United States v. Charles Cadle , 481 F. App'x 856 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5203
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES STEPHEN CADLE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Irene C. Berger,
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00083-1)
Submitted: May 16, 2012 Decided: May 31, 2012
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Christopher D. Lefler, LEFLER & BOGGS, Beckley, West Virginia,
for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney,
John L. File, Assistant United States Attorney, Beckley, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Stephen Cadle pled guilty to an information
charging him with aiding and abetting the distribution of
oxycodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 2(2006). In his plea agreement, Cadle waived his right to appeal
a sentence within the Guidelines range, but reserved the right
to challenge the district court’s determination of his role in
the offense if the issue was preserved by an objection. Cadle
was sentenced to a term of fifty-seven months’ imprisonment, the
bottom of his sentencing Guidelines range. Cadle contends on
appeal that the district court clearly erred in finding that his
role in the offense was that of an organizer, leader, manager,
or supervisor warranting a two-level adjustment under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(c) (2011). He also claims
that his sentence was procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
During a drug investigation in 2009, a confidential
informant bought oxycodone on three occasions at Cadle’s home.
The first time, Cadle told the informant that his daughter,
Chrystal, would conduct the transaction. Chrystal asked another
person, Kenneth Cline, to go next door and get the drugs. She
then handed the drugs to the informant and took the money. On
the next two occasions, the informant went to Cadle’s house and
bought oxycodone from Chrystal each time. After a search
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warrant was executed at Cadle’s home in October 2009, and
various prescription medications were located in a safe, Cadle
gave a statement to investigators. He said he bought
prescription medications from other people and resold them,
usually through Chrystal. Cadle’s wife also gave a statement,
which corroborated her husband’s account. Chrystal initially
refused to give a statement, but in 2011 she spoke to
investigators and told them that she had sold oxycodone for her
father, and for Kenneth Cline, for about a year. She said Cadle
paid her in oxycodone pills, to which she was addicted.
The district court’s determination that a defendant
qualifies as a “leader” under USSG § 3B.1.1(c) is a factual
finding reviewed for clear error. United States v. Cameron, 573
F.3d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 2009). A defendant merits a two-level
adjustment if he was an “organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor” in any criminal activity that did not involve five
or more participants and was not otherwise extensive. USSG
§ 3B1.1(c). To qualify for the adjustment, the defendant must
have been “an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor of
people.” United States v. Sayles, 296 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir.
2002). “Leadership over only one other participant is
sufficient as long as there is some control exercised.” United
States v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 2003).
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Here, Cadle contends that the evidence showed only
that he obtained drugs and allowed his daughter to sell them,
but not that he exercised decision-making authority or control
over other participants. However, the district court had before
it statements from three participants in the sale of drugs from
Cadle’s home, which established that Cadle directed Chrystal to
sell oxycodone and other drugs to customers and kept all the
proceeds, paying Chrystal in pills to support her addiction. On
this evidence, the district court did not clearly err in finding
that the aggravated role adjustment was appropriate.
Cadle next maintains that the district court
procedurally erred when it applied the § 3B1.1(c) adjustment and
also that his within-Guidelines sentence was substantively
unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to fulfill
the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (standard of review).
Cadle does not address the waiver provision in his plea
agreement. However, the government seeks to enforce the waiver. 1
A waiver of appeal rights is reviewed de novo, and is
enforceable if it is knowing and voluntary, and the issue raised
on appeal is within the scope of the waiver. United States v.
1
The government concedes that Cadle reserved the right to
appeal the role adjustment under USSG § 3B1.1(c).
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Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012). Generally, a
waiver is valid if the district court questions the defendant
about the waiver during the guilty plea hearing and the record
demonstrates that the defendant understood the significance of
the waiver. Id. Here, the district court asked Cadle whether
he understood that he was agreeing to give up his right to
appeal his sentence “on any ground whatsoever,” as long as the
sentence was within or below the Guidelines range. Cadle
answered that he did. Cadle does not challenge the validity of
his waiver. We conclude that the waiver is enforceable. 2
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment, but
dismiss that portion of the appeal in which Cadle seeks review
of the reasonableness of his sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the Court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
2
We note that, even if the waiver were not enforceable,
Cadle has not shown that his sentence is either procedurally or
substantively unreasonable. The court did not err procedurally
in calculating Cadle’s Guidelines range. Moreover, an appellate
court may treat a sentence within a correctly calculated
Guidelines range as presumptively reasonable. Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 346 (2007). Although the presumption is
rebuttable, see United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212,
217 (4th Cir. 2010), Cadle has not rebutted the presumption.
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