United States v. Kamoru , 320 F. App'x 199 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4320
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
OLUGBENGA KAMORU,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:07-cr-00231-AW-1)
Submitted: March 18, 2009 Decided: April 10, 2009
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher M. Davis, Mary E. Davis, DAVIS & DAVIS, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
Jonathan C. Su, James A. Crowell, IV, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Olugbenga Kamoru appeals from his convictions for bank
fraud and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344and 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). On appeal, Kamoru challenges the
district court’s decision to admit a letter from his attorney
into evidence and contends the district court’s answer to the
jury’s question regarding the jury instructions was incomplete.
“A district court’s evidentiary rulings are entitled
to substantial deference and will not be reversed absent a clear
abuse of discretion.” United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 974
(4th Cir. 1994). This court “will find that discretion to have
been abused only when the district court acted ‘arbitrarily or
irrationally.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d
1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993)).
“Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence
‘may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’” United
States v. Myers, 280 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2002). “Because
the evidence sought to be excluded under Rule 403 is concededly
probative, the balance under Rule 403 should be struck in favor
of admissibility, and evidence should be excluded only
sparingly.” United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th
Cir. 1996). Rule 403 requires excluding evidence “only in those
instances where the trial judge believes that there is a genuine
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risk that the emotions of the jury will be excited to irrational
behavior, and that this risk is disproportionate to the
probative value of the offered evidence.” United States v. Van
Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 350 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
omitted).
In our review, we “must look at the evidence in a
light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative
value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” United States v.
Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
omitted). Applying these standards, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
letter into evidence.
Kamoru next argues the district court erred by
insufficiently answering a question from the jury. He believes
the district court should have provided further instruction
regarding the unanimity requirement. We review a district
court’s decision to respond to a jury’s question, and the form
of that response, for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1995). “[I]n responding to a
jury’s request for clarification on a charge, the district
court’s duty is simply to respond to the jury’s apparent source
of confusion fairly and accurately without creating prejudice.”
Id. Our review of the jury’s question, the argument of counsel,
and the court’s response convinces us that the district court
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responded fairly and accurately, and thus did not abuse its
discretion in answering the jury’s question.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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