United States v. Kevin Glenn ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6234
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
KEVIN GLENN, a/k/a Manny,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:01-cr-00304-JFM-6)
Submitted: May 30, 2013 Decided: June 5, 2013
Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kevin Glenn, Appellant Pro Se. John Francis Purcell, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Stephen Schenning, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Glenn appeals the district court order denying
his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion for a sentence
reduction. On appeal, Glenn argues that the district court
erred in denying his motion to reduce his sentence under the
crack cocaine Guidelines amendments because his Guidelines range
was driven by a murder cross-reference that was inappropriately
applied during his original sentencing. However, his argument
is unavailing, as challenges to the sentencing court’s original
Guidelines calculations, insofar as they are unaffected by the
amendment at issue, are not appropriately raised in a
§ 3582(c)(2) motion. See United States v. Stewart, 595 F.3d
197, 201 (4th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that consideration of a
§ 3582(c)(2) motion does not constitute “a full resentencing by
the court”); United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247, 251-52 (4th
Cir. 2009) (holding that § 3582(c) proceedings “do not
constitute a full resentencing of the defendant” and “allow a
limited reduction of sentence . . . while prohibiting a complete
reevaluation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For the same
reason, Glenn’s challenge to the original 360-month sentence he
received is not properly before this court.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We deny Glenn’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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