United States v. William Pait, Jr. ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4666
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM LEE PAIT, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:12-cr-00187-BR-1)
Submitted: August 1, 2014 Decided: September 3, 2014
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
R. Clarke Speaks, SPEAKS LAW FIRM, Wilmington, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Lee Pait, Jr., pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to production of child pornography, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e) (2012), and was sentenced to 600
months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
the evidence admitted at sentencing and the reasonableness of
Pait’s sentence. Pait was informed of his right to file a pro
se brief but has not done so. The Government has filed a motion
to dismiss this appeal on the ground that Pait knowingly and
intelligently waived the right to appeal his sentence. For the
reasons that follow, we dismiss in part and affirm in part.
In his plea agreement, Pait waived the right to appeal
his sentence, except to the extent that it exceeded the
Guidelines range established at sentencing. A defendant may
waive the right to appeal if that waiver is knowing and
intelligent and the issues raised on appeal fall within the
waiver’s scope. United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349, 354-55
(4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The validity of an appeal waiver
“ultimately is evaluated by reference to the totality of the
circumstances.” United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528
(4th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Generally, if the
district court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver
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of his right to appeal during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy,
the waiver is both valid and enforceable. Id. A review of the
record reveals that the district court determined Pait was
competent to plead guilty, had the opportunity to discuss his
plea agreement with counsel, entered his guilty plea in the
absence of threats or force, and understood the terms of his
appeal waiver. Moreover, the sentence imposed did not exceed
the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Thus, we conclude
that Pait validly waived his right to appeal his sentence and
that the claims raised on appeal fall within the scope of his
waiver. See Davis, 689 F.3d at 354-55. Accordingly, we grant
the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss the
appeal of Pait’s sentence.
Although the waiver provision in the plea agreement
precludes our review of Pait’s sentence, the waiver does not
preclude our review of any errors in Pait’s conviction that may
be revealed by our review pursuant to Anders. In accordance
with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. Thus, as to Pait’s
conviction, we deny in part the Government’s motion to dismiss
and affirm the conviction.
This court requires that counsel inform Pait, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Pait requests that a
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petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Pait. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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