United States v. Pyne , 175 F. App'x 639 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4011
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHARLES PYNE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-04-18-AW)
Submitted: March 3, 2006 Decided: April 25, 2006
Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Francis A. Pommett, III, LAW OFFICES OF NATHANSON & POMMETT, P.C.,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Daphene R. McFerren, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Charles Kehinde Pyne was convicted of one count of
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
heroin and one count of possession with intent to distribute
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1); 846 (2000). Pyne
was sentenced to imprisonment for 144 months. We find no error and
affirm Pyne’s convictions and sentence.
Pyne contends that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. He maintains that his apartment complex’s
parking garage was curtilage, thereby requiring the Government to
obtain either a search warrant or his consent prior to searching
it.
We review the factual findings underlying the denial of
a motion to suppress for clear error and the legal conclusions de
novo. United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134 (2005). The evidence is construed in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. United
States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
The Fourth Amendment protects a residence’s curtilage if
“the area harbors the intimate activity associated with the
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (internal quotations
omitted). In determining whether curtilage rises to this level, we
consider “‘the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the
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home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding
the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the
steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
people passing by.’” United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 435
(4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301).
The parking garage at issue was used by other tenants,
contained multiple parking spaces, and was located at the bottom
level of a multi-level apartment complex. Though the garage had a
security gate, uncontroverted testimony established that it was, at
best, unreliable. Under these facts, we conclude the district
court did not clearly err in its determination that the parking
garage was not curtilage subject to Fourth Amendment protections.
See United States v. Stanley, 597 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1979)
(holding that a common area parking lot was not within the
curtilage of a mobile home).
Additionally, Pyne argues that the officer’s use of a
drug detection canine was a warrantless search requiring
suppression of the evidence. The Fourth Amendment is not
implicated when Government action does not “compromise any
legitimate interest in privacy.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 408 (2005). Because “any interest in possessing contraband
cannot be deemed legitimate, . . . governmental conduct that only
reveals the possession of contraband compromises no legitimate
privacy interest.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Law
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enforcement officers, who were properly in the complex’s parking
garage, performed a canine scan of a vacant, parked vehicle. Due
to their surveillance, officers had a reasonable suspicion to
believe that the vehicle contained contraband substances. Once the
canine alerted to the vehicle, officers obtained a search warrant.
In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the canine search
was proper as the protections of the Fourth Amendment were not
implicated. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying
Pyne’s motion to suppress.
Pyne also contends the district court improperly denied
a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In order
to establish that a Franks hearing is warranted, a defendant must
show “(1) ‘that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant
in the warrant affidavit,’ and (2) that the statement was necessary
to the finding of probable cause.” United States v. Jeffus, 22
F.3d 554, 558 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72).
“This showing must be more than conclusory and must be accompanied
by a detailed offer of proof.” United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d
297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted).
Pyne has failed to meet this burden. His statements are
conclusory and fail to demonstrate that the challenged portions of
the affidavit are anything more than the result of negligence or
innocent mistake. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 (a challenger’s
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attack must be more than conclusory and allegations of negligence
or innocent mistake are insufficient). Therefore, the district
court properly denied Pyne’s motion for a Franks hearing.
Accordingly, we deny Pyne’s motions to file a pro se
supplemental brief and for correction of alleged errors and
omissions in the district court’s docket report and affirm the
convictions and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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