United States v. Osamwonyi , 402 F. App'x 794 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4351
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH IYOBOSA OSAMWONYI,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:03-cr-00435-REP-1)
Submitted: October 25, 2010 Decided: November 29, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Mary E. Maguire,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Research
and Writing Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, S. David Schiller,
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Iyobosa Osamwonyi appeals the district court’s
order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to six
months’ imprisonment, followed by four years and six months’
supervised release. On appeal, Osamwonyi contends that his
sentence is plainly unreasonable. Finding no reversible error,
we affirm.
A district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will
affirm unless the sentence is “plainly unreasonable” in light of
the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006).
We first must decide whether the sentence is
unreasonable, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and
substantive considerations that we employ in our review of
original sentences.” Id. at 438. A sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court has considered the policy
statements contained in chapter seven of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) and the applicable § 3553(a) factors
and has explained adequately the sentence chosen, though it need
not explain the sentence in as much detail as when imposing the
original sentence. Id. at 439. A sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court states a proper basis for its
2
imposition of a sentence up to the statutory maximum. Id. at
440. If, after considering the above, we determine that the
sentence is not unreasonable, we will affirm. Id. at 439.
Osamwonyi argues that both the imprisonment and
supervised release term imposed by the district court are
plainly unreasonable. Because Osamwonyi was released from
prison on September 10, 2010, and has not demonstrated any
collateral consequences of his imprisonment, we hold that
Osamwonyi’s challenge to his imprisonment upon revocation is
moot. See United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 284 (4th Cir.
2008).
Further, we hold that the district court’s imposition
of four years and six months of supervised release was not
unreasonable. Procedurally, the district court adequately
explained its chosen sentence and considered the § 3553(a)
factors and USSG chapter seven policy statements.
Substantively, the district court stated a proper basis for
sentencing Osamwonyi within the statutory maximum. A term of
supervised release imposed upon revocation is limited to “the
term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense
that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less
any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of
supervised release.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(h) (West 2000 & Supp.
2010). Osamwonyi’s bank fraud conviction, resulting in his
3
original term of supervised release, is a Class B felony, see 18
U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006), for which
the maximum term of supervised release is five years. USSG
§ 5D1.2(a)(1) (2003). Thus, the district court did not err when
it imposed a four and a half year period of supervised release
(five year maximum minus six month term of imprisonment imposed
upon revocation). Because we conclude that Osamwonyi’s sentence
was not unreasonable, we need not consider whether it was
plainly so.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4