United States v. Juvenile Male , 404 F. App'x 805 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5148
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUVENILE MALE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:09-cr-00168-BO-1)
Submitted: November 19, 2010 Decided: December 15, 2010
Before DAVIS and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jorgelina E. Araneda, ARANEDA LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney,
Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Juvenile Male appeals the district court’s order
transferring him to adult status under the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (2006). Juvenile Male
was charged in a three-count juvenile information with
interference with commerce by robbery and aiding and abetting in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 2 (2006) (Count One), using a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) (Count Two), and being an
illegal alien in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5), 924 (2006) (Count Three). The Government
certified to the district court that “there is a substantial
Federal interest in the case and the offenses, to warrant the
exercise of federal jurisdiction due to violent nature of the
offenses.”
Juvenile Male argues that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to transfer him to adult status under 18 U.S.C.
§ 5032. Questions involving subject matter jurisdiction are
reviewed de novo. United States v. White, 139 F.3d 998, 999-
1000 (4th Cir. 1998).
Federal jurisdiction involving a juvenile alleged to
have committed an act of juvenile delinquency is proper if the
Government certifies that “the offense charged is a crime of
violence that is a felony . . . and that there is a substantial
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Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the
exercise of Federal jurisdiction.” 18 U.S.C. § 5032(3) (2006).
The Government’s certification that a substantial federal
interest exists is generally regarded as a matter of
prosecutorial discretion, and while this decision is not immune
from judicial review, we accord the decision substantial
deference. United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314,
1319 (4th Cir. 1996).
In United States v. T.M., 413 F.3d 420, 427 (4th Cir.
2005), we held that a substantial federal interest exists in
§ 924(c) prosecutions. Juvenile Male attempts to distinguish
T.M. by arguing that in T.M., the victim was actually beaten and
shot, whereas in his offense, the victim was not. Juvenile Male
claims that the conduct in T.M. was more violent and egregious
than the conduct in which he engaged. We conclude that this
distinction is of no consequence; it does not alter our previous
holding that because using a firearm during a crime of violence
carries harsh penalties that Congress enacted as an urgent
measure to control criminal use of firearms, the Government
possesses a substantial interest in § 924(c) prosecutions. The
district court properly exercised jurisdiction in this case.
Next, Juvenile Male argues that the district court
abused its discretion in transferring him to adult status
because it wrongfully found that his chances of rehabilitation
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were minimal. Juvenile Male also argues that the district court
gave insufficient weight to his lack of a prior criminal record,
and did not consider that at the end of any juvenile sentence
Juvenile Male would be deported.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
decision to transfer a juvenile to adult prosecution. United
States v. Juvenile Male, 554 F.3d 456, 465 (4th Cir. 2009). A
district court abuses its discretion if it fails to make the
required factual findings, or if those factual findings are
clearly erroneous. United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 858
(4th Cir. 2005). We review de novo the district court’s legal
rulings relating to the entry of the transfer order. See United
States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F.3d 495, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2007).
A juvenile may be transferred to adult status, “if the
district court finds, after hearing, such transfer would be in
the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 5032. In making that
determination, the district court must consider the following
six factors: (1) the juvenile’s age and social background; (2)
the nature of the alleged offense; (3) the extent and nature of
the juvenile’s prior delinquency record; (4) the juvenile’s
present intellectual development and psychological maturity; (5)
the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response
to such efforts; and (6) the availability of programs designed
to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems. Id. The
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Government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that a transfer to adult status would be in the
interest of justice. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1323. The
district court may determine what weight to give the various
factors. Id. In the “interest of justice” analysis, the
district court must weigh the rehabilitative purposes of the
juvenile justice system against the need to protect the public
from violent individuals. Id.After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in transferring
Juvenile Male to adult status. The district court made the
appropriate factual findings, carefully considered those facts
as applied to the transfer factors, and correctly weighed all of
the factors to determine that transfer of Juvenile Male was in
the interest of justice. We discern no sound basis to disturb
the district court’s judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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