United States v. Wilkins , 354 F. App'x 748 ( 2009 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-4372
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    ANTHONY WILKINS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 08-4633
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    KENNETH HOWARD,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    No. 08-4635
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    PIERRE GENTRY,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
    of South Carolina, at Spartanburg.    Henry F. Floyd, District
    Judge.     (7:07-cr-00294-HFF-6; 7:07-cr-00294-HFF-7; 7:07-cr-
    00294-HFF-9)
    Argued:   October 29, 2009                Decided:   December 4, 2009
    Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and Anthony J. TRENGA,
    United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
    Virginia, sitting by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: Joseph Bradley Bennett, SALVINI & BENNETT, LLC,
    Greenville, South Carolina; Jeffrey Falkner Wilkes, Greenville,
    South Carolina; Cameron Boggs, BOGGS LAW FIRM, Greenville, South
    Carolina, for Appellants.    William J. Watkins, Jr., OFFICE OF
    THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for
    Appellee.   ON BRIEF: Jessica Salvini, SALVINI & BENNETT, LLC,
    Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant Anthony Wilkins.    W.
    Walter   Wilkins,  United   States   Attorney,  Columbia,  South
    Carolina, Regan A. Pendleton, Assistant United States Attorney,
    OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellants       Anthony   Wilkins,       Kenneth      Howard,      and     Pierre
    Gentry (collectively, the “defendants”) appeal from their jury
    convictions in the District of South Carolina for being involved
    in    a   wide-ranging        cocaine     and    cocaine      base       distribution
    conspiracy, in contravention of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    .                     The defendants
    challenge their convictions on multiple grounds, and Gentry also
    contests his sentence.           More specifically, Wilkins and Gentry
    assert    that   the    district       court    erred   in    denying      (1)     their
    motions for judgments of acquittal on statute of limitations
    grounds, (2) the request for a multiple conspiracy instruction,
    and (3) their motion for a mistrial due to prejudicial security
    measures at the courthouse.             Gentry also contests an evidentiary
    ruling made by the trial court on a coconspirator’s statement
    and the court’s attribution of a single criminal history point
    for a prior marijuana possession conviction.                        Finally, Howard
    pursues     an   ineffective       assistance      of     counsel        claim.       As
    explained    below,     we    reject    the    defendants’     various      appellate
    contentions and affirm the judgments.
    I.
    A.
    On March 14, 2007, a group of twenty individuals, including
    the   defendants,      were    charged    in    Count   One    of    a    three-count
    3
    indictment         with   conspiracy   to   distribute   cocaine     and   cocaine
    base       (also    known   as   “crack”). 1     On   January   7,    2008,   the
    defendants went to trial in Spartanburg, South Carolina, for
    this offense, of which they were convicted three days later.
    The verdict attributed sixty-five kilograms of cocaine but no
    crack to Wilkins; 296 kilograms of cocaine and fifteen ounces of
    crack to Gentry; and 132 kilograms of cocaine but no crack to
    Howard.       On the basis of their convictions, Wilkins, Gentry, and
    Howard were sentenced, respectively, to 240, 360, and 253 months
    in custody, plus five years of supervised release.
    1
    More specifically, the allegations of the conspiracy in
    Count One of the indictment included the following:
    [B]eginning at least on or about August 1, 2000, and
    continuing thereafter, up to and including the date of
    this Indictment, in the District of South Carolina and
    elsewhere, the Defendants, FNU LNU, a/k/a “Little
    Joe,” SCOTT MOSLEY, CHARLES REED, a/k/a “Milton
    Dixon,” ERIC JENKINS, MARCUS CHAMBERLAIN, ANTHONY
    WILKINS,   KENNETH  HOWARD,  ELIZANDRO  MARTELL-PONCE,
    a/k/a “Alex,” PIERRE GENTRY, NATHANIEL HARRIS, JIMMY
    HALL, DERRICK SIMMONS, ERIC JONES, LONDON ANDERSON,
    JERRY SIMPSON, DANIEL GREGORY, DALLAS SAMUEL, TRAVIS
    WILSON, TRAVIS KENNEDY and LACARLA DAVIS, knowingly
    and intentionally did combine, conspire and agree
    together and have tacit understanding with each other
    and others, known and unknown . . . , to knowingly,
    intentionally and unlawfully possess with intent to
    distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams
    or more of cocaine base (commonly known as “crack”
    cocaine) . . . .
    J.A. 12-13 (emphasis omitted). (Citations herein to “J.A. __”
    refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this
    appeal.)
    
    4 B. 1
    .
    The trial evidence established that the conspiracy involved
    the transportation and distribution of substantial quantities of
    cocaine and crack along the I-85 corridor from Texas to Georgia,
    South Carolina, and North Carolina, with additional drugs being
    shipped from California to South Carolina. 2                    The authorities
    initially learned of this scheme when one of the conspirators,
    Brad       Williams,   came    forward    with    information     concerning      a
    homicide investigation in Spartanburg.               Through their dealings
    with       Williams,    the    Spartanburg       authorities     and    the    FBI
    identified and pursued the conspiracy’s network of drug dealers
    along the I-85 corridor. 3
    At    trial,    the    prosecution     presented   sixteen      witnesses,
    including       five   cooperating       codefendants     and    several      other
    coconspirators, who established the defendants’ involvement in
    2
    We recount the relevant facts in the light most favorable
    to the prosecution, as the prevailing party below.        United
    States v. Bursey, 
    416 F.3d 301
    , 304 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005).
    3
    To facilitate their drug distribution scheme, various
    conspirators from Texas and South Carolina acquired residences
    in Georgia, a convenient location between those states.
    Multiple residences were affordable because, as the sentencing
    court estimated, the drugs involved in the conspiracy had a
    wholesale value of $20 million to $30 million.    Indeed, during
    the conspiracy a kilogram (also known as a “kilo” or a “key”) of
    cocaine sold for between $20,500 and $28,000.
    5
    the charged conspiracy.             Seeking to impeach the credibility of
    prosecution witnesses and denying involvement in the conspiracy,
    the    defense       presented     eight    witnesses,        including         defendants
    Gentry       and     Howard     personally.           The    evidence       revealed      a
    multifaceted         drug     trafficking    scheme,        with    key    participants
    introducing         other    conspirators       to   each   another       and    the   drug
    distribution business.
    By     way    of     example,   defendant        Wilkins      introduced        Brad
    Williams to coconspirators Eric Jenkins and Charles Reed, who
    were       drug    suppliers    from   Texas.         The   first    meeting      between
    Williams and Jenkins occurred in 2000 at one of Wilkins’s homes
    in South Carolina, where Williams was living while evading the
    authorities.          Indeed,     Williams      and    Jenkins      met   when     Jenkins
    delivered two kilograms of cocaine to Wilkins. 4                          From 2000 to
    2002, Williams purchased an estimated 1500 to 1800 kilograms of
    cocaine from the Texas traffickers (Jenkins and Reed) and sold
    at least thirty kilograms of cocaine to Wilkins.                          Additionally,
    Wilkins introduced Williams to Marcus Chamberlain, a drug dealer
    in Charlotte to whom Williams ultimately delivered substantial
    quantities of cocaine.             From 2001 to 2003, Williams fronted at
    least 600 kilograms of cocaine to Chamberlain, who was a charged
    4
    When Williams and Jenkins first met, Jenkins actually
    brought four kilograms of cocaine to Wilkins’s home, splitting
    it evenly between himself and Wilkins.
    6
    coconspirator in the indictment. 5                    Moreover, one of Williams’s
    primary       drug   dealers      in    Spartanburg,         Rashard    McKinney,      sold
    crack to defendant Gentry that he had purchased from Williams.
    At     trial,      Reed   acknowledged        being    “the     one   getting    the
    drugs here . . . to Spartanburg” from Texas.                           J.A. 355. 6     Reed
    had met defendant Wilkins through Wilkins’s cousin, a man named
    D.C. Black.          At their initial meeting, Reed sold Wilkins 250
    grams of cocaine; Reed thereafter ensured that Wilkins received
    cocaine from each of Reed’s drug deliveries to South Carolina
    from Texas, aggregating thirty to thirty-five kilograms by 2002.
    Further, Reed had a residence in Atlanta to which Williams and
    Wilkins travelled to purchase cocaine.
    In addition to introducing defendant Wilkins to Reed, Black
    facilitated several drug deals for Wilkins, including one in May
    2006 involving a confidential informant named Jermaine Monroe.
    Black twice purchased cocaine from his friend defendant Howard,
    with       whom   Black    —     and   other       prosecution   witnesses      —    often
    played cards.          One of the card players was Gary Paden, who Black
    5
    The “fronting” of drugs occurs when a supplier provides
    quantities of drugs to a dealer on consignment, with payment
    being made to the supplier from the proceeds of the dealer’s
    ultimate sales.   See Wolfe v. Johnson, 
    565 F.3d 140
    , 145 (4th
    Cir. 2009).
    6
    Two of Reed’s suppliers, codefendants “Little Joe” and
    Scott      Mosley, were fugitives at the time of the defendants’
    trial.
    7
    had introduced to Howard.          Paden purchased large quantities of
    cocaine from Howard — a quarter to half a kilogram each time —
    once or twice a week for a year.                Paden also purchased drugs
    from    Brad    Williams,      Black,   Monroe,       and,   indirectly,   from
    defendant Gentry, who Paden dealt with through Jermaine Monroe.
    In contrast, from 2001 to 2005, coconspirator Michael Rosenberg
    purchased three to five kilograms of cocaine — a quarter of a
    kilogram at a time — directly from Gentry.
    From 2000 to 2006, coconspirator Daniel Gregory purchased
    one to two kilograms of cocaine per week from defendant Gentry.
    Gregory also had cocaine transactions with coconspirator Eric
    Jones, who Gentry had introduced to drug dealing.                 During a one-
    year   period    ending   in   2006,    Jones    purchased,   sometimes    on   a
    fronting basis, twenty to twenty-five kilograms of cocaine from
    Gentry.         Additionally,      Gentry       was    involved    in   cocaine
    transactions with Terry Feaster, who Gregory had introduced to
    Gentry.     Feaster was also involved in large-quantity cocaine
    transactions with defendant Howard, who Feaster characterized as
    a friend who “had a family member who . . . had the kilos.”
    J.A. 196.      Between 2001 and 2003, Feaster purchased cocaine from
    Howard on about ten occasions, each time acquiring between one
    and two kilograms.          During this period, Howard also rented an
    apartment for Feaster’s use in Spartanburg.
    8
    Of   significance,           defendant       Howard    also     engaged         in   drug
    transactions with a man named V. Wilkins. 7                     Describing Howard as
    merely     one    of   his      “minor       sources”     for   cocaine,         V. Wilkins
    explained, “I never met [Howard].                   I just been to his house and
    on   his   property.”         J.A.    246.         According     to    V. Wilkins,         his
    “middle     man    connection,”          a    man    named      Gregory         McHam,     had
    physically       purchased      the    cocaine       from     Howard.           
    Id.
            More
    specifically, to purchase a kilogram of cocaine from Howard,
    V. Wilkins would give McHam $24,000 in cash; McHam would then
    take V. Wilkins’s and his own money into Howard’s residence in
    Spartanburg and return with two kilograms of cocaine, one for
    V. Wilkins and one for McHam.                      A major portion of the drug
    weight     attributed      to      Howard     by    the     verdict    —    104       of   132
    kilograms — was predicated on V. Wilkins’s testimony.
    2.
    During the trial, the defendants made a variety of motions
    and objections that are relevant to their appellate contentions.
    Defendants       Wilkins     and    Gentry     sought       judgments      of    acquittal,
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, premised upon
    7
    In the record and on appeal, V. Wilkins’s first name is
    generally spelled “Verlantra.”     In a new trial motion and
    supporting affidavit, however, his name is spelled “Velontray.”
    We refer to him as “V. Wilkins.”
    9
    a statute of limitations contention. 8                 Wilkins also requested a
    multiple conspiracy jury instruction.                   Gentry objected to the
    evidentiary    use    of     certain      testimony     from    Feaster,       who   was
    recounting     a    statement      made    to    him   by    Gregory,     under      the
    coconspirator       hearsay      exception      of   Federal    Rule    of     Evidence
    801(d)(2)(E) (the “coconspirator exception”).                     The trial court
    denied these requests and overruled Gentry’s evidence objection.
    3.
    After court recessed on the first day of trial, an incident
    occurred near the Spartanburg courthouse that gives rise to an
    appellate contention pursued by defendants Wilkins and Gentry.
    On that occasion, a disturbance arose “toward the back of the
    [federal]     courthouse.”          J.A.     189.      The     Spartanburg      police
    requested    that    the    prosecutor      notify     the   trial     judge    of   the
    fracas, which apparently involved people yelling and screaming
    at   each   other.         The   prosecutor      informed      the   court      of   the
    incident early on the second day of trial, outside the presence
    of the jury.        In response, the court indicated its awareness of
    the situation and noted that precautions had been taken.                             The
    court then stated from the bench:
    8
    It is somewhat ambiguous whether defendant Gentry actually
    sought judgment of acquittal on the limitations contention. We
    accord him the benefit of doubt, however, and treat such relief
    as having been sought.
    10
    I don’t know whether it pertains to anybody in the
    audience or not, but if it does and if they arrest you
    on federal property, I’ll be dealing with you and not
    some state magistrate, so if you can’t control your
    conduct around here, just go somewhere else, but
    you’re welcome to be here as long as you can behave.
    
    Id.
           After    the   court’s   statement,         the    jury    returned       to    the
    courtroom and the trial proceeded.
    It was later discovered that the disruption had involved
    “members of the defendants’ family,” see J.A. 574, prompting a
    heightened police presence around the courthouse during the jury
    deliberations.           On January 10, 2008, immediately prior to the
    jury retiring to deliberate, several police vehicles, including
    marked and unmarked cars and an unmarked armored truck, arrived
    outside     the    courthouse.          In    addition,        a    police    helicopter
    conducted     flyovers      nearby.          The    police    officers       remained      in
    their vehicles, however, and no juror reported any awareness of
    the heightened security measures.                   Nevertheless, after the jury
    returned its verdicts, the defendants sought a mistrial because
    of these measures.         The court denied the mistrial request.
    4.
    On    January       10,   2008,    the       jury     returned    its    verdicts,
    finding     each    of    the   defendants         guilty    on    Count   One. 9        Soon
    9
    A fourth codefendant, Nathaniel Harris, was tried with the
    defendants, but the jury was initially unable to reach a verdict
    on him.    After returning its verdicts against the defendants,
    the jury resumed deliberations with respect to Harris.        The
    (Continued)
    11
    thereafter, defendant Howard secured a new lawyer, who sought
    post-trial relief for Howard on the basis of newly discovered
    evidence.
    In support of Howard’s motion for a new trial, filed on
    February 26, 2008, he submitted the affidavit of Gregory McHam —
    the    “middle     man   connection”        of     V. Wilkins,       see       J.A.    246    —
    asserting that McHam did not even know V. Wilkins and had never
    purchased     drugs      from   Howard.           In    response,        the    prosecution
    acknowledged that it had not interviewed McHam, but asserted
    that    it   had   provided     McHam’s      identity         to   the    defense       during
    pretrial      discovery       and    that     Howard’s        lawyer       thus       had    the
    opportunity to investigate him.                   The prosecution contended that,
    in any event, Howard failed to show that he would have been
    acquitted by McHam’s testimony, as it would merely impeach that
    of    V. Wilkins.        At   Howard’s      sentencing         hearing     on     April      28,
    2008, the court ruled from the bench that such evidence was “not
    newly    discovered,”         but    was    instead      “available        to     [Howard’s]
    counsel      and   there’s      no    indication         of   the    exercise          of    due
    diligence.”        J.A. 593.         The court thus denied Howard’s motion,
    agreeing      that    the     evidence       was       impeaching        and    “would       not
    necessarily result in an acquittal at trial.”                       
    Id.
    prosecution and Harris then entered into a plea agreement, which
    resolved the trial as to Harris.
    12
    After completion of his Presentence Investigation Report,
    defendant      Gentry     objected        to    its    attribution     of     a    single
    criminal history point, pursuant to Guidelines section 4A1.1(c),
    based    on    his    2003   conviction         in    Maryland   for   possession       of
    marijuana.      Gentry contended that this conviction should instead
    have constituted part of the “instant offense” of conviction,
    under Guidelines section 4A1.2, precluding the attribution of a
    criminal history point.             In Gentry’s sentencing hearing on April
    29, 2008, the court rejected this assertion, finding that “there
    was absolutely no evidence of marijuana use during the course of
    the     conspiracy      by    any     of       the    persons     involved        in   the
    conspiracy.”         J.A. 669.
    5.
    The defendants have each filed a timely notice of appeal,
    and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .                              The
    defendants’ three separate appeals have been consolidated for
    disposition in this Court.
    Defendants Wilkins and Gentry maintain on appeal that the
    district court erred in denying (1) their motions for judgments
    of acquittal on statute of limitations grounds, (2) the request
    for a multiple conspiracy instruction, and (3) their motion for
    a mistrial premised on the heightened security measures during
    the     jury   deliberations.             Gentry      also   appeals    the       court’s
    evidentiary      ruling      on     the    coconspirator         exception    and      the
    13
    court’s attribution of a single criminal history point for his
    2003   marijuana      conviction.       Finally,     defendant    Howard       seeks
    relief   for    the      ineffective    assistance      of   counsel,     premised
    primarily on his trial lawyer’s failure to properly investigate
    the case.
    II.
    We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion for
    judgment of acquittal, recognizing that a guilty verdict must be
    upheld   if    it   is    supported    by    substantial     evidence.      United
    States v. Alerre, 
    430 F.3d 681
    , 693 (4th Cir. 2005).                      We also
    review   de    novo   the   question    of    whether   prosecution      has   been
    pursued in a timely manner, in the context of an applicable
    statute of limitations.         United States v. United Med. & Surgical
    Supply Corp., 
    989 F.2d 1390
    , 1398 (4th Cir. 1993).                       We review
    for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on whether to
    give a proposed jury instruction.               United States v. Abbas, 
    74 F.3d 506
    , 513 (4th Cir. 1996).                We also review for abuse of
    discretion a trial court’s ruling on a mistrial motion, United
    States v. Dorlouis, 
    107 F.3d 248
    , 257 (4th Cir. 1997), as well
    as its evidentiary rulings, United States v. Smith, 
    441 F.3d 254
    , 261 (4th Cir. 2006).         In assessing whether a district court
    has properly applied the Guidelines, we review factual findings
    for clear error.         United States v. Allen, 
    446 F.3d 522
    , 527 (4th
    14
    Cir. 2006).      Finally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
    is cognizable on direct appeal only when the record conclusively
    demonstrates that the defense lawyer failed to provide effective
    representation.        United States v. Benton, 
    523 F.3d 424
    , 435 (4th
    Cir. 2008).
    III.
    A.
    Defendants     Wilkins    and    Gentry    contend     that    the    district
    court should have granted them judgments of acquittal because
    the applicable statute of limitations barred their prosecution.
    The indictment was returned in March 2007, and the applicable
    five-year statute of limitations thus bars the prosecution of
    offenses    that     occurred    prior    to    March    2002.        See    
    18 U.S.C. § 3282
    (a) (providing that “no person shall be prosecuted, tried,
    or   punished    for     any   offense    . . .    unless      the    indictment       is
    [returned]      within    five    years”).         Unfortunately        for       Gentry,
    multiple witnesses confirmed his involvement in very substantial
    drug    transactions     within    five    years    of   the     indictment.         For
    example, Gregory had purchased cocaine from Gentry from 2000 to
    2006, and Jones purchased cocaine from him in both 2005 and
    2006.
    Although the evidence regarding Wilkins’s drug-dealing is
    somewhat more circumscribed — involving conduct prior to 2002
    15
    and then in 2006 — his limitations contention also fails to pass
    legal muster.         In support thereof, Wilkins argues that his 2006
    cocaine transaction with Monroe at Black’s home in Spartanburg
    was an isolated event, distinct from his earlier conspiratorial
    dealings in 2000 and 2001.              Wilkins nevertheless failed to show
    that    he    ever    withdrew   from    the    conspiracy.       And,    under   our
    precedent,
    [o]nce a conspiracy is established . . . it is
    presumed to continue unless or until the defendant
    shows that it was terminated or he withdrew from it.
    A mere cessation of activity in furtherance of the
    conspiracy is insufficient.    The defendant must show
    affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the
    conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably
    calculated to reach his co-conspirators.     The burden
    of proving withdrawal rests on the defendant.
    United       States   v.   Walker,   
    796 F.2d 43
    ,   49   (4th    Cir.   1986)
    (citations omitted).          Simply put, Wilkins presented no evidence
    that he withdrew from the conspiracy or that it ended before
    March 2002. 10
    10
    Generally, pursuant to the continuing offense doctrine,
    only one relevant aspect of a conspiracy need have occurred
    during the limitations period for a prosecution to be timely.
    See Brown v. Elliot, 
    225 U.S. 392
    , 401 (1912).    Since no overt
    acts are required to sustain a conviction for a drug conspiracy
    under 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , see United States v. Shabani, 
    513 U.S. 10
    , 15 (1994), the dispositive consideration for Wilkins’s
    limitations claim is whether he withdrew from the conspiracy or
    the conspiracy ended outside the five-year limitations period.
    See Walker, 
    796 F.2d at 49
    ; see also United States v. Seher, 
    562 F.3d 1344
    , 1364 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The government satisfies the
    requirements of the statute of limitations for a non-overt act
    conspiracy if it alleges and proves that the conspiracy
    (Continued)
    16
    Furthermore,          Wilkins’s        assertion      of    an    isolated     2006
    cocaine transaction — independent of the charged conspiracy —
    is   not     at    all     supported     by   the     record.      The   2006      incident
    involved a monitored transaction between Wilkins and informant
    Monroe at Black’s home.                 Notably, Monroe and Black both had a
    history of involvement in the charged conspiracy:                               Monroe was
    “the first guy [Reed] met” on Reed’s first trip with Jenkins to
    South      Carolina        when   the    Texas      participants     were       seeking   to
    expand their business.               J.A. 356.        Reed met Black on his second
    trip, and Black then introduced Reed to Wilkins, to whom Reed
    sold    cocaine      on     his    subsequent       trips.      Moreover,       Monroe,   in
    agreeing to cooperate against Wilkins, acknowledged to one of
    the officers, “I can’t actually call Mr. Wilkins himself.                                  I
    have    to   go     through       his   cousin      [Black].”      Id.   at     32.    This
    evidence,         viewed    in    the   proper      light,   confirms       a    continuing
    conspiratorial           relationship,        undermining       Wilkins’s       limitations
    contention.         Finally, although Black’s testimony focused on the
    monitored transaction between Wilkins and Monroe, Black further
    acknowledged that (1) he was a drug dealer, (2) he had acquired
    drugs from Wilkins, and (3) people would pay him for the drugs
    and he would “give [the money] to [Wilkins].”                           See id. at 176-
    continued into the                limitations        period.”     (internal      quotation
    marks omitted)).
    17
    77.    Notably, Black used the plural “they” when testifying to
    cocaine deals, further demonstrating that Wilkins’s transaction
    with Monroe was not an isolated event.
    B.
    Defendants      Gentry     and    Wilkins        next      challenge      the   trial
    court’s       denial   of   a    multiple         conspiracy        jury   instruction,
    claiming the ruling constituted reversible error because such an
    instruction could have affected the drug weights attributed to
    them, as well as their limitations claims.                          More particularly,
    Wilkins maintains that the issue of whether he was part of the
    alleged       conspiracy,       rather       than       involved      in      some     other
    conspiracy that terminated in 2001, should have been submitted
    to the jury.           A primary basis for Wilkins’s pursuit of the
    multiple       conspiracy       instruction         was     the     lack   of     evidence
    concerning his participation in the alleged conspiracy from 2002
    to 2006.       Notably, however, Wilkins was incarcerated from 2002
    to    2004.      Wilkins    also    argued         at     trial    that    the    evidence
    actually proved three separate conspiracies:                         one in Texas, one
    in the Carolinas, and one in Georgia.                       On the other hand, the
    prosecution      maintained      that    a    multiple       conspiracy       instruction
    would be confusing and that “if nothing else, [Reed] and Pierre
    Gentry and Mr. Wilkins connect all three of those conspiracies.”
    J.A.   525.      On    appeal,    Wilkins         and     Gentry    maintain      that   two
    separate      conspiracies       were    proven,        separated     by    a    four-year
    18
    period, with the earlier one obtaining cocaine from Texas and
    the later one securing it from California.                               See, e.g., id. at
    195 (discussing Feaster’s method of acquiring cocaine via FedEx
    deliveries from California).
    The     determination        of    whether       multiple         conspiracies      exist
    generally depends upon the overlap of goals, methods, and key
    actors.       See United States v. Nunez, 
    432 F.3d 573
    , 578 (4th Cir.
    2005).        Indeed, as we have recognized, a single conspiracy can
    be comprised of a “loosely-knit association of members linked
    only     by    their     mutual      interest          in    sustaining        the     overall
    enterprise of catering to the ultimate demands of a particular
    drug     consumption         market.”            
    Id.
        (internal          quotation       marks
    omitted).        Moreover, a multiple conspiracy instruction is not
    required unless the evidence shows that a particular defendant
    was involved only in an entirely separate conspiracy, unrelated
    to the conspiracy charged.                  See United States v. Squillacote,
    
    221 F.3d 542
    , 574 (4th Cir. 2000).
    In     this    prosecution,        as     the    trial      court    observed,       “the
    evidence       supports       the    idea        that       this     [was]     one     ongoing
    continuous conspiracy.”                  J.A. 526.          For example, the evidence
    linked the defendants to a single drug consortium, with Feaster
    linked to drug dealings with both Howard and Gentry, Black to
    drug   dealings       with    Howard       and    Wilkins,         and    Williams    to    such
    dealings       with    Gentry   and       Wilkins.          And     there    was     extensive
    19
    evidence that these conspirators, including Wilkins, Black, and
    Gentry, had introduced other participants to each other and the
    drug-dealing business.             We note, as well, that the defendants
    asserted at trial that three conspiracies had been proven, but
    argue   on    appeal   that    two    different   conspiracies   were    shown,
    which confirms the potential merit of the prosecution’s concern
    about juror confusion.         In these circumstances, the trial court
    did not abuse its discretion in declining the request for a
    multiple conspiracy instruction.
    C.
    Defendants Wilkins and Gentry next assert that “an extreme
    police presence during the jury deliberations” unduly influenced
    the jury and requires that their convictions be vacated.                Br. of
    Appellants 19.      They maintain that the jury must have been aware
    of the heightened security measures being undertaken, because a
    window in the jury room overlooked the street where the police
    officers and vehicles were massing, and because a helicopter
    flew over the courthouse.            They contend that the sudden advent
    of such security measures during the trial’s deliberation phase
    necessarily biased the jury by creating the impression that the
    defendants were dangerous.             Accordingly, they assert that the
    trial court erred in denying their request for a mistrial.
    As      the   Supreme     Court     has   observed,   in    the     proper
    circumstances,      even     the    conspicuous   “deployment    of    security
    20
    personnel     in   a    courtroom           during    trial”       is   not      inherently
    prejudicial.         See     Holbrook        v.    Flynn,    
    475 U.S. 560
    ,     568-69
    (1986).     Underlying this rule is the recognition that “society
    has become inured to the presence of armed guards in most public
    places; they are doubtless taken for granted so long as their
    numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular official concern
    or alarm.”     
    Id. at 569
    .           In evaluating this mistrial contention,
    however,    “the     question        must    be    not     whether      jurors    actually
    articulated    a     consciousness           of    some    prejudicial        effect,     but
    rather     whether      an       unacceptable        risk      [was]       presented      of
    impermissible factors coming into play.”                       
    Id. at 570
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted).                   Thus, we must “look at the scene
    presented to jurors and determine whether what they saw was so
    inherently    prejudicial         as   to     pose    an    unacceptable         threat    to
    [the]     defendant’s        right     to    a     fair     trial.”        
    Id. at 572
    .
    Nonetheless, “if the challenged practice is not found inherently
    prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show actual prejudice,
    the inquiry is over.”            
    Id.
    Importantly,          the    heightened         security       measures      occurred
    outside the courthouse and thus would have been visible only
    through a window.            In denying the mistrial request, the trial
    court found, inter alia, that an alleged SWAT van was actually
    an unmarked vehicle resembling an armored car; that the officers
    were in their vehicles rather than milling about on the street;
    21
    and that unmarked cars and those with tinted windows are not
    necessarily suspicion-inducing.                 The court then reasoned that
    these measures, even if seen by the jury, could not have been
    intimidating         since   the   jury,     rather   than     rushing   to   find
    defendant Harris guilty, continued its deliberations on his case
    even    after        delivering    its     verdicts   with     respect   to     the
    defendants.          See supra note 9.          Finally, the court recognized
    that (1) the heightened security measures were necessitated by
    the family members’ actions on the first day of trial; (2) no
    jurors expressed concern over the security measures, which did
    not begin until after the jury was in the courtroom; (3) that
    area of Spartanburg generally has a substantial police presence;
    and (4) there are two courthouses on that particular street, and
    the    marked       Sheriff’s    vehicle    could   readily    be   perceived   as
    connected to the nearby county courthouse.
    In these circumstances, these security measures have not
    been shown to be so inherently prejudicial as to pose a threat
    to a fair trial, and the trial court’s denial of the mistrial
    request was well within its discretion.
    D.
    Defendant Gentry next asserts that the trial court erred in
    admitting       a    statement     by    Gregory    under     the   coconspirator
    exception, which provides that a statement is not hearsay if it
    is offered against a party and was made “by a coconspirator of a
    22
    party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
    Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).                  In pursuing this contention, Gentry
    maintains that the court erred in admitting Feaster’s rendition
    of a statement that Gregory had made to Feaster with respect to
    a cocaine deal.          More specifically, Gentry argues that the court
    erroneously admitted Feaster’s testimony after finding only that
    some drug conspiracy existed, and not first finding that the
    speaker (Gregory) was a coconspirator and that the statement was
    made in furtherance of the charged conspiracy.                             The disputed
    interchange follows:
    [Prosecutor]: What sort of business relationship did
    you develop with Pierre Gentry as far as dope was
    concerned?
    [Feaster]: Well, when [Gregory] got out, he hollered
    at me.   I was — I had some keys.     He called me and
    told me that Pierre wanted to get some, so I —
    J.A.   193-94.       The       heart    of     Gentry’s      contention    is   that      the
    prosecution had not linked Gregory and Gentry as members of the
    alleged     conspiracy         prior     to    the    court’s     admission     of     this
    statement, thereby precluding a determination that Gregory made
    the statement to Feaster in furtherance of the conspiracy.
    In   handling      an    evidentiary          issue    such    as   this,     it   is
    notable     that     a    trial        court     possesses      the    discretion         “to
    conditionally admit co-conspirators’ statements subject to the
    subsequent       satisfaction            of     the     requirements        for      their
    admission.”        United States v. Blevins, 
    960 F.2d 1252
    , 1256 (4th
    23
    Cir. 1992).        Moreover, an appeals court “may affirm a judgment
    where the record reveals that the co-conspirator’s statements
    were plainly admissible, whether or not a detailed rationale for
    admitting the statements has been stated by the trial court.”
    
    Id.
    Put simply, this record provides more than ample support
    for the proposition that the requirements of the coconspirator
    exception     were      satisfied.      First,     when    he    provided      the
    challenged testimony, Feaster had already testified that he met
    defendant Gentry “through a mutual friend . . . Daniel Gregory,”
    who had already been convicted of the conspiracy offense.                      See
    J.A.     192-93.        Second,   Gregory   himself       testified     for    the
    prosecution — acknowledging his own drug dealings with Gentry —
    and was thus subject to cross-examination.             For example, Gregory
    admitted that he “would set up the drug deals and [Gentry] would
    assist [him] on getting [them] accomplished, making drug deals
    go through.”       Id. at 258.       According to Gregory, he introduced
    Feaster to Gentry “so we could establish some drug deals.”                     Id.
    at     262.    Other     coconspirators     also   testified      to    Gentry’s
    participation      in   the   conspiracy.     See,    e.g.,     id.    at   271-72
    (Jones); id. at 305 (LaCarla Davis); id. at 393 (Rosenberg).
    Third, Gregory’s contested statement to Feaster was made around
    the year 2004, during the timeframe of the conspiracy and at a
    point when Gentry was selling large quantities of cocaine.                     See
    24
    id. at 262 (2004); id. at 393 (2001-05).                     Finally, Gregory’s
    statement to Feaster satisfies the “in furtherance of” component
    of the coconspirator exception, for the statement was “designed
    to induce [the listener] either to join the conspiracy or to act
    in a way that will assist it in accomplishing its objectives.”
    United States v. Shores, 
    33 F.3d 438
    , 444 (4th Cir. 1994).                          In
    these     circumstances,         the     trial     court   did     not    abuse    its
    discretion      in      ruling     that     the     challenged      statement      was
    admissible under the coconspirator exception.
    E.
    Defendant Gentry’s final contention is that the court erred
    in   awarding      a    single     criminal      history   point    for    his    2003
    possession    of       marijuana    conviction.        Pursuant     to    Guidelines
    section    4A1.1(c),      a   single      criminal    history    point    should    be
    awarded for “each prior sentence not [already] counted,” with a
    “prior sentence” defined in Guidelines section 4A1.2(a)(1) as
    “any sentence previously imposed . . . for conduct not part of
    the instant offense.”            Gentry contends that the evidence shows
    that the alleged conspiracy involved marijuana — as well as
    cocaine and crack — since Black admitted to purchasing marijuana
    from the Texas conspirators in 1998 and 1999.
    This    contention          fails    for     multiple   reasons.            First,
    Gentry’s 2003 conviction was in Maryland, outside the geographic
    scope of the alleged conspiracy.                  Moreover, his 2003 conviction
    25
    was for marijuana possession only, as opposed to possession with
    intent to distribute, and the only punishment was a fine.                   These
    facts    suggest    that    only   a   small    quantity     of    marijuana     was
    involved    in    the   2003   case    and   further      distinguish    Gentry’s
    Maryland conduct from the alleged conspiracy.                     This conclusion
    also comports with Gentry’s admission that he experimented with
    marijuana.       Thus, the court did not clearly err in finding that
    Gentry’s 2003 marijuana conviction was for conduct that was not
    part of the charged conspiracy.                Accordingly, this sentencing
    contention must also be rejected.
    F.
    Finally, defendant Howard asserts an ineffective assistance
    of counsel claim, which has two main components:                        his trial
    counsel failed to properly investigate (as seen in his failure
    to interview Gregory McHam), and actually argued in favor of the
    prosecution        in    his   closing         argument.           To   establish
    constitutionally        ineffective    assistance    of    counsel,     Howard    is
    obliged to show (1) objectively unreasonable performance and (2)
    prejudice     resulting     from   that      deficient     performance.          See
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984).                     Generally,
    an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “should be raised by
    a habeas corpus motion under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     in the district
    court and not on direct appeal, unless it conclusively appears
    from the record that defense counsel did not provide effective
    26
    representation.”              United States v. Richardson, 
    195 F.3d 192
    , 198
    (4th     Cir.       1999)        (internal      quotation       marks    and      alteration
    omitted).
    Put        simply,        our   review    of     the     record     leads       to     the
    conclusion that it fails to “conclusively establish” ineffective
    assistance of counsel.                 See United States v. King, 
    119 F.3d 290
    ,
    295 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel
    claim on direct appeal); see also Massaro v. United States, 
    538 U.S. 500
    , 504, 505, 506 (2003) (recognizing that “in most cases
    a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for
    deciding      claims        of    ineffective        assistance”    because       the       trial
    record is “often incomplete or inadequate for [addressing such
    claims       on    direct        review,]”      thereby       risking    the   failure         of
    “[e]ven meritorious claims”); cf. United States v. Fisher, 
    477 F.2d 300
    , 302 (4th Cir. 1973) (addressing ineffective assistance
    claim on direct appeal because record clearly revealed counsel
    had    only        one        hour     to   prepare      for     trial).          In        these
    circumstances, Howard’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
    is not cognizable on direct appeal.
    IV.
    Pursuant          to      the    foregoing,       we     reject     each     of       the
    defendants’ contentions and affirm the judgments.
    AFFIRMED
    27
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-4372, 08-4633, 08-4635

Citation Numbers: 354 F. App'x 748

Judges: Motz, King, Trenga, Eastern, Virginia

Filed Date: 12/4/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (23)

united-states-v-theresa-marie-squillacote-aka-tina-aka-mary-teresa , 221 F.3d 542 ( 2000 )

Holbrook v. Flynn , 106 S. Ct. 1340 ( 1986 )

United States v. Jenny Nunez, United States of America v. ... , 432 F.3d 573 ( 2005 )

united-states-v-terrance-smith-aka-ty-united-states-of-america-v , 441 F.3d 254 ( 2006 )

United States v. Seher , 562 F.3d 1344 ( 2009 )

Massaro v. United States , 123 S. Ct. 1690 ( 2003 )

United States v. Arthur James Walker , 796 F.2d 43 ( 1986 )

United States v. Keith Ramon Allen, Jr. , 446 F.3d 522 ( 2006 )

United States v. Ronald Richard Fisher , 477 F.2d 300 ( 1973 )

United States v. Benton , 523 F.3d 424 ( 2008 )

United States v. Fred Shores, Jr. , 33 F.3d 438 ( 1994 )

United States v. Ervin Jahue Blevins, United States of ... , 960 F.2d 1252 ( 1992 )

Columbia Casualty Company v. Westfield Insurance Company , 416 F.3d 301 ( 2005 )

Brown v. Elliott , 225 U.S. 392 ( 1912 )

fed-sec-l-rep-p-97402-38-fed-r-evid-serv-462-united-states-of , 989 F.2d 1390 ( 1993 )

United States v. Ricardo U. Alerre, United States of ... , 430 F.3d 681 ( 2005 )

united-states-v-philippe-dorlouis-aka-terrance-united-states-of , 107 F.3d 248 ( 1997 )

United States v. Willie James Richardson, A/K/A Riz, A/K/A ... , 195 F.3d 192 ( 1999 )

United States v. Andre Cardell King, United States of ... , 119 F.3d 290 ( 1997 )

United States v. Shabani , 115 S. Ct. 382 ( 1994 )

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