United States v. Lamont Miller, Jr. , 529 F. App'x 331 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4981
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAMONT LEE MILLER, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-4982
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAMONT LEE MILLER, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00062-1; 3:11-cr-00192-1)
Submitted: May 30, 2013 Decided: June 18, 2013
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Troy N. Giatras, THE GIATRAS LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States
Attorney, William B. King, II, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Lamont Lee Miller, Jr., was sentenced to 132-months’
imprisonment after pleading guilty to two counts of receiving a
firearm while under felony indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(n), 924(a)(1)(D) (2006), and five counts of distribution
of a quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2006). Miller initially pled guilty to the
firearms charges pursuant to a plea agreement in exchange for
the Government’s promise to drop the drug charges. However,
after Miller breached the plea agreement and thereby released
the Government from its obligation, Miller pled guilty to the
drug charges as well. He now appeals his guilty pleas and
sentence, contending the district court erred in voiding his
plea agreement, in allowing him to plead guilty to both the drug
and firearms charges, and in applying several offense-level
enhancements. We affirm.
I.
Miller first contends the district court erred in
voiding the plea agreement. We review a claim that a party has
breached a plea agreement under a bifurcated standard, reviewing
the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
application of contract interpretation principles de novo.
United States v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2000). Under
general contract interpretation principles, an injured party is
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relieved of its obligations under an agreement upon a breach
only if that breach is material. United States v. Scruggs, 356
F.3d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 2004). A material breach is one that
deprives the injured party of the benefit that it reasonably
expected to receive under the agreement. Id. In the context of
a plea agreement, “[s]uch a breach relieves the government of
its obligation to conform to the agreement’s terms even when
defendant has relied to his substantial detriment by, for
example, entering his guilty plea.” United States v. West, 2
F.3d 66, 69-70 (4th Cir. 1993).
The district court properly found that Miller
materially breached his obligation under the plea agreement to
cooperate with the Government, by failing to be forthright and
truthful in a debriefing and in grand jury testimony. Moreover,
despite Miller’s contention to the contrary, the district court
properly allowed Miller’s guilty plea to the firearms charges to
stand despite freeing the Government from its obligation to
dismiss the drug charges. West, 2 F.3d at 69-70. As the
district court indicated, voiding the guilty plea would have
unjustly rewarded Miller for his breach and disrupted the
sentencing process. United States v. Huang, 178 F.3d 184, 189
(3d Cir. 1999) (“defendant’s breach of the plea agreement does
not permit him to withdraw his guilty plea”); see also United
States v. Bowe, 309 F.3d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Double
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Jeopardy Clause cannot be applied to reward [defendant] with a
type of punishment less severe than that provided for in his
plea agreement when the less severe punishment was obtained only
by his breach of his plea agreement.”). We therefore conclude
that the district court properly voided the plea agreement.
II.
Miller next contends that the district court erred in
combining his guilty plea to the information with his guilty
plea to the indictment. To the extent Miller challenges the
validity of his guilty pleas, his contention fails. Our review
of the transcripts of the guilty plea hearings leads us to
conclude that the district court complied with the requirements
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Miller’s
pleas. The court ensured that both of Miller’s guilty pleas
were knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis, and
that Miller understood the rights he was relinquishing by
pleading guilty and the sentence he faced. Moreover, the
court’s order voiding the plea agreement did not force Miller to
plead guilty to both the firearms and drug charges. That Miller
was not free to withdraw his guilty plea to the firearms charges
does not mean that he entered the plea involuntarily. Likewise,
the Government’s ability to pursue the drug charges did not
compel Miller to plead guilty. We therefore conclude that the
district court properly accepted both of Miller’s guilty pleas.
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III.
Miller also contends that the district court erred in
applying several offense-level enhancements at sentencing. In
determining whether the district court properly applied the
sentencing Guidelines, this court reviews its interpretation of
the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 679 (4th Cir. 2004).
A.
Miller contends that the district court erred in
applying an enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (USSG) § 2K2.1(b)(4) (2012) based on his possession of a
firearm with an altered or obliterated serial number. Miller
asserts that “there is insufficient evidence to prove that the
said firearm that allegedly had an obliterated serial number was
intentionally possessed by the Defendant with full knowledge of
the fact.” This contention is meritless. The Government
presented ample evidence—including Miller’s stipulation, an
investigating agent’s testimony, and a photograph of the
firearm—that Miller possessed a firearm with an obliterated
serial number, and the Guidelines specifically indicate that
knowledge of the obliterated serial number is not required.
USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4) cmt. n.8(B); see United States v. Brown, 514
F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2008) (enhancement for obliterated serial
number is a strict liability enhancement). Accordingly, we
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conclude that the district court properly applied the
enhancement.
B.
Miller next argues that the Government presented
insufficient evidence to support an enhancement for use of a
minor to commit an offense. USSG § 3B1.4. “‘Used or attempted
to use includes’ directing, commanding, encouraging,
intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, or soliciting.”
USSG § 3B1.4 cmt. n.1. The Government presented ample evidence,
including Miller’s factual stipulation and an investigating
agent’s testimony, that Miller used a person under eighteen to
assist him by carrying and producing firearms for sale. United
States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 513-14 (4th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly
applied the enhancement.
C.
Miller argues that the district court erred in
imposing a four-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5)
based on its finding that he engaged in the trafficking of
firearms. The enhancement applies if the defendant transferred
two or more firearms to another individual, knowing or having
reason to believe that the other individual intended to use or
dispose of the firearms unlawfully. USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) cmt.
n.13(A). Miller contends that the Government failed to prove
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that he knew or had reason to believe that the buyers intended
to use or dispose of the firearms unlawfully. This contention
fails. The Government presented sufficient evidence that Miller
had reason to believe that his buyers would use or dispose of
the firearms unlawfully, including that fact the buyers also
purchased large quantities of crack cocaine from Miller, that
the buyers indicated they were purchasing the guns to sell in
other cities for a profit, the inflated prices paid by the
buyers, and the clandestine nature of the transactions. In
fact, Miller admitted that he had reason to suspect that the
firearms would be disposed of unlawfully. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court properly applied the
enhancement.
D.
Miller next contends that the Government presented
insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Miller was
an organizer or manager of the offense and therefore the
district court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement
pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1. To merit the enhancement, the
defendant must have exercised managerial responsibility over
other persons, rather than over property, assets, or activities.
USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. The Government presented evidence that
Miller occupied a managerial role over multiple associates by
directing them to complete menial tasks, such as carrying and
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producing the firearms and driving, while Miller retained the
authority to plan the transactions, negotiate prices, and
collect the money. See United States v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 160,
165-66 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Leadership over only one other
participant is sufficient as long as there is some control
exercised.”) Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
properly applied the enhancement.
E.
Finally, Miller asserts error in the imposition of a
two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. USSG § 3C1.1.
The Government claims that Miller obstructed justice by
providing false information and failing to cooperate during a
debriefing and in testimony before a grand jury. Miller
contends that his claim of full responsibility for and refusal
to implicate others in his offenses did nothing to obstruct his
own investigation or prosecution. However, this contention must
fail.
As part of his plea agreement, Miller agreed to a
stipulation of facts describing his offense and relevant
conduct. However, during his debriefing and before the grand
jury, Miller directly contradicted various details contained in
the stipulation. Miller repeatedly lied about his associates’
involvement, repeatedly claimed not to know or remember various
details of his offense, and repeatedly attempted to “plead the
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Fifth.” Miller thereby attempted to obstruct justice with
respect to his own investigation, prosecution, or sentencing,
and Miller’s actions related to his offense of conviction and
relevant conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court properly applied the enhancement.
We therefore affirm Miller’s convictions and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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