United States v. Anthony Miller ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4996
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY STERLING MILLER, a/k/a Ant, a/k/a New York, a/k/a
Tony, a/k/a Big Al, a/k/a Big A,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Solomon Blatt, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (2:08-cr-01155-SB-8)
Submitted: June 4, 2013 Decided: June 10, 2013
Before AGEE, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher W. Adams, CHRISTOPHER W. ADAMS LAW OFFICE, P.C.,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, Peter T. Phillips, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Sterling Miller appeals from his convictions
on one count each of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 846 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012); and money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2012). His sole argument is that the district court erred
in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2007). In order to
withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, a defendant must show
that a “fair and just reason” supports his request. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “[A] ‘fair and just’ reason . . . is one
that essentially challenges . . . the fairness of the Rule 11
proceeding.” United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th
Cir. 1992) (en banc). The defendant bears the heavy burden of
demonstrating the existence of such a reason. United States v.
Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).
In determining whether a defendant has met this
burden, a district court must consider the six factors
articulated in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th
Cir. 1991). We have reviewed the record in this case and, after
carefully considering the factors described in Moore, conclude
2
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Miller’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
When conducting Miller’s plea colloquy, the district
court substantially complied with the mandates of Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11, and we discern no error in the district court’s
determination that Miller’s plea was knowing and voluntary.
Further, Miller averred during his Rule 11 hearing that he was
satisfied with his attorney’s representation. Such statements
are presumed true, and Miller has not produced sufficient
evidence to support his assertion that his counsel’s assistance
was deficient. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977);
see Fields v. Attorney Gen., 956 F.2d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1992)
(“Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a
defendant is bound by the representations he makes under oath
during a plea colloquy.”). Additionally, we defer to the
district court’s determination that Miller did not successfully
assert his innocence.
Accordingly, we find that the district court correctly
concluded that consideration of the Moore factors counseled
against allowing Miller to withdraw his plea. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately
3
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4