United States v. Markle , 252 F. App'x 553 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4227
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
NATASHA MARIE MARKLE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Glen E. Conrad, District
Judge. (5:04-cr-00025-gec)
Submitted: October 12, 2007 Decided: October 29, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
I. D. Walton Caudill, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Ray Burton
Fitzgerald, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Natasha Marie Markle pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or
more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). The
district court granted the government’s motion for downward
departure under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1, p.s.
(2004), based upon Markle’s substantial assistance, and sentenced
Markle to a 132-month term of imprisonment, which was 103 months
below the advisory sentencing guideline range. Markle’s counsel
has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), challenging the adequacy of the hearing conducted pursuant
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and the reasonableness of Markle’s
sentence. Markle has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising
several issues.1 We affirm.
Counsel raises as a potential issue the adequacy of the
plea hearing but does not specify any deficiencies in the district
court’s Rule 11 inquiries. Because Markle did not move in the
district court to withdraw her guilty plea, any error in the
Rule 11 hearing is reviewed for plain error. United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing standard).
1
We have thoroughly reviewed the issues raised in the pro se
brief and find them to be without merit. To the extent Markle
seeks to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal, we decline to review them at this time. See United
States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir.) (providing
standard), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1203 (2006).
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Our careful review of the record convinces us that the magistrate
judge substantially complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in
accepting Markle’s guilty plea. Moreover, the magistrate judge and
the district court ensured that Markle entered her plea knowingly
and voluntarily and that the plea was supported by an independent
factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116,
119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Counsel also suggests that Markle’s sentence is
unreasonable. In imposing a sentence post-Booker,2 courts still
must calculate the applicable guideline range after making the
appropriate findings of fact and consider the range in conjunction
with other relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). United States v. Moreland, 437
F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006).
This court will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it “is within the
statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.” Id. at 433(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007).
The district court properly calculated the guideline
range and appropriately treated the sentencing guidelines as
advisory. The district court explicitly considered Markle’s
assistance to the government in granting the government’s motion
for a substantial assistance departure. The court also considered
2
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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the nature of the offense and Markle’s history and characteristics
before imposing a sentence well below the guideline range. Thus,
we find that the sentence is reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of her right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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