United States v. Allen Stanley , 669 F. App'x 124 ( 2016 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 16-4101
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    ALLEN DONNELL STANLEY,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
    District Judge. (1:12-cr-00335-TDS-1)
    Submitted:   September 27, 2016           Decided:   October 4, 2016
    Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    Kyle David Pousson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Allen Donnell Stanley was convicted of violating several
    terms of his supervised release and was sentenced to 24 months in
    prison.     Stanley now appeals.           His attorney has filed a brief
    pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), stating
    that   there     are   no   meritorious     issues      for   appeal.      Counsel
    questions,     however,     whether   evidence     at    Stanley’s      revocation
    hearing supported a finding that Stanley possessed a firearm in
    violation of the terms of his release and whether the sentence is
    reasonable.      Stanley was advised of his right to file a pro se
    brief but has not filed such a brief.            We affirm.
    I
    Stanley    initially    contends     that     there    was   insufficient
    evidence upon which to find that he possessed a firearm.                       “We
    review a district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s
    supervised release for abuse of discretion.”                   United States v.
    Padgett, 
    788 F.3d 370
    , 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    136 S. Ct. 494
    (2015).      To revoke release, the district court need only find
    a violation of a condition of release by a preponderance of the
    evidence.      18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012).            This “simply requires
    the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more
    probable than its nonexistence.”            United States v. Manigan, 
    592 F.3d 621
    , 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    “[W]e review a district court’s factual findings underlying a
    2
    revocation    for    clear    error.”       
    Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373
    .
    Credibility    determinations      made     by     the    district       court    at
    revocation hearings are rarely reviewable. United States v. Cates,
    
    613 F.3d 856
    , 858 (8th Cir. 2010).
    At Stanley’s revocation hearing, an officer testified that,
    during a traffic stop, he ordered Stanley to exit the vehicle in
    which he was a passenger.       As he got out of the car, Stanley bent
    over and had his back to the officer.            Stanley began to flee but
    was immediately apprehended.       A handgun was discovered in the area
    where Stanley had exited the vehicle.            The officer testified that
    the gun was not there when he initiated the stop.               Records revealed
    that Stanley had been charged three months earlier with possession
    of the same firearm.
    Based on this testimony, which the district court found
    credible, the court determined that a preponderance of the evidence
    established that Stanley had violated a term of his release by
    possessing a firearm.        After reviewing the record and giving due
    deference to the district court’s credibility determination in
    favor of the officer, we conclude that the court did not clearly
    err   in   finding   that    Stanley    violated    the    terms    of    release.
    Further, in light of the statutory requirement that release be
    revoked when the defendant possesses a firearm, see 18 U.S.C.
    § 3583(g)(2) (2012), revocation of Stanley’s supervised release
    was not an abuse of discretion.
    3
    II
    Stanley   also   contends     that       his   24-month     sentence     is
    unreasonable.        A   sentence     imposed       following     revocation     of
    supervised release will be affirmed if it is within the applicable
    statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.                 United States
    v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    , 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006).                 Stanley does not
    dispute that he received the maximum sentence to which he was
    statutorily subject. We conclude that the sentence is procedurally
    reasonable:       the district court considered both the Chapter 7
    policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors that
    it was permitted to consider.             See 
    id. at 438-40.
            Finally, we
    hold that the sentence also is substantively reasonable.                        The
    district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing the
    sentence, noting that Stanley possessed a firearm after having
    been previously convicted of being a felon in possession of a
    firearm, and that Stanley had absconded from probation twice.                   The
    court    expressed   the   need     for       deterrence   and    said   that   its
    overarching concern was protecting the public.
    III
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
    in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.                    We
    therefore affirm.        This court requires that counsel inform his
    client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of
    the United States for further review.             If the client requests that
    4
    a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
    would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave
    to withdraw from representation.        Counsel=s motion must state that
    a copy of the motion was served on his client.           We dispense with
    oral   argument   because   the   facts    and   legal   contentions   are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-4101

Citation Numbers: 669 F. App'x 124

Judges: Niemeyer, Motz, Diaz

Filed Date: 10/4/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024