United States v. Reshawn Allen , 530 F. App'x 278 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4019
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RESHAWN ORLANDO ALLEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00218-TDS-1)
Submitted: June 20, 2013 Decided: June 25, 2013
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen F. Wallace, THE WALLACE LAW FIRM, High Point, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Timothy Nicholas Matkins, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Reshawn Orlando Allen appeals his conviction and
forty-five-month sentence following his guilty plea to being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006). In accordance with Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), Allen’s counsel has filed a brief certifying that
there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether
the district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when
accepting Allen’s plea and whether Allen’s sentence is
reasonable. Although notified of his right to do so, Allen has not
filed a supplemental brief. We affirm.
Where, as here, a defendant did not move to withdraw
his plea, we review his Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Because
the district court fully complied with Rule 11 when accepting
Allen’s plea, we conclude that the plea was knowing and
voluntary and, therefore, final and binding. United States v.
Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
We review Allen’s sentence for reasonableness, using
an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We first review for significant procedural
errors, including improperly calculating the Guidelines range,
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors,
sentencing under clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
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adequately explain the sentence. Id. at 51; United States v.
Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). Only if we find a
sentence procedurally reasonable may we consider its substantive
reasonableness. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009).
“When rendering a sentence, the district court must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented,”
Carter, 564 F.3d at 328 (internal quotation marks and emphasis
omitted), and must “adequately explain the chosen sentence to
allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the
perception of fair sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. When, as
here, a district court imposes a sentence that falls outside of
the applicable Guidelines range, we consider “whether the
sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its
decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the
extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United
States v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir.
2007). In conducting this review, we “must give due deference
to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on
a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at
51.
We conclude that Allen’s sentence is both procedurally
and substantively reasonable. The district court correctly
calculated Allen’s Guidelines range and clearly explained the
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basis for imposing a sentence above that range, with reference
to the appropriate 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, Allen’s
individual circumstances, and the nature of Allen’s offense.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Allen’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Allen, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Allen requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Allen. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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