence from Mrs. Edwards’s case-in-
    chief, reserving the right to reconsider the relevance of that evidence
    to counter any theories or evidence presented by Bell.12
    3.
    During its opening statement, Bell’s counsel asserted that "the evi-
    dence at trial [would] reveal . . . that [the Yoke was] the only tail rotor
    yoke that ever failed [on any AH-1W helicopter]" or 214ST helicop-
    ter. In his trial testimony, Dr. Bendiksen testified that, based on his
    statistical analysis of the rate of metal fatigue in the AH-1W tail rotor
    yokes, he would have expected two to three failures of the tail rotor
    yokes in the AH-1W fleet "up to this point." On cross-examination,
    he acknowledged that, as of the time of trial, the Yoke on the
    Edwards Helicopter was the only failure of which he was aware.
    Following Dr. Bendiksen’s testimony, Mrs. Edwards again sought
    admission of the YFS evidence. She contended that the door had been
    opened for the YFS evidence by Bell’s opening statement that there
    had been no other tail rotor yoke failures on the AH-1W or the
    214ST, coupled with the testimony elicited from Dr. Bendiksen on
    cross-examination. She maintained that the YFS evidence was rele-
    vant to why no other tail rotor yokes had failed after the crash of the
    Edwards Helicopter, and that such evidence was proper rebuttal. The
    court disagreed, however, finding that "sufficient evidence [had not
    12
    Although the court excluded the YFS evidence, it permitted introduc-
    tion of evidence on previous helicopter crashes that had been caused by
    failed tail rotor yokes, as well as notes from Safety Board meetings and
    other Bell documents regarding tail rotor yoke failures that were due to
    low CRS levels. These documents were redacted to exclude all refer-
    ences to the YFS.
    8                EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON
    been] presented that would permit [it] to change [its] ruling" exclud-
    ing the YFS evidence.13
    4.
    On June 11, 2001, after a nine-day trial, the jury returned its verdict
    in favor of Bell on all theories of liability. Mrs. Edwards has
    appealed, asserting that the court abused its discretion in excluding
    the YFS evidence. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    II.
    We review the rulings of a district court on the admission or exclu-
    sion of evidence for abuse of discretion. Westberry v. Gislaved
    Gummi AB, 
    178 F.3d 257
    , 261 (4th Cir. 1999). A trial court abuses
    its discretion in excluding evidence only if its "conclusion is guided
    by erroneous legal principles, or rests upon a clearly erroneous factual
    finding," or if, after considering all the evidence, a reviewing court
    possesses a "definite and firm conviction that the court below com-
    mitted a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a
    weighing of the relevant factors." 
    Id.
     (internal quotations omitted).
    Even if we "might have ruled differently on the matter in the first
    instance," United States v. Dickerson, 
    166 F.3d 667
    , 678 (4th Cir.
    1999), rev’d on other grounds, 
    530 U.S. 428
     (2000), we are con-
    strained by "a significant measure of appellate deference to the judg-
    ment calls of trial courts," United States v. Pittman, 
    209 F.3d 314
    , 316
    (4th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Mason, 
    52 F.3d 1286
    , 1289
    (4th Cir. 1995) ("Under the abuse of discretion standard, this Court
    may not substitute its judgment for that of the district court; rather,
    we must determine whether the court’s exercise of discretion, consid-
    ering the law and the facts, was arbitrary or capricious.").
    13
    The court noted that Mrs. Edwards may have waived the door-
    opening argument by failing to timely object to Bell’s opening statement
    and its cross-examination of Dr. Bendiksen. Nevertheless, the court ruled
    on the merits of Mrs. Edwards’s contention.
    EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON                   9
    III.
    Mrs. Edwards first asserts that the YFS evidence was relevant both
    to her failure-to-warn claim and to her claims against Bell for strict
    liability and negligent defective design. She next contends that the
    district court abused its discretion by excluding the YFS evidence on
    rebuttal. We address each of these contentions in turn.
    A.
    1.
    Pursuant to the law of Georgia, which governs here, a manufacturer
    with knowledge of a danger from its product has the duty to provide
    an adequate warning of such danger to the product’s users. Battersby
    v. Boyer, 
    526 S.E.2d 159
    , 162 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). Mrs. Edwards
    contends that the YFS evidence was relevant to Bell’s knowledge of
    the danger of CRS loss in the tail rotor yokes on the helicopters that
    it manufactured. She maintains that, had Bell warned the Marine
    Corps of the problem of CRS loss, the Corps would have discovered
    the CRS loss in the Edwards Helicopter. Specifically, Mrs. Edwards
    asserts that, had Bell issued its March 29, 1996, Military Alert Bulle-
    tin (the "MAB") prior to the crash of the Edwards Helicopter, the fatal
    crash would have been prevented, because the YFS installation pro-
    cess, in which the Marine Corps would have engaged on receipt of the
    MAB, would have detected the Yoke’s CRS loss.
    To establish a failure-to-warn claim under Georgia law, a plaintiff
    must show that the defendant had a duty to warn, that it breached such
    duty, and that the breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
    injury. See Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc. v. Calgon Carbon Corp.,
    
    4 F. Supp. 2d 1198
    , 1203 (S.D. Ga. 1998); Daniels v. Bucyrus-Erie
    Corp., 
    516 S.E.2d 848
    , 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). In the context of the
    Edwards Helicopter crash, Bell’s development of the YFS is relevant
    to its knowledge of the consequences of CRS loss to tail rotor yokes
    resulting from static bending loads. However, neither of Mrs.
    Edwards’s expert witnesses contended that the Yoke’s CRS loss was
    due to a static bending load. Dr. Butler opined that the Yoke’s CRS
    loss was due either to improper shot peening or to mishandling "at
    some point before it got on the helicopter." Dr. Bendiksen testified
    10               EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON
    that the likely cause of the Yoke’s CRS loss was a "gradual dynamic
    relaxation," which occurs during normal flight when the tail rotor is
    rotating. Importantly, neither expert suggested that a YFS would have
    detected CRS loss from improper shot peening, mishandling, or grad-
    ual dynamic relaxation.
    While Mrs. Edwards seems to recognize that the YFS would not
    itself have detected any of the forms of CRS loss that her husband’s
    helicopter may have experienced, she nonetheless maintains that
    Bell’s failure to timely issue the warning contained in the MAB was
    a proximate cause of the Edwards Helicopter crash. This contention
    is without merit. The MAB recommended, inter alia, (1) the immedi-
    ate review of each tail rotor yoke’s historical records to determine if
    it had been involved "in any prior static or dynamic incidents which
    could have induced a bending load into the yoke"; (2) a dimensional
    inspection of each tail rotor yoke to determine if it had been subjected
    to excessive bending loads; and (3) installation of a YFS on each AH-
    1W helicopter. Mrs. Edwards asserts that, had the MAB been issued
    prior to the fatal crash, the Marine Corps would have learned of the
    CRS loss on the Edwards Helicopter. The district court admitted the
    MAB into evidence in a redacted form, editing out only the mention
    of the YFS (the "Redacted MAB"). Because Mrs. Edwards’s experts
    never opined that installation of the YFS on the Edwards Helicopter
    would have detected the Yoke’s CRS loss under any of their theories
    of the fatal crash, and because the relevant portions of the MAB were
    admitted in redacted form,14 we are unable to conclude that the court
    abused its discretion in its initial exclusion of the YFS evidence with
    respect to the failure-to-warn claim.
    2.
    Mrs. Edwards also contends that the YFS evidence is relevant to
    14
    Mrs. Edwards also asserts on appeal that the redaction of Bell’s doc-
    uments to exclude mention of the YFS effectively re-crafted those docu-
    ments, misleading the jury into believing that Bell had fully informed the
    Marine Corps of the dangers associated with CRS loss on tail rotor
    yokes. Even if Bell withheld information regarding the YFS from the
    Marine Corps, however, such was not a proximate cause of the fatal
    crash under any of Mrs. Edwards’s theories.
    EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON                    11
    her claims of strict liability and negligent defective design. She
    asserts that the YFS evidence, showing a non-implemented pre-
    accident design modification, was admissible to demonstrate that (1)
    the original design of the Yoke was defective, and (2) there was an
    available and feasible alternative design for the Yoke.
    In order to prevail on either her strict liability claim or her negli-
    gent defective design claim, Mrs. Edwards was required to demon-
    strate that a design defect was a proximate cause of the injuries
    alleged. See Ogletree v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 
    535 S.E.2d 545
    ,
    548 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). Neither of Mrs. Edwards’s experts testified
    that the YFS would have detected the Yoke’s CRS loss from
    improper shot peening, mishandling, or gradual dynamic relaxation.
    Nor did either expert suggest that the Yoke’s CRS loss was due to a
    static bending load. Because a YFS only detects static bending loads,
    the fact that the Edwards Helicopter was not equipped with the YFS
    — an "alternative design" — could not have contributed to the fatal
    crash. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that
    the YFS evidence was irrelevant to the proof of Mrs. Edwards’s strict
    liability and negligent defective design claims.
    B.
    Finally, Mrs. Edwards contends that the district court abused its
    discretion in refusing to admit the YFS evidence as rebuttal to Bell’s
    theory that the Towing Incident caused the Yoke’s CRS loss, and also
    as rebuttal to Bell’s "absence of accidents" contention in its opening
    statement to the jury.
    Bell asserted that the Marine Corps’ failure to dimensionally
    inspect the Yoke following the Towing Incident ultimately caused the
    fatal crash. Mrs. Edwards maintains that the YFS evidence should
    have been admitted because, even if the Towing Incident caused the
    Yoke’s CRS loss, the process of installing the YFS on the AH-1W
    helicopters would have led the Marine Corps to detect the Yoke’s
    CRS loss, and thus would have prevented the fatal crash. Mrs.
    Edwards contends that Bell also "opened the door" to admission of
    the YFS evidence by asserting to the jury that, aside from the Yoke
    on the Edwards Helicopter, no AH-1W or 214ST tail rotor yoke had
    ever failed. In particular, she asserts that information regarding Bell’s
    12              EDWARDS v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON
    recommendation to the Marine Corps that it install YFSs, in conjunc-
    tion with the evidence of Bell’s recommendations that historical
    record review and dimensional inspections be conducted on all AH-
    1W tail rotor yokes, would have shown the jury why there had not
    been a greater number of failed tail rotor yokes. By denying her the
    opportunity to present the YFS evidence, Mrs. Edwards maintains, the
    court prevented her from countering Bell’s assault on her theory that
    the AH-1W helicopters were unreasonably susceptible to metal
    fatigue.
    The court, however, admitted evidence of certain aspects of the
    YFS installation process that were relevant for rebuttal purposes. The
    MAB made three recommendations for all AH-1W tail rotor yokes:
    (1) historical record review; (2) dimensional inspections; and (3)
    installation of YFSs. The Redacted MAB contained only two of the
    three recommendations, i.e., historical record review and dimensional
    inspections. In the context of this case, those two recommendations,
    rather than the redacted recommendation of YFS installation, consti-
    tuted the relevant part of the MAB. The historical record review and
    the dimensional inspection of the tail rotor yokes, even if the Towing
    Incident caused the fatal CRS loss, are the only two recommendations
    which might have enabled the Marine Corps to detect such loss.
    Those recommendations, contained in the Redacted MAB, provided
    the jury with a possible explanation for the dearth of failed tail rotor
    yokes following the crash of the Edwards Helicopter. Because the rel-
    evant aspects of the MAB were admitted into evidence, we are unable
    to conclude that the court abused its discretion in excluding the YFS
    evidence for rebuttal purposes.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.
    AFFIRMED