United States v. Brown , 359 F. App'x 419 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5006
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WALLACE BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:07-cr-00437-CCB-1)
Submitted: November 24, 2009 Decided: January 4, 2010
Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Allen H. Orenberg, THE ORENBERG LAW FIRM, P.C., North Bethesda,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Mushtaq Z. Gunja, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Wallace Brown appeals from his convictions for two
counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On
appeal, Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his jury convictions and the denial of his motion to
suppress. We affirm.
To establish a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2006), the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant: (1) knowingly; (2) possessed a narcotic
controlled substance; (3) with the intent to distribute it. See
United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 209 (4th Cir. 1999). A
defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence “bears a
heavy burden.” United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067
(4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n
appellate court’s reversal of a conviction on grounds of
insufficient evidence should be confined to cases where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Jones, 735
F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
With regard to the charge arising from the cocaine
sale at Tivoly Avenue, Brown contends that the evidence was
insufficient because he provided alibi evidence and evidence
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regarding a potential police motive for fabricating evidence. *
However, the jury was free to reject Brown’s alibi evidence and
allegations of police misconduct. In convicting Brown, the jury
plainly credited the testimony of the officers, and we do not
review the jury’s credibility determinations on appeal. See
United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 283 (4th Cir. 2007).
Turning to the charge arising from the cocaine found
in Brown’s apartment, Brown asserts that his testimony
contradicted that of the police officers. However, again, we do
not review the credibility of the witnesses, and we “must assume
that the jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in favor
of the Government.” United States v. United Med. & Surgical
Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390 (4th Cir. 1993).
Finally, Brown contends that, even assuming the
cocaine in the apartment belonged to him, there was insufficient
evidence of his intent to distribute. However, we conclude that
the drug paraphernalia found in Brown’s apartment, the weight of
the drugs, and the fact that officers observed Brown conducting
a drug deal provided more than sufficient evidence to satisfy
the Government’s burden of proving intent to distribute. See
United States v. Fisher, 912 F.2d 728, 729-31 (4th Cir. 1990)
*
Brown also asserts that the officers’ testimony conflicted
regarding the timeline of events. However, a review of the
record does not show a concrete conflict.
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(finding sufficient evidence of possession with intent to
distribute 1.52 grams of cocaine where cocaine was packaged for
individual sale and was found in proximity to firearms).
Accordingly, the Government’s evidence was sufficient to support
the jury’s guilty verdict on both counts.
Next, Brown asserts that the district court committed
clear error in preferring the police officer’s testimony to
Brown’s at the hearing on the motion to suppress. At the
hearing, the district court was faced with a credibility
question--the officer testified that he witnessed Brown conduct
a drug deal, and Brown testified that he was not there. The
officer’s testimony was corroborated by the cocaine found in the
buyer’s possession, as well as the cocaine found in Brown’s
apartment and the currency found in Brown’s car.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we
“particularly defer to a district court’s credibility
determinations, for it is the role of the district court to
observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial
motion to suppress.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210,
232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009). When the district court has
denied a suppression motion, we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Government. See United States v. Neely,
564 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 2009). Viewing the evidence under
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this standard, there was no clear error in the district court’s
credibility determination. Accordingly, Brown’s challenge to
the denial of his motion to suppress is without merit.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Brown’s convictions.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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