United States v. Vincent Myers ( 2012 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-4568
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    VINCENT ANTA MYERS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 11-4583
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    VINCENT MYERS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of West Virginia, at Huntington.   Robert C. Chambers,
    District Judge. (3:10-cr-00093-1; 3:01-cr-00099-1)
    Submitted:   January 18, 2012              Decided:   February 14, 2012
    Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Carl E. Hostler, PRIM LAW FIRM, PLLC, Hurricane, West Virginia,
    for Appellant.    R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney,
    Joseph F. Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington,
    West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    In these consolidated appeals, Vincent Myers appeals
    his    conviction        and     forty-one-month              sentence    on        federal     drug
    charges         (No.   11-4568);     and   the       revocation          of    his    supervised
    release from a prior federal sentence, and resulting thirty-six-
    month sentence (No. 11-4583).                       Because Myers’ brief raises no
    challenges to the supervised release revocation or sentence, he
    has abandoned any such claims.                  See United States v. Brooks, 
    524 F.3d 549
    , 556 n.11 (4th Cir. 2008).                             We therefore affirm the
    district         court’s     judgment      in       No.       11-4583,        and    proceed      to
    consideration of the claims raised in No. 11-4568.
    A jury convicted Myers of two counts of distributing
    oxycodone, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (2006),* and the
    district court imposed concurrent forty-one-month sentences of
    imprisonment.              The      charges     stemmed          from         controlled        buys
    conducted by police in West Virginia.                          Myers challenges: (1) the
    district court’s denial of his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a
    judgment of acquittal, (2) the district court’s denial of his
    Fed.       R.   Crim.   P.     33   motion      for       a    new   trial,         and   (3)    the
    propriety of the sentence.              We affirm.
    We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny
    a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal.                                 United States v.
    *
    The jury acquitted Myers of a third count.
    3
    Hickman, 
    626 F.3d 756
    , 762-63 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 469
     (2011).       Where such a motion alleges insufficiency of
    the evidence, we must sustain the jury’s verdict if, viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the government, “any
    rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
    of    the   crime   beyond    a   reasonable      doubt.”      United    States   v.
    Green, 
    599 F.3d 360
    , 367 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks
    omitted), cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 271
    , 340 (2010).                     Because the
    credibility of witnesses is properly assessed by the jury, we
    may not make our “own credibility determinations but must assume
    that the jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in favor
    of the Government.”          United States v. Penniegraft, 
    641 F.3d 566
    ,
    572    (4th    Cir.)    (internal      quotation       marks    and      alteration
    omitted), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 564
     (2011).
    To convict Myers of violating 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1),
    the Government was required to prove that (1) he knowingly or
    intentionally distributed oxycodone, and (2) he knew that the
    drug “was a controlled substance under the law.”                   United States
    v. Alerre, 
    430 F.3d 681
    , 689 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Two law enforcement officers and an informant offered
    substantially similar accounts of the controlled buys supporting
    the     charges     against       Myers,       with   the   informant       stating
    unequivocally that he purchased all of the oxycodone in question
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    from Myers.     These accounts were supported, at least in part, by
    the recordings captured by a concealed device carried by the
    informant    during   each     controlled         buy.       Additionally,      Myers
    indicated     his   awareness    of      the      fact    that     oxycodone    is     a
    prescription drug.
    Moreover, the fact that the jury acquitted Myers of
    one count does not undermine the validity of his convictions on
    the   remaining     counts.       See        Green,       
    599 F.3d at 368-69
    .
    Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s denial of
    Myers’ Rule 29 motion.
    Next, we conclude that the district court did not err
    in denying Myers’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for new trial.                           We
    review such a ruling for abuse of discretion.                      United States v.
    Lighty, 
    616 F.3d 321
    , 374 (4th Cir. 2010).                  Myers asserts that a
    new trial was appropriate due to the bias of the informant and
    the fact that the recording of each controlled buy was obtained
    in violation of the West Virginia Constitution.                         See State v.
    Mullens, 
    650 S.E.2d 169
    , 173-78, 191 (W. Va. 2007).
    Regarding    the     recordings,             federal    statutory        and
    constitutional law permit law enforcement officials to place an
    electronic    surveillance      device       on   a   consenting     informant       for
    purposes of recording communications with third-party suspects
    without a warrant or other judicial authorization.                         
    18 U.S.C. § 2511
    (2)(c) (2006); United States v. White, 
    401 U.S. 745
    , 749-
    5
    52 (1971) (plurality opinion).                    Accordingly,        as the district
    court    determined,        the   admission       of    the    recordings       at     Myers’
    trial was proper and did not warrant a new trial.                               See United
    States v. Van Metre, 
    150 F.3d 339
    , 347 (4th Cir. 1998).
    The     same    is    true     for        the    alleged      bias      of     the
    informant.     “A jury verdict is not to be overturned except in
    the rare circumstance when the evidence weighs heavily against
    it.”     United States v. Smith, 
    451 F.3d 209
    , 216-17 (4th Cir.
    2006)    (internal        quotation        marks        omitted).            Here,        audio
    recordings      and       the     testimony         of        two     police      officers
    substantially        corroborated         the     informant’s         account        of     the
    controlled buys.          Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in
    the district court’s denial of Myers’ Rule 33 motion.
    Finally, we reject Myers’ challenge to the substantive
    reasonableness       of     his   sentence.            We    review    a   sentence         for
    reasonableness,        applying       a    “deferential             abuse-of-discretion
    standard.”     Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007).                                In
    considering        substantive      reasonableness,             we    must      take       into
    account the “totality of the circumstances.”                              
    Id.
         When, as
    here,    a   sentence       is    within    a     properly         determined     advisory
    Guidelines     range,        we     presume        that       it     is    substantively
    reasonable.        United States v. Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    , 193 (4th Cir.
    2007).
    6
    Myers claims that the district court erred in refusing
    to reduce his sentence based on the fact that he previously
    served a sentence for a federal crack cocaine offense, imposed
    before the sentencing reforms effected by the Fair Sentencing
    Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 
    124 Stat. 2372
    .                   Furthermore,
    Myers suggests that the district court should have reduced his
    sentence      based     on     the    informant’s   admittedly      inconsistent
    statements         regarding    the    total   quantity      of   oxycodone     he
    purchased from Myers.
    We     conclude these arguments are not sufficient to
    rebut   the    presumption       of   reasonableness    we   accord    to    Myers’
    within-Guidelines sentence.             The district court, upon assessing
    the informant’s evidence concerning drug quantity, attributed to
    Myers a relatively conservative amount that is justified by the
    record.       Further, the court made a thorough assessment of the
    facts and § 3553(a) factors in announcing a sentence at the top
    of   the   applicable        Guidelines    range.      Therefore,     this   claim
    warrants no relief.
    We affirm Myers’ conviction and sentence in No. 11-
    4568, and the revocation of supervised release and sentence in
    No. 11-4583.         We dispense with oral argument because the facts
    and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
    7
    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    8