United States v. Cory Fennell ( 2013 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4647
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    CORY DEXTER FENNELL, a/k/a Ace,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.   Louise W. Flanagan,
    District Judge. (5:04-cr-00440-FL-1)
    Submitted:   February 14, 2013            Decided:   February 21, 2013
    Before KING, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant.   Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
    P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
    Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Cory Dexter Fennell appeals from the district court’s
    judgment     revoking       his    supervised             release    and       imposing        a
    thirty-six-month prison term.                 Fennell challenges this sentence,
    arguing that it is plainly unreasonable.                      We affirm.
    A   district    court          has    broad    discretion        to    impose     a
    sentence     upon     revoking          a    defendant’s        supervised           release.
    United States v. Thompson, 
    595 F.3d 544
    , 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
    We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
    release if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and not
    “plainly unreasonable.”            United States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    ,
    437,    439-40      (4th    Cir.        2006).        In     determining           whether    a
    revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the
    sentence     for     unreasonableness,              “follow[ing]            generally        the
    procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
    review of original sentences.”                
    Id. at 438
    .
    A     supervised           release           revocation         sentence         is
    procedurally       reasonable      if       the    district    court        considered       the
    Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and
    the    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)          (2006)      factors     it     is    permitted        to
    consider in a supervised release revocation case.                              
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3583
    (e) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); Crudup, 
    461 F.3d at 439
    .
    Although     a   district    court          need    not    explain     the    reasons        for
    imposing a revocation sentence in as much detail as when it
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    imposes an original sentence, “it still must provide a statement
    of reasons for the sentence imposed.”                     Thompson, 
    595 F.3d at 547
    (internal quotation marks omitted).                       A revocation sentence is
    substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
    basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
    imposed, up to the statutory maximum.                      Crudup, 
    461 F.3d at 440
    .
    Only   if    a     sentence       is   found       procedurally          or    substantively
    unreasonable       will      we    “then     decide       whether        the   sentence       is
    plainly     unreasonable.”             
    Id. at 439
    .        A    sentence      is   plainly
    unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable.                               
    Id.
    Fennell      contends        that     his    sentence        is    procedurally
    unreasonable because the district court failed to consider and
    explain why it rejected his arguments for the imposition of a
    six-month sentence.           We conclude that this contention is without
    merit.      At the revocation hearing, Fennell’s counsel and Fennell
    made     note     of   his     accomplishments            on       release,     raised       the
    possibility that his drug use on release was related to his
    untreated mental illness, and described his living environment
    and a family dispute without explaining why these circumstances
    merited a revocation sentence of six months’ imprisonment.
    Fennell also contends that the district court failed
    to provide a sufficient explanation for its decision to impose a
    sentence     three     times      above      the    top    of      the    advisory      policy
    statement        range.       Assuming       without       deciding        that    Fennell’s
    3
    revocation sentence is unreasonable because the district court
    failed to provide an adequate explanation — grounded in relevant
    § 3553(a) factors — for imposing a thirty-six-month prison term,
    we   conclude      that   the    sentence    is   not    “plainly    unreasonable”
    because the sentence does not exceed the applicable statutory
    maximum,      
    18 U.S.C. § 3559
    (a)(1)          (2006);      
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3583
    (e)(3), and Fennell does not point to facts establishing
    that the sentence is clearly or obviously unreasonable.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We   dispense      with   oral    argument    because     the     facts   and   legal
    contentions     are   adequately      presented     in    the   materials       before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-4647

Judges: King, Duncan, Davis

Filed Date: 2/21/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024