United States v. Donald Snyder ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6738
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
DONALD SNYDER,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:06−hc−02125−BR)
Argued: March 19, 2013 Decided: June 24, 2013
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Jennifer Dee Dannels, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, David T. Huband,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2006, Donald Snyder was civilly committed under 18
U.S.C. § 4246. Following a competency hearing in March 2012,
the district court found that Snyder continued to meet the
criteria for commitment because he posed a substantial risk of
danger to the person or property of another if unconditionally
released. Shortly thereafter, in April 2012, the district court
conditionally released Snyder under a specific regimen of care.
On appeal, Snyder argues that the district court erred by
finding that he continued to meet the criteria for commitment
and by ordering conditional release instead of unconditional
release. For the reasons addressed below, we disagree and
affirm the district court’s orders.
I.
In June 2004, Snyder was charged with making threats
against the president. Following a psychiatric evaluation at
Federal Medical Center Butner (“FMC Butner”), Snyder was found
incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to be restored to
competency in the near future. The government subsequently
dismissed the criminal charge against Snyder and filed a
Certificate of Mental Disease or Defect and Dangerousness under
18 U.S.C. § 4246, which permits hospitalization of certain
persons suffering from a mental disease or defect. On October
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3, 2006, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina committed Snyder to the custody of
the Attorney General under Section 4246.
Between January 2008 and July 2011, the district court
conducted several competency review hearings to determine if
Snyder continued to meet the criteria for commitment. In July
2008, the district court conditionally discharged Snyder, but
revoked his release after less than one week because Snyder
threatened to shoot patrons in a bar in violation of his release
conditions. Snyder then returned to FMC Butner. With the
exception of that brief period of conditional release, the
district court determined at each competency hearing that Snyder
continued to meet the criteria for commitment. This Court
affirmed several of those decisions on appeal.
On January 6, 2012, Snyder filed a motion for a hearing to
determine if he should be discharged. Prior to the hearing,
Snyder was examined by two psychiatrists: Dr. Holly Rogers,
whom the court ordered to evaluate Snyder, and Dr. Bryon Herbel,
a staff psychiatrist at FMC Butner and Snyder’s primary
clinician. Each psychiatrist submitted a forensic update to the
district court.
Dr. Herbel and Dr. Rogers agreed that Snyder suffers from
the mental disease of schizoaffective disorder. Because of that
disease, both psychiatrists believed that Snyder would continue
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to have episodes of decompensation and illness requiring periods
of confinement in psychiatric hospitals. Nevertheless, both
psychiatrists believed Snyder should be released. But Dr.
Herbel and Dr. Rogers disagreed about whether conditional or
unconditional release was appropriate. Dr. Rogers believed that
Snyder did not present a substantial risk of danger. Therefore,
she opined that Snyder did not continue to meet the criteria for
commitment and should be unconditionally released. Dr. Herbel,
however, opined that because of Snyder’s history of threatening
others during periods of illness, he continued to pose a
substantial risk of danger if he were unconditionally released.
Dr. Herbel therefore recommended conditional release.
At the competency hearing on March 12, 2012, the
psychiatrists testified consistent with their forensic reports,
with Dr. Rogers recommending unconditional release and Dr.
Herbel recommending conditional release. Both psychiatrists
agreed that aside from making threats, Snyder had actually
harmed other people or property on only one occasion, when he
kicked out the window of a police car after his June 2001
arrest. Snyder also testified at the hearing.
At the end of the hearing, the district court found that
Snyder continued to meet the criteria for commitment under
Section 4246 because he failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he had recovered from his mental disease to
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such an extent that his unconditional release would no longer
create a substantial risk of danger to others or property.
Nevertheless, the district court advised Snyder that “if the
authorities do submit [to] me the conditional release plan, I
will be very happy to sign it.” J.A. 59. On the same day, the
district court entered an order consistent with its statements
in open court.
On March 29, 2012, the Warden at FMC Butner filed a
Certificate of Improved Mental Condition and Request for
Conditional Release under Section 4246(e). The certificate
stated that Snyder had recovered from his mental disease or
defect such that his conditional release under the attached
regimen of care did not pose a substantial risk of danger to
others or property. On April 5, 2012, the government filed a
motion for conditional release with proposed conditions of
release. The government attached to its motion the Warden’s
certificate and a letter from a United States Probation Officer
accepting the proposed conditional release plan for Snyder. The
district court filed an order of conditional release on the same
day. Snyder was released on April 19, 2012.
II.
Snyder appeals from the district court’s March 12 order,
arguing that the district court erred by finding that he
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continued to meet the criteria for commitment because his
unconditional release posed a substantial risk of danger to
other people or property. Snyder also appeals from the district
court’s April 5 order, contending that the district court erred
by ordering conditional release instead of unconditional
release.
A.
A district court’s decision to deny unconditional release
under Section 4246 is a factual determination that will be
overturned by this Court only if clearly erroneous. United
States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992). To
discharge a person hospitalized under Section 4246(d), a court
must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the person has
recovered from his mental disease or defect such that either (1)
his unconditional release would no longer create a substantial
risk of danger to the person or property of another; or (2) his
conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical,
psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment approved by the
court and the director of the facility in which the person is
committed would no longer create a substantial risk of danger to
the person or property of another. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) (permitting a person committed under
Section 4246 to file a motion for a hearing to determine if he
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or she should be discharged even if the director of the facility
does not file a certificate of recovery).
B.
Snyder first challenges the district court’s March 12
finding that his unconditional release would pose a substantial
risk of danger to the person or property of another.
We conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record
to support the district court’s finding. The evidence regarding
Snyder’s illness and history is undisputed, and Snyder does not
dispute that he has a mental disease. Because of that disease,
Dr. Herbel and Dr. Rogers believed that Snyder would continue to
have episodes of illness requiring periods of hospitalization.
Dr. Herbel and Dr. Rogers also agreed that aside from making
threats against the president on two occasions and threatening
bar patrons during a prior period of conditional release, Snyder
caused actual harm on one occasion when he kicked out the window
of a police car after his 2001 arrest.
Based on Snyder’s mental disease and history of threatening
others during periods of illness, Dr. Herbel opined that Snyder
would pose a substantial risk of dangerousness to persons or
property if unconditionally released. See United States v.
Ecker, 30 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that overt acts
of violence are not required to prove dangerousness).
Nonetheless, Dr. Herbel believed that Snyder would not pose such
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a threat if conditionally released. Dr. Rogers disagreed about
the degree of risk posed by Snyder’s unconditional release,
explaining that despite his mental illness, Snyder did not have
a history of violence against other people.
It was not clearly erroneous for the district court to
accord Dr. Herbel’s testimony greater weight than Dr. Rogers’s
testimony, particularly since Dr. Herbel was Snyder’s primary
psychiatrist at FMC Butner, while Dr. Rogers evaluated Snyder
only periodically. See Cox, 964 F.2d at 1433. Accordingly, we
reject Snyder’s argument.
C.
Snyder next contends that the district court erred by
ordering conditional release instead of unconditional release.
As discussed above, Dr. Herbel recommended conditional
release, and the district court did not clearly err by accepting
that recommendation and denying unconditional release. Shortly
after the March 12 competency hearing, the Warden at FMC Butner
filed a certificate of improved mental condition on March 29,
2012, which stated that Snyder’s conditional release under the
attached regimen of care would no longer create a substantial
risk of danger. On April 5, 2012, the government filed a motion
for conditional release with proposed conditions of release, and
the district court filed an order of conditional release on the
same day. Thus, Snyder’s discharge proceeded in accordance with
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Section 4246(e), and the district court did not clearly err by
ordering his conditional release.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s March 12 and
April 5 orders.
AFFIRMED
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