United States v. Irbenis Mederos ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4620
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
IRBENIS MEDEROS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00203-CCE-1)
Submitted: April 28, 2016 Decided: June 16, 2016
Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Daniel A. Harris, Locke T. Clifford, CLIFFORD CLENDENIN & O’HALE,
LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand,
United States Attorney, Eric L. Iverson, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Irbenis Mederos pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to
receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) (2012), and the district court imposed a downward
variant sentence of 125 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Mederos
argues that the court procedurally erred by failing to properly
consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities when
explaining Mederos’ sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012).
Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
51 (2007); United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 194-95 (4th Cir.
2016). In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider,
among other factors, whether the district court adequately
analyzed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors and sufficiently
explained the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “By
drawing arguments from § 3553 for a sentence different than the
one ultimately imposed,” Mederos preserved his challenge to the
court’s explanation and consideration of the § 3553(a) factors,
and any error will result in reversal unless “the error was
harmless.” United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576, 578 (4th
Cir. 2010).
In explaining a defendant’s sentence, a court “need not
robotically tick through the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
2
Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, “[w]here the defendant or prosecutor presents
nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence than that
set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should
address the party’s arguments and explain why he has rejected those
arguments.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such an explanation is
necessary to “promote the perception of fair sentencing” and to
permit “meaningful appellate review.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
It may be possible, however, for an appellate court to
evaluate from “[t]he context surrounding a district court’s
explanation . . . both whether the court considered the § 3553(a)
factors and whether it did so properly.” United States v. Montes-
Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006). Where the record
clearly reveals that the court considered the parties’ arguments
and relevant evidence and the case is “conceptually simple,” the
law does not require a judge “to write more extensively.” Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007).
Although Mederos correctly asserts that the court’s
explanation is devoid of any reference to his statistical disparity
argument, the record provides enough context for us to conclude
that the court considered the argument and that it also
contemplated generally the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities. The court could have addressed in open court the
3
statistical disparity argument raised exclusively in counsel’s
sentencing memorandum. However, it was not required to do so, as
it provided an individualized and detailed explanation for its
denial of Mederos’ request for the statutory minimum sentence.
See, e.g., Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 (“Sometimes a judicial opinion
responds to every argument; sometimes it does not . . . . The law
leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s own professional
judgment.”).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4