United States v. Julio Huizar , 457 F. App'x 271 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4315
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JULIO ANTONIO ARREOLA HUIZAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:10-cr-00356-TDS-1)
Submitted: November 22, 2011 Decided: December 7, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P.
Clough, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Julio Antonio Arreola Huizar appeals the seventy-one
month sentence imposed after he pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to illegally reentering the United
States after being deported for committing a felony, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1) (2006). On appeal, he
argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable because the district court failed to address
mitigating factors he raised at sentencing, the sentence imposed
creates an unwarranted disparity when compared with defendants
sentenced in “fast-track” jurisdictions, and the sentence is
unduly harsh in light of his personal characteristics.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 46-47 (2007); United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335
(4th Cir. 2009). In so doing, we first examine the sentence for
“significant procedural error,” including “failing to calculate
(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation
from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We then
“‘consider[] the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
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imposed.’” United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.
2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51) (internal alterations
omitted).
“When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.’” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50) (emphasis omitted).
Accordingly, a sentencing court must apply the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors to the particular facts presented and must
“‘state in open court’” the particular reasons that support its
chosen sentence. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c) (West 2000
& Supp. 2011)). The court‘s explanation need not be exhaustive;
however, it must be “sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court
that the district court has considered the parties’ arguments
and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal
decisionmaking authority.’” United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d
832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 356 (2007)) (alterations omitted).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
district court, with the exception discussed below, adequately
addressed arguments asserted by Huizar and sufficiently
explained its sentencing determination.
Huizar argues that his sentence was procedurally
unreasonable because the court failed to address his argument
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that he should receive a lower sentence in order to avoid
sentencing disparities with other similarly situated defendants
convicted and sentenced in other federal districts who are given
more lenient sentences based on the fast-track programs in such
districts. Although the district court failed to explicitly
address Huizar’s fast-track argument, we conclude that any error
was harmless. Boulware, 604 F.3d at 838. This Court previously
held that the type of fast-track disparities among defendants in
different districts “are ‘warranted’ as a matter of law.”
United States v. Perez-Pena, 453 F.3d 236, 243 (4th Cir. 2006).
In fact, “refusing to sentence [Huizar] as if he were a fast-
track defendant is not ‘penalizing’ him for not accepting a deal
that the Government never offered . . . ; rather, it is simply
not rewarding him for conferring a benefit upon the Government
that he did not confer.” Id. at 243.
Huizar next argues that his within-Guidelines sentence
is substantively unreasonable because his ties to his community,
his good work history, and his history of drug addiction warrant
a lower sentence. Huizar fails to explain how these personal
characteristics render his within-Guidelines sentence of
seventy-one months’ imprisonment unreasonable. We conclude that
his arguments are without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm Huizar’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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