United States v. Charles Curtin , 662 F. App'x 198 ( 2016 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 16-4071
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    CHARLES BRIAN CURTIN, a/k/a White Boy Brian, a/k/a B,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt.    Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge.
    (8:14-cr-00467-TDC-1)
    Submitted:   September 29, 2016           Decided:   October 3, 2016
    Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Charles N. Curlett, Jr., LEVIN & CURLETT LLC, Baltimore,
    Maryland, for Appellant.     Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
    Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland; Leah Bressack, Arun G. Rao,
    Assistant United States Attorneys, Joseph Ronald Baldwin, OFFICE
    OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Charles Brian Curtin pled guilty, pursuant to a written
    plea      agreement,    to   conspiracy         to    possess        with    intent       to
    distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine,
    in violation 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     (2012), and possession of a firearm
    by   a    convicted    felon,   in    violation       of    
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1)
    (2012).       The    district   court     sentenced         Curtin    to    200    months’
    imprisonment, a sentence below his 262- to 327-month advisory
    Sentencing Guidelines range.               On appeal, counsel has filed a
    brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967),
    stating      that    there   are     no   meritorious         grounds       for    appeal.
    Curtin was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
    brief but he did not file one.                 The Government declined to file
    a brief.
    Because    Curtin   did   not    move       in    the   district         court   to
    withdraw his guilty plea, we review the guilty plea hearing for
    plain error.        United States v. Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 525 (4th
    Cir. 2002).         “To establish plain error, [Curtin] must show that
    an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
    affected his substantial rights.”                    United States v. Muhammad,
    
    478 F.3d 247
    , 249 (4th Cir. 2007).                        Even if Curtin satisfies
    these requirements, “correction of the error remains within our
    discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error
    seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
    2
    of     judicial       proceedings.”          
    Id.
         (internal              quotation     marks
    omitted).        Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
    the district court fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal
    Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting Curtin’s guilty plea,
    which Curtin entered knowingly and voluntarily.
    Next,     we     review    Curtin’s       sentence          for       procedural     and
    substantive           reasonableness        under      a        deferential        abuse     of
    discretion standard.             Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51
    (2007).        We must first ensure that the district court did not
    commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing to
    properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing to
    consider the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2012) sentencing factors, or
    failing to adequately explain the sentence.                           
    Id.
         If we find the
    sentence        procedurally       reasonable,             we     then        consider      its
    substantive reasonableness.              
    Id. at 328
    .              We presume on appeal
    that     a    sentence       within    or    below         the     properly        calculated
    Guidelines range is substantively reasonable.                            United States v.
    Louthian, 
    756 F.3d 295
    , 306 (4th Cir. 2014).                           Such a presumption
    is rebutted only when the defendant shows “that the sentence is
    unreasonable          when    measured   against        the       §    3553(a)     factors.”
    United       States    v.    Montes-Pineda,      
    445 F.3d 375
    ,   379   (4th    Cir.
    2006).
    We discern no procedural or substantive sentencing error by
    the district court.              The district court correctly calculated
    3
    Curtin’s advisory Guidelines range, heard argument from counsel,
    provided Curtin an opportunity to allocute, and considered the
    § 3553(a) sentencing factors.        We have reviewed the record and
    conclude   that     Curtin’s     below-Guidelines     sentence    is    both
    procedurally and substantively reasonable.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this
    case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.                   This
    court requires that counsel inform Curtin, in writing, of the
    right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    further review.      If Curtin requests that a petition be filed,
    but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
    then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
    representation.     Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on Curtin.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions   are   adequately    presented   in    the   materials    before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-4071

Citation Numbers: 662 F. App'x 198

Judges: Shedd, Keenan, Harris

Filed Date: 10/3/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024