United States v. Jake Smith ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4905
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAKE SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00060-IMK-JSK-1)
Submitted: May 30, 2013 Decided: June 4, 2013
Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Zelda E. Wesley, Assistant United States
Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jake Smith appeals from his conviction and 151-month
sentence imposed after he pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to one count of aiding and abetting in the
distribution of cocaine hydrochloride within 1000 feet of a
protected location, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); 21
U.S.C.A. §§ 840(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 860 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012).
Smith’s sole argument on appeal is that his below-Guidelines
sentence is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes
of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012). We reject
Smith’s argument and affirm the district court’s judgment.
We review Smith’s sentence under a deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007); United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 216 (2012). This review requires
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). After
determining whether the district court correctly calculated the
advisory Guidelines range, we must decide whether the court
considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed the arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575–76; United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
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Once we have determined that the sentence is free of
procedural error, we consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances[.]” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is
within the appropriate Guidelines range, we apply a presumption
on appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United States v.
Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216-17 (4th Cir. 2010). Where
the district court imposes a departure or variant sentence, we
consider “whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both
with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with
respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range.” United States v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118,
123 (4th Cir. 2007). The district court “has flexibility in
fashioning a sentence outside of the Guidelines range,” and need
only “‘set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that it
has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis’”
for its decision. United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359,
364 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 356 (2007)) (brackets omitted).
Smith asks us to vacate his sentence and remand to the
district court for resentencing. According to Smith, sentencing
him as a career offender was “unnecessary” given the
circumstances of his case. We have reviewed the record and have
considered the parties’ arguments and conclude that the district
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court properly exercised its discretion to reject Smith’s
arguments in mitigation. See United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d
669, 679-80 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that appellate courts
must give due deference to district court’s broad discretion in
determining weight to be given to § 3553(a) factors when
choosing an appropriate sentence); United States v. Evans, 526
F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that deference to a
district court’s sentence is required because “the sentencing
judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their
import under § 3553(a) in the individual case”) (brackets
omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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