United States v. Schoolfield , 282 F. App'x 274 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4162
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CURTIS L. SCHOOLFIELD, a/k/a Smoosh,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:07-cr-00103-JFM-1)
Submitted: June 19, 2008 Decided: June 24, 2008
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dwight E. Crawley, LAW OFFICES OF DWIGHT E. CRAWLEY, Arlington,
Virginia, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
Gregory Welsh, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Curtis L. Schoolfield was convicted
of various crack cocaine offenses. On appeal, Schoolfield
challenges the sufficiency of Alfonso Harmon’s identification
evidence at trial. Harmon testified that he purchased drugs from
Schoolfield in controlled buys on three occasions. Harmon spoke
with Schoolfield on the phone to arrange the purchases, and
Schoolfield then sent others to deliver the drugs and take Harmon’s
money.
Schoolfield argues first that Harmon’s voice
identification failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of
Evidence 901(b)(5). However, all that is required under the Rule
is that the witness have “minimal familiarity” with the speaker’s
voice; once minimal familiarity is satisfied, it is for the jury to
assess any issues regarding the extent of the witness’s familiarity
with the voice. See United States v. Bush, 405 F.3d 909, 919 (10th
Cir. 2005). Here, Harmon testified that he had known Schoolfield
for several years, through family members and from seeing him
around the neighborhood, and had spoken personally with him on at
least three or four occasions. This evidence laid the proper
foundation for Harmon’s familiarity with Schoolfield’s voice, and
the admission of his identification testimony was therefore proper.
Schoolfield next argues that, because the only evidence
against him was Harmon’s identification, the evidence was
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insufficient to support his conviction. In evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence, we do not “weigh the evidence or
review the credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. Wilson,
118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997). We will uphold a jury’s verdict
if there is substantial evidence to support it, and will reverse
only in those rare cases “where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.” United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir.
1997).
Here, Harmon identified Schoolfield as the person who
brokered the drug sales. In addition, circumstantial evidence
corroborated Harmon’s testimony. The people who conducted the
actual drug sales were all individuals with whom Schoolfield was
closely associated, including his own mother. Further, phone
records were admitted at trial showing that one of the cell phones
used to broker and make the transactions was subscribed in a third
party’s name at an address where Schoolfield’s grandmother and aunt
lived and where Schoolfield had been observed on numerous
occasions. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support
Schoolfield’s convictions. See United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d
1185, 1190 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that uncorroborated testimony
of one witness may be sufficient to sustain a conviction).
Accordingly, we affirm Schoolfield’s convictions. We
deny Schoolfield’s attorney’s motion to withdraw. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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