United States v. Jones ( 2004 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4050
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TYRELLE DEYON JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior
District Judge. (CR-03-69)
Submitted: June 9, 2004 Decided: June 30, 2004
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Harry D. Harmon, Jr., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J.
McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J. Elston, Janet S.
Reincke, Assistant United States Attorneys, Newport News, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Tyrelle Deyon Jones appeals his convictions of one count
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2000), and four counts of distribution of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. We affirm.
Jones first argues that the district court erred in
denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motions for judgment of acquittal
because the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s
verdict. A jury’s verdict must be upheld on appeal if there is
substantial evidence in the record to support it. Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In determining whether the
evidence in the record is substantial, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government, and inquire whether there
is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d
849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidence, we do not review the credibility of the witnesses,
and assume that the jury resolved all contradictions in the
testimony in favor of the Government. United States v. Romer, 148
F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998). Our review of the record in this
case convinces us that the evidence was sufficient to support
Jones’ convictions.
- 2 -
Jones next argues that the district court erred in
denying his motions to withdraw his not guilty plea, to order the
Government to withdraw its notice of prior convictions for
sentencing enhancement, and to vacate the jury’s verdict. Jones
entered into a plea agreement with the Government in which he
agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy count, and the Government
agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. At the plea hearing,
however, Jones maintained his innocence, and attempted to enter an
Alford* plea. The Government refused to accept that plea under the
terms of the plea agreement, and Jones was convicted after a jury
trial. Jones essentially asserts that because an Alford plea is a
permissible form of a guilty plea, the district court erred in
refusing to accept the plea and subsequently denying his post-trial
motions to resurrect his guilty plea and plea agreement. We find
this argument without merit.
Jones does not allege, and the record does not indicate,
any improper motive on the part of the Government in its refusal to
accept an Alford plea. See generally Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439
U.S. 212, 218-26 (1978) (discussing plea bargaining and permissible
use of sentencing leniency); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
363-65 (1978) (same). Moreover, Jones has no constitutional right
to plead guilty, or to require the court to accept an Alford plea.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); North Carolina v.
*
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
- 3 -
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970). We conclude that, because the
Government was completely within its rights to refuse an Alford
plea in satisfaction of the plea agreement, and Jones persisted in
his refusal to admit his guilt, the district court correctly
rejected Jones’ attempted plea and tried the case.
Accordingly, we affirm Jones’ convictions and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 4 -