United States v. Glenn Young ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4131
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GLENN YOUNG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones,
District Judge. (2:14-cr-00004-JPJ-PMS-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: June 3, 2016
Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Barry L. Proctor, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant. John P.
Fishwick, Jr., United States Attorney, Kevin L. Jayne, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Glenn Young of bribery of a public
official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A), (C) (2012),
and conspiracy to bribe a public official, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371 (2012). On appeal, Young argues that the
Government failed to present sufficient evidence to support
these convictions and that the district court plainly erred in
instructing the jury. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
“We review [a] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
de novo” and will “sustain the verdict if there is substantial
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government,
to support it.” United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th
Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to
support a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
Thus, “[a] defendant bringing a sufficiency challenge must
overcome a heavy burden, and reversal for insufficiency must be
confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
To convict Young of bribing a public official, the
Government had to prove that: (1) Kimberlee Crabtree, the nurse
at the prison where Young was incarcerated, qualified as a
public official; (2) Young corruptly gave, offered, or promised
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something of value to Crabtree (directly or indirectly); and (3)
Young did so with the intent “to influence any official act,” 18
U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A), or “to induce [her]. . . to do or omit to
do any act in violation of [her] lawful duty,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(b)(1)(C).
We need not decide whether Crabtree’s actions—smuggling
contraband into the prison and otherwise violating a variety of
prison regulations to effectuate the scheme—qualify as “official
acts” under § 201(b)(1)(A) because the Government presented
ample evidence that Young violated § 201(b)(1)(C). See United
States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 400 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(holding that “district court does not commit reversible error
when it submits a legally adequate, although factually
unsupported, theory of liability to the jury along with a
factually supported and legally adequate theory of liability”).
The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
Government establishes that Young approached Crabtree in July or
August of 2013 with an offer to pay her for any tobacco products
she could transport into the prison. Crabtree agreed to the
scheme because she needed money to help pay her daughter’s
medical bills and, between August and October, she delivered
several loads of tobacco products to Young. During the same
time period, Young arranged for third parties to wire payments
to Crabtree. We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to
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support Young’s bribery conviction under § 201(b)(1)(C) and his
related conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Alfisi, 308
F.3d 144, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that conviction
under § 201(b)(1)(C) is “most appropriate in the case of bribes
to induce actions that directly violate a specific duty, such as
a prison guard’s duty to prevent the smuggling of contraband”).
II.
During deliberations, the jury asked the court whether it
matters who initiated the transaction—Young or Crabtree. Young
contends that the district court erred when it responded that
the Government did not have to establish who initiated the
transactions so long as it proved the elements of the offenses.
Young suggests that the jury was concerned about the timing of
the payments: did Crabtree provide the contraband first or did
Young provide the payment first?
Because Young did not object to the court’s instruction
until after the jury returned its verdict, we review the
propriety of the instruction for plain error. United States v.
Tillery, 702 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2012). To establish plain
error, Young must demonstrate that (1) the district court
committed an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error
affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013). Moreover, the correction of such
an error lies within our discretion, which we exercise only if
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the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1127 (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Young has not met this demanding burden.
As we have explained, “the timing of the payment in relation to
the official act for which it is made is (in theory)
irrelevant.” United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014
(4th Cir. 1998); see United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 19
(1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he timing of the payment may not provide a
conclusive answer as to whether that payment is a bribe or a
gratuity . . . .”). What matters is whether Young offered or
promised to pay Crabtree with the intent to induce her to
disregard her lawful duties. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(C). The
district court, therefore, appropriately turned the jury’s focus
from the timing of the payments to the elements of the crime.
Finally, Young contends that the jury’s question indicates
that it had reason to believe that Crabtree offered to smuggle
contraband into the prison before Young agreed to pay her.
There is no evidence to support this assertion. Moreover, Young
would be no less guilty under this scenario. Young would still
be promising to pay a public official with the corrupt intent of
inducing her to violate her lawful duties. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(b)(1)(C). Notably, Crabtree’s testimony established that
she only agreed to the scheme because Young promised or offered
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to pay her the money she needed for her daughter’s medical
bills.
III.
We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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