Tuan Dong Yong v. Gonzales , 158 F. App'x 403 ( 2005 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 04-2525
    TUAN DONG YONG,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals. (A77-641-908)
    Submitted:   October 26, 2005            Decided:   November 21, 2005
    Before WIDENER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Hanbin Wang, New York, New York, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler,
    Assistant Attorney General, M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Dennis J.
    Dimsey, Lisa Wilson Edwards, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Tuan Dong Yong, a native and citizen of the People’s
    Republic of China (“PRC”), petitions for review of an order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirming the immigration
    judge's order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
    We deny the petition for review.
    Yong does not challenge the immigration judge’s denial of
    his asylum application as untimely. See United States v. Al-Hamdi,
    
    356 F.3d 564
    , 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that issue not
    raised on appeal is waived); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 
    178 F.3d 231
    , 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).    Yong’s appeal is therefore
    limited to the denial of his application for withholding of removal
    and protection under the CAT.
    To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an
    alien must show a clear probability that if he was removed to his
    native country, his “life or freedom would be threatened” on a
    protected ground.   
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(A) (2000); see Camara v.
    Ashcroft, 
    378 F.3d 361
    , 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A “clear probability”
    means it is more likely than not the alien would be subject to
    persecution.   INS v. Stevic, 
    467 U.S. 407
    , 429-30 (1984).    “The
    burden of proof is on the applicant for withholding of removal
    . . . to establish that his or her life or freedom would be
    threatened in the proposed country of removal” on account of a
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    protected ground.    
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b) (2005).       A showing of past
    threat to life or freedom on such a ground creates a rebuttable
    presumption that the threat would recur upon removal.             
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(1)(i); Camara, 
    378 F.3d at 370
    .               Withholding of
    removal is mandatory if the alien meets the standard of proof.
    Stevic, 
    467 U.S. at 429-30
    .
    Furthermore,   to   qualify    for   protection     under   the
    Convention Against Torture, a petitioner bears the burden of
    demonstrating that “it is more likely than not that he or she would
    be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (c)(2) (2005).      “[An] applicant need not prove the
    reason for the torture, nor that she has a well-founded fear of it
    . . .   .”    Camara, 
    378 F.3d at 371
    .
    We find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s
    ruling that Yong failed to prove he is eligible for mandatory
    withholding of removal or protection under the CAT, and Yong fails
    to show that his evidence compels a contrary result.           For example,
    Yong claimed his wife had a forced abortion, but the abortion
    certificate submitted to corroborate that claim establishes only
    that his wife had an abortion, not that it was forced.            Moreover,
    Yong    submitted   no   declaration   or    affidavit    from    his    wife
    corroborating his story and the circumstances of his departure.
    Nor were any similar statements provided by Yong’s parents, with
    whom Yong, his wife, and his son apparently live.         The immigration
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    judge    properly   concluded    that    this   corroborating       evidence   is
    available and should have been submitted by Yong.
    The immigration judge also had before him the State
    Department’s 2002 Country Report for China.                  The 2002 Report
    reflects that in September 2002, following Yong’s wife’s alleged
    forced abortion in 1999, the PRC enacted a new law that prohibited
    forced abortions and sterilizations.             Under the new law, local
    officials are prohibited from employing forced procedures, and
    instead,    administer   their    population     control    policies    through
    “education, propaganda, and economic incentives.”               We therefore
    find that Yong has not shown that it is more likely than not that
    he will be sterilized now.       Even if Yong is subjected to additional
    fines,    such   fines   in   and   of    themselves   do     not    constitute
    persecution.     Chen v. INS, 
    195 F.3d 198
    , 204-05 (4th Cir. 1999).
    Yong counters that the immigration judge’s ruling was the
    result of ineffective assistance of counsel.               To properly allege
    such a claim, a petitioner must submit an affidavit setting forth
    the relevant facts in detail, including the agreement that was
    entered into with former counsel with respect to the actions to be
    taken and what counsel did or did not represent to the alien in
    this regard.     See Matter of Lozada, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 637
    , 639 (BIA
    1988).     In addition, before allegations of ineffective assistance
    are presented to the Board, former counsel must be informed of the
    allegations and allowed an opportunity to respond.                    Counsel’s
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    response or his failure or refusal to respond should be submitted
    with the motion.     If the alien asserts that prior counsel’s
    handling of his case involved a violation of ethical or legal
    responsibilities, “the motion should reflect whether a complaint
    has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities regarding
    such representation, and if not, why not.”      
    Id.
       Finally, a movant
    must show prejudice as a result of the alleged ineffectiveness.
    Rusu v. INS, 
    296 F.3d 316
    , 324 (4th Cir. 2002).       We need not decide
    if Lozada’s requirements were satisfied because even assuming that
    they were, we would nevertheless conclude that Yong’s claim is
    meritless, as, based on the 2002 Report, Yong fails to demonstrate
    that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s actions.
    Accordingly,   we   deny   the   petition   for   review.   We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED
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