Tete Smith v. Bank of America, NA ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1504
TETE B. SMITH,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
Judge. (2:10-cv-00357-RAJ-FBS)
Submitted: August 18, 2011 Decided: August 22, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tete B. Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Erin Quinn Ashcroft, Robert W.
McFarland, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tete B. Smith sued her former employer, Bank of
America, alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006), as well as religious and national
origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2011). After a three-day trial, the jury found in favor
of Bank of America. Smith now appeals, arguing that the
testimony of two of the witnesses was false and misleading and
that the court erred in admitting evidence that she received a
traffic citation.
Smith does not argue that the testimony of the two
witnesses was improperly admitted, but rather that it was false
and clouded the judgment of the jury. An appellate court must
be mindful that “the jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the
credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the
evidence presented.” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 217
(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Because we do not review credibility determinations, Smith’s
claim does not entitle her to relief.
A district court’s determination of the admissibility
of evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 995 (4th
2
Cir. 1997). An abuse of discretion occurs only when "the
[district] court acted arbitrarily or irrationally in admitting
evidence." United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 732 (4th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of "[e]vidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b). However, such evidence is "admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." Id. Rule 404(b) is an inclusionary rule, allowing
evidence of other crimes or acts to be admitted, except that
which tends to prove only criminal disposition. United
States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 1997).
For such evidence to be admissible, it must be
“relevant to an issue other than the general character of the
defendant,” necessary, and reliable. United States v. Hodge,
354 F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Queen, 132 F.3d at
997). Additionally, the probative value of the evidence must
not be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id.We have reviewed the record and find that the evidence relating
to Smith’s driving ticket was properly admitted as impeachment
evidence.
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Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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