United States v. Barnhart ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4938
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
KEITH RAMSEY BARNHART,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (CR-03-222)
Submitted: July 31, 2006 Decided: September 6, 2006
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marshall A. Swann, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy
Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Keith Ramsey Barnhart pled guilty to possession of a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(I) (2000) (Count Two), and possession of a
firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2000) (Count Three). The district court
sentenced Barnhart to 222 months’ imprisonment, consisting of a
102-month sentence on the § 924(c) offense, and a consecutive 120-
month term on the § 922(g) offense.
Barnhart’s attorney filed an Anders1 brief, arguing that
Barnhart is entitled to specific performance by the Government of
its agreement to make a motion for downward departure.2 Barnhart
signed a plea agreement containing the following provisions:
23. When and if the defendant assists the
government as described above:
a. The United States, in its sole
discretion, will determine whether
said assistance has been
substantial.
b. Upon a determination that the
defendant has rendered substantial
1
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2
Barnhart’s attorney also argues that the waiver in the plea
agreement does not preclude his appeal that the Government breached
its agreement to file a substantial assistance motion. Because the
Government has not relied on the waiver provision to assert that
appellate review is precluded, the argument raised by Barnhart’s
counsel need not be addressed. See United States v. Blick, 408
F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Brock, 211
F.3d 88, 90 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000)).
- 2 -
assistance, the government may make
a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 5K1.1 for imposition of a sentence
below the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines. The United States may
also, within its sole discretion,
move the Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) to impose a sentence below
any applicable statutory mandatory
minimum.
24. The defendant understands that if he . . .
violates any federal, state, or local law, or
any order of any court, including any
condition of pre-trial or pre-sentence, or
post-sentence release, the United States will
be relieved of its obligation under this Plea
Agreement, but the defendant will not be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
First, we note that the plea agreement unambiguously
provides that the decision whether to file a departure motion was
within the Government’s discretion, and Barnhart does not allege
that the refusal to so move was based on an improper motive, such
as racial or religious animus. See United States v. Butler, 272
F.3d 683, 686-88 (4th Cir. 2001). Moreover, after he signed the
plea agreement, Barnhart tested positive for illegal drugs, freeing
the Government from any obligation it had under the plea agreement.
Thus, the issue is without merit.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Barnhart asserts that
his guilty plea was not voluntary because during the plea hearing,
he was led to believe his sentences for the § 922(g) offense and
the § 924(c) offense would run concurrently. As Barnhart suggests,
- 3 -
the magistrate judge3 appeared to accede to counsel’s suggestion
that the sentences would be concurrent, when, by statute, the
sentence on the § 924(c) count was required to run consecutively to
any other sentence imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii).4
Because Barnhart did not object or seek to withdraw his
guilty plea on the basis of this error, this court’s review is for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 527 (4th
Cir. 2002). Under plain error review, this court may notice an
error that was not preserved by timely objection only if the
defendant can demonstrate that: (1) there was error; (2) it was
plain; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial
rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). Even
when these three conditions are satisfied, this court may exercise
its discretion to notice the error only if the error “seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the error here did not rise to the level
of reversible “plain error” because it did not impact Barnhart’s
substantial rights. An error is substantial if it was so
3
The plea hearing was conducted by the magistrate judge with
Barnhart’s consent. See United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281,
288 (4th Cir. 2003).
4
We note that in all other respects, the magistrate judge
properly advised Barnhart and informed him of the charges against
him, the rights he was foregoing by pleading guilty, and the
penalties for the offenses.
- 4 -
prejudicial as to affect the outcome of the proceedings. Id.;
Martinez, 277 F.3d at 532. In the guilty plea context, to prove
that an error is substantial, the defendant must show that, but for
the error, he would not have pled guilty. Martinez, 277 F.3d at
532. Barnhart signed a plea agreement that stated with regard to
each count that the sentence would be consecutive to any other
sentence. Both the magistrate judge and the plea agreement also
stated that the maximum penalty for Count Two was life
imprisonment, which is far below the sentence Barnhart ultimately
received. Any confusion that may have resulted from the
misstatement in the Rule 11 hearing did not prejudice Barnhart.
Barnhart next claims his counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate his mental health before advising him to
plead guilty, and he states that he was taking several prescription
drugs at the time of the offense and guilty plea hearing.
Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not
cognizable on direct appeal. To allow for adequate development of
a record, a defendant must bring his claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255(2000) motion, unless the record conclusively establishes
ineffective assistance. United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192,
198 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th
Cir. 1997). Because the present record does not conclusively
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Barnhart’s claim is
not cognizable on direct appeal.
- 5 -
Barnhart also claims that he should not have been
convicted of the § 924(c) offense when he did not plead guilty to
the underlying drug offense. However, “a defendant’s conviction
under § 924(c) ‘does not depend on his being convicted--either
previously or contemporaneously--of the predicate offense, as long
as all of the elements of that offense are proved and found beyond
a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Hopkins, 310 F.3d 145, 152
(4th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 466
(4th Cir. 1997)). Barnhart’s guilty plea to the § 924(c) offense
constituted an admission of all material elements of the crime.
See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1969); United
States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993) (“A knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea to an offense conclusively
establishes the elements of the offense and the material facts
necessary to support the conviction.”). Thus, Barnhart has failed
to establish plain error in the taking of his plea.
Similarly, Barnhart challenges the factual basis for his
guilty plea to Count Two. Specifically, he argues that he did not
actively use a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking under
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Again, because
Barnhart voluntarily entered a guilty plea, his claims are waived.
Willis, 992 F.2d at 490.
Pursuant to Anders, we have examined the entire record
and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm
- 6 -
the judgment of the district court. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decision process.
AFFIRMED
- 7 -