Venus Springs v. Ally Financial Incorporated , 657 F. App'x 148 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1244
VENUS YVETTE SPRINGS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALLY FINANCIAL INCORPORATED, f/k/a GMAC Incorporated; AMY
BOUQUE,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
KATHLEEN PATTERSON; YEQUIANG HE, a/k/a Bill He; CYNTHIA
DAUTRICH,
Defendants.
No. 15-1888
VENUS YVETTE SPRINGS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALLY FINANCIAL INCORPORATED, f/k/a GMAC Incorporated; AMY
BOUQUE,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
KATHLEEN PATTERSON; YEQUIANG HE, a/k/a Bill He; CYNTHIA
DAUTRICH,
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00311-MOC-DCK)
Submitted: July 7, 2016 Decided: July 26, 2016
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
No. 15-1244 remanded; No. 15-1888 vacated by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Herman Kaufman, HERMAN KAUFMAN, ESQ., Old Greenwich,
Connecticut, for Appellant. Venus Yvette Springs, SPRINGS LAW
FIRM PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, Appellant Pro Se. Kirk
Gibson Warner, Clifton L. Brinson, SMITH, ANDERSON, BLOUNT,
DORSETT, MITCHELL & JERNIGAN, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Venus Yvette Springs appeals the district court’s order
affirming the magistrate judge’s order modifying a prior
protective order (No. 15-1244) and the court’s order denying in
part the motion for sanctions filed by Ally Financial, Inc., and
Amy Bouque (collectively, “Defendants”) and requiring Springs to
comply with the protective order (No. 15-1888). The parties
raise several jurisdictional challenges on appeal. We remand to
the district court for further proceedings in No. 15-1244 and
vacate the order in No. 15-1888.
I.
Defendants first argue that we lack jurisdiction over these
appeals. We may exercise jurisdiction over only final decisions
and certain interlocutory and collateral orders. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291, 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). “A final
decision is typically one by which a district court
disassociates itself from a case,” Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter,
558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted), and “ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the
judgment.” Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S.
863, 867 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude
that the district court’s orders are final, appealable orders
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for purposes of § 1291. Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Ass’n, 594 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2010); Solis v. Current Dev.
Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2009).
II.
Springs challenges the district court’s subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ motions for a protective
order and for sanctions. We review de novo a district court’s
determination of its subject matter jurisdiction. Barlow v.
Colgate Palmolive Co., 772 F.3d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 2014) (en
banc).
Springs argues that Defendants’ motion did not present an
Article III case or controversy. The Supreme Court, however,
has rejected the argument that the district court must have an
Article III case or controversy before it in order to consider
collateral issues. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135-36
(1992). Because an order on a collateral issue “implicates no
constitutional concern[,] . . . it does not signify a district
court’s assessment of the legal merits of the complaint” and,
“therefore[,] does not raise the issue of a district court
adjudicating the merits of a case or controversy over which it
lacks jurisdiction.” Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Springs next contends that the motion for a protective
order was not a proper collateral issue and, therefore, that the
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district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction. “It is well
established that a federal court may consider collateral issues
after an action is no longer pending.” Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990). Proper collateral
issues “are independent proceedings supplemental to the original
proceeding and not a request for a modification of the original
decree.” Id. at 395 (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted).
We conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to
consider Defendants’ postjudgment request for a protective
order. Like disputes over attorney’s fees, costs, and sanctions
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see id.
at 396, adjudicating Defendants’ request for a postjudgment
protective order for materials gained during discovery in the
underlying litigation does not require that the district court
delve into the merits of the closed litigation. Moreover,
Defendants’ request clearly arises from—and is related to—the
underlying litigation; but for discovery on the merits of
Springs’ ultimately unsuccessful claims, Springs would not have
deposed Bouque nor had possession of the video of Borque’s
deposition to later post on the internet.
Springs argues that her notice of appeal in No. 15-1244
divested the district court of jurisdiction to enter the
sanctions order at issue in No. 15-1888. “Generally, a timely
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filed notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction of a case to the
court of appeals and strips a district court of jurisdiction to
rule on any matters involved in the appeal.” Doe v. Pub.
Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 258 (4th Cir. 2014). “‘Although a
district court may not alter or enlarge the scope of its
judgment pending appeal, it does retain jurisdiction to enforce
the judgment.’” City of Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland Elec.
Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380, 394 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
NLRB v. Cincinnati Bronze, Inc., 829 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir.
1987)). We conclude that the district court therefore had
jurisdiction to order Springs to comply with the original
protective order.
III.
Springs contends that a third party’s public dissemination
of the video rendered moot Defendants’ request for a protective
order. The Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to the adjudication of actual cases or controversies.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).
“[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). “A
case becomes moot, however, only when it is impossible for a
court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing
party. As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however
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small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.”
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the request was not moot. While the
district court could not order the third party to remove the
video, the court could provide some remedy to Defendants by
ordering Springs to use the videos only for purposes of the
litigation, thereby preventing her from using the deposition to
create new videos to post on the internet.
IV.
Finally, Springs challenges the magistrate judge’s
authority to enter an order—rather than a recommendation—on
Defendants’ postjudgment motion for a protective order. The
Federal Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3402 (2012), 28
U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (2012), “delineates and circumscribes the
scope of magistrate judges’ authority. In doing so, the Act
explicitly grants magistrate judges a number of specific powers,
. . . [including] the authority ‘to hear and determine any
pretrial matter pending before the court, except’ for eight
enumerated dispositive motions.” United States v. Benton, 523
F.3d 424, 429-30 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A)). A district court reviews such determination
for clear error. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). “A magistrate judge
[also] may be assigned such additional duties as are not
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inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). Unlike a matter referred under
§ 636(b)(1)(A), review by the district court of a magistrate
judge’s discharge of duties under § 636(b)(3) is de novo. In re
Application of the U.S. of Am. for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 2703(D) (“In re Application”), 707 F.3d 283, 289
(4th Cir. 2013). In the absence of consent by the parties, a
magistrate judge lacks authority to enter a final order
disposing of the merits of a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72;
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 663 F.2d 499,
501 (4th Cir. 1981).
Generally, a district court refers pretrial discovery to a
magistrate judge under § 636(b)(1)(A) and reviews discovery
orders for clear error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Ocelot
Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1462 (10th Cir.
1988) (“Discovery is clearly a pretrial matter [under
§ 636(b)(1)(A)].”). Here, however, Defendants filed the motion
for a protective order after judgment was entered—not as part of
ongoing discovery in an open case. Neither the Federal
Magistrates Act nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address
whether a magistrate judge has authority to adjudicate
postjudgment motions.
We conclude that the magistrate judge lacked authority to
enter an order on Defendants’ motion for a protective order. A
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magistrate judge may not decide, postjudgment, a motion that
would be a proper pretrial motion under § 636(b)(1)(A) because
“resolution of such motions is dispositive of a claim.” Massey
v. City of Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 1993); see
Rajaratnam v. Moyer, 47 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 1995); Aluminum
Co. of Am., 663 F.2d at 501 (holding that motion to quash
subpoena “was not a ‘pretrial matter’ but set forth all of the
relief requested”). Therefore, the district court was required
to provide de novo review; its order makes clear, however, that
it reviewed only for clear error. In re Application, 707 F.3d
at 289; Aluminum Co. of Am., 663 F.2d at 501-02. “Although this
standard is not necessarily inconsistent with the requirements
of a de novo determination, the district judge did not clearly
indicate that he afforded the parties a de novo determination.
In order to satisfy the [Federal Magistrates] Act, he must do
so.” Aluminum Co. of Am., 663 F.2d at 502.
V.
Accordingly, we remand the order in No. 15-1244 for a de
novo review of the magistrate judge’s order. Because the order
in No. 15-1888 depends on the existence of the protective order,
we vacate the portion of the sanctions order requiring Springs
to comply with the protective order. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
No. 15-1244 REMANDED;
No. 15-1888 VACATED
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