United States v. Coxton ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4239
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DION MONTREAL COXTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J.
Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:04-cr-00248)
Submitted: October 20, 2008 Decided: November 19, 2008
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dion Montreal Coxton was convicted of: possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon; possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana; and using or
carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense. He was
sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 150 months. Coxton now
appeals. His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising one issue but stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Coxton has
filed a pro se brief raising additional issues. We affirm.
In the Anders brief, counsel argues that the district
court improperly denied Coxton’s motion to suppress statements
made to the police because Coxton received inadequate warnings
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When considering
a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the
court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481
(4th Cir. 2008).
Here, the court found that Coxton was properly advised
of his Miranda rights on March 11, 2004, and was advised the
following day that he “still had Miranda rights.” These
findings are not clearly erroneous. They are supported by the
testimony of Detective Paul Conner and Officer Scott Sherwood,
which the court credited over Coxton’s testimony. Further, we
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find no infirmity in the court’s legal conclusion that Coxton
voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his rights
prior to making a statement on March 12. Notably, he was
reminded that the Miranda warnings administered twelve hours
earlier still applied, the same detective questioned Coxton on
March 11 and March 12, Coxton did not hesitate to make his
statement, and there were no unusually intimidating or coercive
circumstances involved. Cf. United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d
241, 244-47 (3rd Cir. 2005).
The claims raised in Coxton’s pro se brief lack merit.
First, his claim that counsel was ineffective is not cognizable
on direct appeal because ineffectiveness does not conclusively
appear on the face of the record. He should raise this claim,
if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. See United
States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999).
Second, we discern no plain error in a license checkpoint. See
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-43 (1993) (stating
standard of review); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32, 37-38 (2000) (“roadblock with the purpose of verifying
drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations would be
permissible”).
We have examined the entire record in this case in
accordance with the requirements of Anders, and we find no
meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm. This
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court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw
from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of
the motion was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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