United States v. John Robinson , 583 F. App'x 53 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4073
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN MICHAEL ROBINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00194-TDS-1)
Submitted: August 28, 2014 Decided: September 2, 2014
Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States
Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted John Michael Robinson of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012). He received the statutory mandatory minimum
sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Robinson
argues the interstate commerce element of § 922(g), as applied
to him, is unconstitutional, under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, and that the district court
improperly excluded from the jury evidence of the mandatory
minimum sentence. We affirm.
We review Robinson’s preserved challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute de novo. United States v.
McFadden, 753 F.3d 432, 439 (4th Cir. 2014). Robinson concedes
that the precedent of this Circuit forecloses his current
argument that evidence that the firearm traveled across state
lines was insufficient to prove an effect on interstate
commerce. See United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 137–38
(4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting argument made in reliance on Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), and United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), that transport across state lines
was insufficient to establish possession “in or affecting”
interstate commerce); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 810–
11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting similar argument made in reliance
on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)). One panel of
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this court may not overrule the precedent set by a prior panel.
United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 564 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010).
Next, Robinson contends that the district court erred
in prohibiting him from testifying as to the mandatory minimum
sentence he faced if convicted of the crime charged. We review
rulings concerning the admission of evidence for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 212 (4th
Cir. 2005). It is settled law that it is the exclusive function
of the jury to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused
and the sole province of the court to determine punishment.
United States v. Goodface, 835 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Davidson, 367 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1966).
Informing a jury of the penalty for an offense is prejudicial,
and breach of this well-grounded principle may constitute
reversible error. United States v. Meredith, 824 F.2d 1418,
1429 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383,
1384 (10th Cir. 1980). Courts have therefore uniformly held
that juries must reach a verdict without knowledge of possible
sentences. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975);
Meredith, 824 F.2d at 1429. There is simply no authority to
support Robinson’s contention that the jury should have been
informed of the fifteen-year sentence facing him upon conviction
of the crime charged. See Goodface, 835 F.2d at 1237 (holding
the jury should not be instructed that the defendant faced a
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mandatory minimum for possession of a handgun as the “jury’s
duty is to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused
solely on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial” without
considering possible sentences).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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