Nance v. Apfel, Commissioner ( 1997 )


Menu:
  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    SHIRLEY NANCE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 97-1782
    KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF
    SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    Daniel E. Klein, Jr., Chief Magistrate Judge.
    (CA-96-1690-CCB)
    Submitted: November 18, 1997
    Decided: December 8, 1997
    Before ERVIN and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
    PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Debra Gardner, Nina Shore, LEGAL AID BUREAU, INC., Freder-
    ick, Maryland, for Appellant. James A. Winn, Chief Counsel,
    Region III, Robert S. Drum, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of the
    General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Phila-
    delphia, Pennsylvania; Lynn A. Battaglia, United States Attorney,
    Allen F. Loucks, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Mary-
    land, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Shirley Nance appeals from the magistrate judge's order upholding
    the determination of the Commissioner of Social Security
    ("Commissioner") that she was no longer entitled to social security
    disability benefits. Because substantial evidence supports the Com-
    missioner's decision, we affirm.
    The Commissioner first found Nance disabled in 1988. At that
    time, Nance's diagnosed psychiatric condition resulted in appetite dis-
    turbance, sleep disturbance, decreased energy, and feelings of guilt
    and worthlessness. The Commissioner determined that Nance experi-
    enced a marked difficulty in social functioning and concentration,
    persistence, or pace resulting in frequent failure to complete tasks in
    a timely manner. Therefore, Nance's impairments met or equaled a
    listed impairment in the listing of impairments in the Social Security
    Regulations, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1§ 12.04 (1997), and
    she was found to be disabled.
    In 1994, Nance's eligibility for social security disability benefits
    was reviewed. The Commissioner determined that Nance's condition
    had improved, and that she had only moderate difficulty in social
    functioning and infrequent difficulty with concentration resulting in
    a failure to complete tasks in a timely manner. Thus, Nance no longer
    had functional limitations of the severity necessary to satisfy the
    criteria of Listing § 12.04, and the Commissioner determined that she
    was no longer disabled.
    Nance's request for reconsideration of cessation of her benefits was
    denied, and she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law
    Judge ("ALJ"). At the hearing, Nance and a Vocational Expert ("VE")
    testified. The ALJ considered the opinions of each of Nance's psychi-
    atrists, Nance's testimony, and the opinion of the VE. Based on the
    2
    evidence presented, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Nance
    no longer disabled because she was capable of performing various
    low stress jobs identified by the VE.
    In reaching this decision, the ALJ applied the sequential analysis
    found at 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1594
    (f) (1997). The ALJ first determined
    that Nance had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
    date of her initial award of benefits. The ALJ concluded that although
    Nance continued to suffer from an organic mental disorder and affec-
    tive disorder, these two diagnosed conditions together did not exacer-
    bate her condition to the point that it met or equaled the severity of
    an impairment in Listing § 12.04, as it had when Nance first began
    receiving disability benefits. The ALJ then found that Nance had
    shown significant medical improvement which resulted in increased
    residual functional capacity to do basic work activities.
    Despite the medical improvement, the ALJ found that Nance still
    had nonexertional limitations on her ability to work, including moder-
    ate difficulty concentrating, handling stress, and dealing with supervi-
    sors, co-workers, and the general public. Based on this finding, the
    ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the VE, who had already
    reviewed Nance's record. The ALJ asked the VE whether there were
    any simple low stress jobs which Nance could perform in the local
    economy. The VE determined that there were thousands of jobs
    which Nance could perform.
    Based on the VE's assessment, the ALJ then determined that
    although Nance's impairments were severe, given her residual func-
    tional capacity, her age, education, and past work experience, she
    could perform jobs that were available in the local economy. Thus,
    the ALJ concluded that Nance was no longer disabled, and that her
    disability insurance benefits were appropriately terminated.
    The Appeals Council denied Nance's request for review, and the
    ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Nance
    then filed a civil action in the district court. The Commissioner filed
    a motion for summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted,
    finding that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner's deci-
    sion. Nance appealed to this court.
    3
    We must uphold the finding of the Commissioner that Nance was
    no longer eligible for benefits, if such a finding is supported by sub-
    stantial evidence. See Smith v. Schweiker, 
    795 F.2d 343
    , 345 (4th Cir.
    1986). Substantial evidence is that evidence which"``a reasonable
    mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" See
    Richardson v. Perales, 
    402 U.S. 389
    , 401 (1971) (quoting Consol-
    idated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938)). Substantial
    evidence consists of "``more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may
    be somewhat less than a preponderance.'" Hays v. Sullivan, 
    907 F.2d 1453
    , 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 
    368 F.2d 640
    , 642 (4th Cir. 1966)).
    As the presiding officer at the administrative hearing, the ALJ
    makes factual determinations and resolves evidentiary conflicts,
    including inconsistencies in the medical evidence. Reviewing courts
    do not weigh evidence anew or substitute their judgment for that of
    the Commissioner, provided substantial evidence supports the Com-
    missioner's decision. See Hays, 
    907 F.2d at 1456
    .
    Nance contends first that the ALJ erred in finding that her school
    attendance and activities of daily living showed that her mental condi-
    tion had improved from the time of the initial award of disability ben-
    efits. In determining that Nance's medical condition had improved
    such that she no longer met the listed requirements of § 12.04, the
    ALJ took into consideration that Nance had a normal appetite, was
    able to drive or take the bus to class, and could care for her personal
    needs; was able to cook, shop, and take care of her home without
    help; was able to concentrate sufficiently to watch television, read
    books and newspapers; and significantly, that she was one semester
    short of attaining her associate degree, and that her ability to pursue
    this degree over the course of several years reflected her ability to
    concentrate and to get along at least minimally well with others. The
    ALJ also considered Nance's own testimony of her daily activities,
    such as her attendance at plays and dances, her testimony that she
    studied about ten hours per week plus her time in class, and her testi-
    mony that she kept up with her studies. The ALJ considered the psy-
    chiatric evaluations indicating that Nance had only moderate
    difficulties with social functioning and concentration. Given the cur-
    rent psychological evaluations of Nance, and her ability to perform
    daily chores and attend school regularly, substantial evidence sup-
    4
    ports the ALJ's finding that Nance's impairments no longer met
    listing-level severity, and that her medical condition had improved.
    See Gross v. Heckler, 
    785 F.2d 1163
    , 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting
    that pattern of claimant's daily activities, including cooking, taking
    care of house, and shopping, showed that he was not disabled).
    Nance next contends that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medi-
    cal evidence. Specifically, Nance asserts that the ALJ failed to give
    the proper weight to the opinions of Nance's nurse and Nance's treat-
    ing physician, Dr. Sahandy. The opinion of a treating physician is
    entitled to great weight unless it is unsupported by the clinical evi-
    dence or it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.927
    (d)(2) (1997). The ALJ's opinion should reveal the
    weight given to all the evidence; if the ALJ chooses to discredit the
    report of the treating physician, he must articulate the reasons for
    doing so. See Gordon v. Schweiker, 
    725 F.2d 231
    , 235-36 (4th Cir.
    1984); DeLoatche v. Heckler, 
    715 F.2d 148
    , 150 (4th Cir. 1983).
    However, the opinions of those other than trained medical doctors,
    such as nurses, are not afforded the same weight as the opinions of
    physicians. See 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513
    , 416.913 (1997); see also
    Craig v. Chater, 
    76 F.3d 585
    , 590 (4th Cir. 1996); Lee v. Sullivan,
    
    945 F.2d 687
    , 691 (4th Cir. 1991).
    The ALJ noted that because Nurse Butkovich's report was submit-
    ted by a nurse, it did not carry the same weight as though it were sub-
    mitted by a physician or psychiatrist. Moreover, the ALJ also noted
    that the limitations outlined in the nurse's evaluation were inconsis-
    tent with the other evidence presented. Thus, the ALJ did not err in
    according little weight to this report. See 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513
    ,
    416.927(d)(2).
    To the extent that Nance asserts the ALJ failed to give sufficient
    weight to Dr. Sahandy's evaluations, this assertion is unsupported by
    the record. The ALJ considered all of Dr. Sahandy's submissions,
    which were not inconsistent with the other reports all reflecting that
    Nance no longer experienced marked difficulties in maintaining social
    functioning, and that her condition did not result in marked restriction
    of activities of daily living or inability to function in work or work-
    like settings.
    5
    Nance's final argument is that the ALJ lacked substantial evidence
    to support his finding that there were jobs in the economy which
    Nance could perform despite her functional limitations. Once the ALJ
    found that Nance could no longer perform her past work, the burden
    shifted to the Commissioner to establish that other work existed in
    significant numbers in the local economy that an individual of
    Nance's age, education, experience, and residual functional capacity
    could perform. See Hall v. Harris, 
    658 F.2d 260
    , 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
    Here, the ALJ solicited the testimony of the VE regarding whether
    there were jobs available which Nance could perform based on
    Nance's functional limitations, which were supported by the record.
    The ALJ's question involved a person who needed to work in a low
    stress environment with reduced contact with co-workers, supervi-
    sors, and the general public, and who would have moderate difficulty
    with concentration and accepting instructions and criticism from
    supervisors. Based on the question as well as his own review of the
    medical evidence in the record, the VE testified that there were
    approximately 9000 low-stress jobs in the local economy which
    Nance could perform.
    Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, we
    affirm the magistrate judge's order. We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    6