United States v. Taylor ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4488
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM BILLY TAYLOR,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas David
Schroeder, District Judge. (1:08-cr-00211-TDS-1)
Submitted: December 14, 2009 Decided: January 15, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Billy Taylor pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of possession with the intent to
distribute 20.1 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006), and one count of possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006). The district court
calculated Taylor’s advisory Guidelines’ imprisonment range
under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2008) at 308 to 355
months, but granted Taylor’s request for a downward variance and
imposed a sentence of 170 months’ imprisonment on the cocaine
base possession count and a consecutive sentence of 120 months’
imprisonment on the § 924(c) count, for a total imprisonment
term of 290 months.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but suggesting that Taylor’s
sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to
satisfy the sentencing factors at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
Taylor has filed a pro se supplemental brief. The Government
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has declined to file a brief and does not seek to enforce the
plea agreement’s appeal waiver. * We affirm.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
review. Our review of the transcript of the plea hearing leads
us to conclude that the district court substantially complied
with the mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Taylor’s
guilty plea and that Taylor’s substantial rights were not
infringed. Critically, the transcript reveals that the district
court ensured the plea was supported by an independent factual
basis and that Taylor entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily
with an understanding of the consequences. See United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Turning to Taylor’s sentence, we review it for
reasonableness, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In conducting
this review, we first examine the sentence for “significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)
*
Taylor waived his right to appeal his sentence in the plea
agreement. Because the Government fails to assert the waiver as
a bar to the appeal, however, we may consider the issue raised
in the Anders brief and conduct an Anders review. See United
States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007).
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factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id.When “rendering a sentence, the district court must make an
individualized assessment based on the facts presented,”
applying the “relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific
circumstances” of the case and the defendant, and “must state in
open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen
sentence.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
If the sentence is free from procedural error, we then
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall,
552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 476 (2008). “Substantive
reasonableness review entails taking into account the ‘totality
of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from
the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468,
473 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Even if we
would have imposed a different sentence, this fact alone is
“insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Id.
at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court correctly calculated the
advisory Guidelines range and heard argument from the parties on
the appropriate sentence and allocution from Taylor. The court
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considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, addressing on the
record the nature and circumstances of the offense, Taylor’s
history and characteristics, and the need for the sentence to
reflect the seriousness of Taylor’s offenses, promote respect
for the law, provide just punishment, deter Taylor, and protect
the public. In granting Taylor’s request for a downward
variance, the court explained that it considered the need to
avoid unwanted sentencing disparities. Based on these factors,
the court concluded that a sentence of 170 months’ imprisonment
on the cocaine base count was sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to achieve the purposes of sentencing. We conclude
that the district court adequately explained its rationale for
imposing the variant sentence and that the reasons relied upon
by the district court are valid considerations under § 3553(a)
and justify the sentence imposed. See Pauley, 511 F.3d at
473-76.
Further, Taylor was sentenced to the
statutorily-mandated minimum term of 120 months’ imprisonment on
his § 924(c) conviction, and the district court was obligated to
run that sentence consecutive to the sentence imposed for
Taylor’s cocaine base possession conviction. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c). This sentence is also reasonable. See United
States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir.) (“A statutorily
required sentence . . . is per se reasonable.”), cert. denied,
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129 S. Ct. 743 (2008). Thus, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Taylor.
Finally, we conclude Taylor’s pro se supplemental brief raises
no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Taylor, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Taylor requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Taylor.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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