United States v. Byrd ( 2010 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-7703
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JAMES EDWARD BYRD, III,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger,
    District Judge. (3:01-cr-00178-MR-1)
    Submitted:    October 16, 2009              Decided:   January 15, 2010
    Before DUNCAN and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Sandra J.     Barrett, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    Edward R.    Ryan, Acting United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
    Carolina;     Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Asheville,   North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    A jury convicted James Edward Byrd, III of conspiracy
    to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams
    or    more   of    crack   cocaine,    in       violation    of   
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    (2006), and the district court sentenced him to 240 months of
    imprisonment. 1       In a prior appeal, we vacated Byrd’s sentence and
    remanded for resentencing consistent with Gall v. United States,
    
    552 U.S. 38
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 586
     (2007).                  See United States v. Byrd,
    278    F.    App’x   277   (4th     Cir.    2008)     (No.   06-5162).        At   the
    resentencing       hearing,   the    district        court   imposed    a   240-month
    sentence. 2       On appeal, 3 Byrd challenges the reasonableness of his
    sentence.      We affirm.
    This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness under
    an abuse of discretion standard.                Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 597
    .           This
    review requires appellate consideration of both the procedural
    and    substantive      reasonableness          of   a   sentence.      
    Id.
         After
    determining whether the district court properly calculated the
    1
    The initial sentence imposed by the district court was 360
    months.   See United States v. Byrd, 151 F. App’x 218 (4th Cir.
    2005) (No. 04-4953) (vacating 360-month sentence and remanding
    for resentencing).
    2
    The guidelines ranges was 360 months to life imprisonment
    but became 240 months, the statutory maximum sentence.      U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.1(a) (2007).
    3
    Byrd also filed a pro se supplemental brief challenging
    his sentence.    We have carefully reviewed the claims raised
    therein and find them to be without merit.
    2
    defendant’s      advisory          guidelines       range,     we    must    then     consider
    whether the district court considered the factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)       (2006),      analyzed         any      arguments      presented        by    the
    parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.                                   
    Id. at 596-97
    ; see United States v. Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 330 (4th
    Cir. 2009).          Finally, we review the substantive reasonableness
    of the sentence.             United States v. Pauley, 
    511 F.3d 468
    , 473
    (4th Cir. 2007).
    Byrd’s counsel first asserts that the district court
    procedurally erred in sentencing Byrd to 240 months because the
    court viewed the guidelines range of 240 months as mandatory and
    therefore sentenced Byrd under de facto mandatory guidelines.
    Our review of the record convinces us that the district court
    understood the advisory nature of the sentencing guidelines.
    Next, counsel asserts that the district court failed
    to   address         adequately       the       § 3553(a)      factors,        particularly
    § 3553(a)(6),         by    failing      to     take    into    account       the     need    to
    prevent    unwarranted         sentence         disparities         among   co-defendants.
    However,    at       the    August       2008    sentencing         hearing,       the      court
    engaged    in    a    colloquy       with     defense      counsel       about      this     very
    factor.         The        court     correctly         found      that      Byrd      and    his
    co-defendants were not similarly situated.
    Finally, Byrd argues that his sentence is procedurally
    unreasonable         because       the    district        court      failed      to    explain
    3
    adequately      why   it    sentenced      Byrd        to     double       the    sentences
    received by his co-defendants.                 We review this claim for plain
    error because, after being given an opportunity to object to the
    sentence imposed by the district court, Byrd failed to challenge
    the adequacy of the court’s explanation.                            To establish plain
    error, Byrd “must show: (1) an error was made; (2) the error is
    plain; and (3) the error affects substantial rights.”                                   United
    States   v.    Massenburg,       
    564 F.3d 337
    ,        342-43    (4th       Cir.    2009)
    (reviewing unpreserved Rule 11 error).                   “The decision to correct
    the   error    lies    within    our   discretion,            and    we     exercise      that
    discretion only if the error seriously affects the fairness,
    integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”                                
    Id. at 343
     (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    We have carefully reviewed the sentencing transcript
    and   find    that    the   district       court       did     not        err--plainly      or
    otherwise--in explaining its chosen sentence.                        “When rendering a
    sentence,      the    district     court       ‘must        make     an    individualized
    assessment based on the facts presented.’”                         Carter, 564 F.3d at
    328 (quoting Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 597
    ).                      Thus, “‘[t]he sentencing
    judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court
    that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
    basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007));
    see United States v. Moulden, 
    478 F.3d 652
    , 658 (4th Cir. 2007).
    4
    The district court did in fact discuss the relevant
    § 3553(a)    factors,    rejecting     Byrd’s    assertion     that    he   should
    receive a sentence similar to those of his co-defendants.                       In
    addition, the court noted that Byrd was well spoken and had the
    family support to be successful once released from prison.                     The
    court    also   acknowledged    Byrd’s     post-sentencing      rehabilitative
    efforts but found that those efforts were not relevant to its
    sentencing decision but, instead, would be taken into account by
    the Bureau of Prisons in calculating Byrd’s good-time credits.
    Although the district court did not mention specifically all of
    the     § 3553(a)   factors,     the     court     addressed     the     parties’
    arguments and provided the individualized assessment required by
    Carter.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.      We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions    are   adequately     presented    in    the     materials
    before    the   court   and   argument     would   not   aid   the     decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-7703

Judges: Duncan, Agee, Hamilton

Filed Date: 1/15/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024