United States v. Armando Medina , 501 F. App'x 287 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4232
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ARMANDO GONZALEZ MEDINA, a/k/a Pablito, a/k/a FNU LNU,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District
Judge. (3:10-cr-00308-JRS-9)
Submitted: December 20, 2012 Decided: December 26, 2012
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Edwin F. Brooks, EDWIN F. BROOKS, LLC, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael R.
Gill, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Armando Gonzalez Medina appeals his 84-month sentence
imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to a racketeering conspiracy
and a conspiracy to possess, produce, and transfer false
identification documents. The district court imposed a variance
sentence above the 27-33 month advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range. On appeal, Gonzalez Medina contends that his upward
variance is unreasonable because the district court erroneously
relied upon factual findings unsupported by evidence. We
affirm.
We review a district court's sentence under the
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A district court commits
procedural error and abuses its sentencing discretion if it
selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts. See id.Whether a sentence is substantively unreasonable is considered
“in light of the totality of the circumstances.” United
States v. Worley, 685 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2012). A variance
sentence that deviates significantly from the advisory
Guidelines range is not presumptively unreasonable and is still
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United
States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 106 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 133 S.Ct. 274 (2012).
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The district court varied upwards based upon its
findings that Gonzalez Medina’s criminal conduct spanned a
lengthy period of time and that he participated in violence
against members of competing organizations. The court also
compared Gonzalez Medina’s sentence to a co-conspirator’s
sentence in order to avoid unwarranted disparities. Most of
Gonzalez Medina’s appellate brief attempts to show that there
was insufficient evidence tying Gonzalez Medina to a murder
committed by members of his conspiracy. However, the district
court explicitly declined to find that Gonzalez Medina was
involved with the murder; instead, the court found that Gonzalez
Medina participated in violent acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
Considering the evidence that Gonzalez Medina’s
criminal cell had a history of violent acts against competitors
and that Gonzalez Medina was recorded speaking of “getting rid
of the competition” and “kick[ing] those guys’ asses,” we find
that the district court’s conclusion that Gonzalez Martinez was
involved in “disciplining or dealing with competitors” was not
clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (holding that district court’s account of
evidence must be “plausible”). Further, we do not perceive any
other reason to conclude that, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the district court’s chosen sentence was not
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rooted in reason. See United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 166
(4th Cir. 2008). Under the deference due to the district court,
we conclude that Gonzalez Martinez’s 84-month sentence is
substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the material
before this court and argument will not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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