Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs , 642 F. App'x 231 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1041
CERES MARINE TERMINALS, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; SAMUEL JACKSON,
Respondents.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board.
(14-0071)
Argued: December 8, 2015 Decided: March 24, 2016
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Petition for review denied by unpublished opinion. Judge
Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Floyd
joined.
ARGUED: Lawrence Philip Postol, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Petitioner. Ira Michael Steingold, STEINGOLD &
MENDELSON, Suffolk, Virginia; Sarah Marie Hurley, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Respondents. ON
BRIEF: M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, Rae Ellen James,
Associate Solicitor, Gary K. Stearman, Counsel for Appellate
Litigation, Mark A. Reinhalter, Counsel for Longshore, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Respondent
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United
States Department of Labor.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
This case arises from a horribly tragic work-related
accident. Samuel P. Jackson, an employee of Ceres Marine
Terminals, Inc. (“CMT”), was operating a forklift when he
accidently struck and killed his coworker, Paula Bellamy. After
this event, Jackson, who was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress
disorder (“PTSD”), filed a claim with the Director of the Office
of Workers’ Compensation Programs (the “Director”) for
disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (“LHWCA” or the “Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 901. The
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reviewing the claim determined
that Jackson was entitled to benefits and the Benefits Review
Board (the “Board”) affirmed.
CMT now petitions for review of the Board’s decision,
arguing that a person bringing a claim under the LHWCA is
required to satisfy the “zone of danger” test outlined by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994). “Under this test, a worker
within the zone of danger of physical impact will be able to
recover for emotional injury caused by fear of physical injury
to himself, whereas a worker outside the zone will not.” 512
U.S. at 556. Had the Board adopted such a test, CMT asserts,
Jackson would have been precluded from any recovery under the
LHWCA because he was not in the zone of danger and thus did not
3
suffer a compensable injury. In addition, CMT contends that the
ALJ erred in failing to give the report of an independent
medical examiner, appointed pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 907(e),
dispositive weight. We disagree on both points and therefore
deny the petition.
I.
A.
On March 28, 2011, Jackson, employed by CMT as a
longshoreman, was operating a forklift on a pier in Portsmouth,
Virginia, when he accidently struck and killed Bellamy. At the
time, Jackson was transporting barrels of container pins when he
veered the forklift to his left to avoid being struck by a
hustler truck that was backing up and carrying a forty foot
container. When he veered, he hit Bellamy, a spotter, who had
her back towards him. Jackson did not see Bellamy, and did not
realize he had hit her until another spotter “hollered at [him]
to let [him] know that [he] had just ran over . . . somebody.”
J.A. 61. Jackson immediately got off his forklift to help
extricate Bellamy who was almost completely pinned underneath
the forklift. Another forklift driver drove over and, with his
machine, raised the back end of Jackson’s forklift. Jackson and
others worked to free Bellamy from under his forklift.
4
Once they were able to lift the forklift, it was apparent
that Bellamy’s condition was dire: Jackson testified that
“[Bellamy] was bleeding from her mouth. Her arm was burned and
pretty mangled, hanging off.” J.A. 63. Jackson further
testified that Bellamy’s leg was wrapped around the axle of the
forklift. For about ten minutes, Bellamy’s condition was in
full view until emergency vehicles arrived. By this time,
approximately one hundred people gathered at the scene,
including ambulance and fire truck personnel and CMT employees.
During the entire time that the first responders worked to save
Bellamy, Jackson stood ten to fifteen feet away, with a clear
view of her.
After the ambulance left for the hospital, Jackson spent
the rest of the day reporting the accident to the Portsmouth
Police Department, Virginia International Terminals Police
Department, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
and CMT officials. Jackson testified that after his
conversation with Gregory Concepcion, the superintendent for
CMT, he sought medical attention.
B.
Jackson saw several medical professionals for mental health
treatment after the March 2011 accident. Jackson visited
Dr. Margaret Stiles, his primary care physician, on March 29,
2011, one day after the incident. Dr. Stiles noted that Jackson
5
was “acutely extremely upset, stressed,” and diagnosed and
treated him for PTSD. J.A. 351, 354, 360. At and around this
time, Dr. Stiles recommended that Jackson not return to work
because of his condition. On April 6, 2011, Dr. Stiles referred
Jackson to Gregory Griffin, a licensed clinical social worker,
for counseling. Griffin recommended brief supportive crisis-
debriefing counseling and that Jackson not return to work for
four to six weeks. Griffin diagnosed Jackson with an adjustment
reaction with depressed mood.
After Jackson’s family noticed “dramatic changes” in his
behavior, they collectively “persuade[d]” Jackson to see
Dr. Norbert Newfield. J.A. 286-87. Dr. Newfield, a clinical
psychologist, first evaluated Jackson on July 11, 2011.
Dr. Newfield found that Jackson suffered from PTSD with
significant levels of anxiety and depression resulting from the
work-related accident. Over the course of his treatment – from
mid-2011 through 2013 – Dr. Newfield usually saw Jackson on a
weekly basis, sometimes twice a week. On February 20, 2012,
almost a year after the accident, Dr. Newfield noted that
Jackson was still experiencing extremely bad nightmares and
levels of guilt, shame, and grief that prevented him from
6
returning to work. Dr. Newfield monitored Jackson for suicide
as well. 1
Dr. Patrick Thrasher, a psychiatrist retained by CMT,
conducted an independent medical examination of Jackson on
September 14, 2011, and reviewed Jackson’s medical records.
Dr. Thrasher diagnosed Jackson with PTSD and major depression,
and he concluded that these diagnoses were causally related to
the work accident. Dr. Thrasher stated that the severity of
Jackson’s depression and PTSD rendered him incapable of
returning to work. Dr. Thrasher further stated that with
aggressive psychiatric treatment and psychotherapy, Jackson
might be able to return to work within six to twelve months.
After reviewing updated medical records, Dr. Thrasher, on
February 12, 2012, noted that Jackson was undermedicated, and
recommended a more aggressive psychotropic treatment targeting
Jackson’s depressive symptoms and sleep disturbance.
Based on Dr. Thrasher’s recommendation that Jackson was
undermedicated, CMT requested, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 907(e),
an independent medical examination to determine if Jackson was
1 Dr. Newfield referred Jackson to a psychiatrist,
Dr. Deborah Giorgi-Guarnieri. Dr. Giorgi-Guarnieri began
treating Jackson on November 14, 2011. Dr. Giorgi-Guarnieri’s
notes indicate that she treated Jackson every two to four weeks.
Dr. Giorgi-Guarnieri recorded that Jackson had been battling
depression and anxiety and suffered from flashbacks and
nightmares. Dr. Giorgi-Guarnieri continued to see Jackson for
medication management.
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receiving proper medical care. In light of this request, the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs referred Jackson to
psychiatrist Dr. Paul Mansheim for an independent medical
examination. Dr. Mansheim evaluated Jackson on November 15,
2012, and reviewed Jackson’s medical records, as well as the
results of a standardized personality assessment inventory test.
In his December 8, 2012 report, Dr. Mansheim stated that the
diagnoses suggested by the personality assessment inventory test
were extremely broad and suggested PTSD, schizophrenia, and
major depressive disorder. Dr. Mansheim, however, “rule[d] out
the [PTSD] diagnosis” because Jackson “did not experience a
threat to himself” and “was never in danger” during the
accident. J.A. 154. Dr. Mansheim further opined that Jackson
demonstrated “significant evidence of malingering, attempting to
appear more ill than is actually the case.” J.A. 155.
Dr. Mansheim concluded that Jackson was able to work as a
longshoremen.
After reviewing Dr. Mansheim’s report, CMT – who had
voluntarily paid Jackson temporary total disability benefits –
terminated its payments on December 17, 2012.
C.
Jackson filed a claim for disability benefits under the
LHWCA, alleging that he suffered from PTSD as a result of the
8
work-related incident. 2 CMT disputed the claim, arguing that
Jackson was not entitled to compensation under the LHWCA for a
psychological injury because he did not sustain a physical
injury or was placed in immediate risk of physical injury by the
incident. In other words, Jackson was not in the zone of
danger. CMT further contended that the ALJ should give
dispositive weight to Dr. Manshiem’s conclusion that Jackson did
not suffer from PTSD.
In his November 13, 2013 decision, the ALJ rejected CMT’s
“contention that a claimant cannot recover for psychological
injury unless he sustains a physical injury or is placed in
immediate risk of harm.” J.A. 44. The ALJ held that
“[l]ongshore case law has established that a claimant can obtain
benefits for a work-related psychological injury,” and declined
“to carve out a negligence law based exception whereby claimants
are not entitled to benefits if they are emotionally harmed
2In addition to filing a claim under the LHWCA, Jackson
filed a claim with the Virginia Workers’ Compensation
Commission. The commission denied Jackson’s claim for medical
benefits and compensation, holding that Jackson was not in the
zone of danger. See Jackson v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc.,
769 S.E.2d 276, 277 (Va. Ct. App. 2015). The Court of Appeals
of Virginia reversed, declining to adopt a zone of danger test
under Virginia law. The court held that “psychological injury
must be causally related to either a physical injury or an
obvious sudden shock or fright arising in the course of
employment, without a specific requirement that the claimant be
placed at risk of harm.” Id. at 280. The court remanded the
case back to the commission to apply the correct legal standard.
That case is currently pending.
9
without being physically harmed or threatened with physical
harm.” Id. Addressing the medical evidence, the ALJ first
refused, as contrary to Board precedent, to accord dispositive
weight to Dr. Manshiem’s opinion. After weighing the evidence,
the ALJ found that Jackson suffered from PTSD which was causally
related to the March 28, 2011, work incident. The ALJ concluded
that, because Jackson “is suffering from work-accident related
PTSD,” he was entitled to temporary total disability benefits
and medical benefits under the LHWCA. Id. at 50.
CMT appealed, raising the same arguments to the Board. In
its November 25, 2014 opinion, the Board rejected CMT’s
contention that the zone-of-danger test precluded Jackson from
recovery in this case. The zone-of-danger test, the Board held,
is a “tort concept which does not apply to the workers’
compensation provisions of the Longshore Act.” J.A. 10. The
Board stated that CMT’s “argument fails to acknowledge the
critical distinction, [as recognized in Consolidated Rail],
between tort actions, which rely on common law fault and
negligence principles, and worker’s compensation claims, which
are not governed by those principles.” Id. It is well
established, the Board concluded, “that a work-related
psychological impairment, with or without an underlying physical
harm, may be compensable under the Act.” Id. at 9-10.
10
In addition, the Board rejected CMT’s contention that
Dr. Mansheim’s opinion should be given dispositive weight,
holding that Dr. Mansheim’s opinion “should be weighed along
with the other medical opinions in the record.” Id. at 12.
Because the ALJ properly weighed the evidence, the Board
affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Jackson sustained a compensable
work-related injury.
II.
CMT has petitioned this Court for review, and we possess
jurisdiction pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). In reviewing the
Board’s decision, we must determine “whether the Board observed
its statutorily-mandated standard for reviewing the ALJ’s
factual findings.” Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v.
Stallings, 250 F.3d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). We are also guided by the
principle that an ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a
whole.” 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3). Substantial evidence requires
“more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Norfolk
Shipbldg. & Drydock Co. v. Faulk, 228 F.3d 378, 380–81 (4th Cir.
2000). Further, an ALJ’s findings “may not be disregarded on
the basis that other inferences might have been more reasonable.
Deference must be given the fact-finder’s . . . credibility
11
assessments, and . . . the scope of review of ALJ findings is
limited.” Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. Tann, 841
F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1988). In reviewing legal issues, the
Board’s “adjudicatory interpretation of the LHWCA is entitled to
no special deference, and is subject to our independent review.
However, a reasonable interpretation of the LHWCA by the
Director should be respected.” Stallings, 250 F.3d at 871(internal quotations and citations omitted).
III.
The LHWCA was enacted to create a federal workers’
compensation statute for longshoremen and harbor workers, in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision that state workers’
compensation statutes constitutionally could not apply to
injured maritime workers. See Nogueira v. N.Y., New Haven &
Hartford R. Co., 281 U.S. 128 (1930). The LHWCA, like most
workers’ compensation legislation, represents a compromise
between employer and employee. “Consistent with the central
bargain of workers’ compensation regimes - limited liability for
employers; certain, prompt recovery for employees - the LHWCA
requires that employers pay benefits voluntarily, without formal
administrative proceedings.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1350, 1354 (2012).
12
In other words, the LHWCA strikes a balance between the
competing interests of injured workers and their employers in
which the certainty of benefits is exchanged for tort immunity.
See Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 461 U.S. 624,
636 (1983); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 449 U.S. 268,
281-82 & n.24 (1980). The LHWCA, therefore, “imposes liability
without fault and precludes the assertion of various common-law
defenses . . . .” Potomac Elec. Power Co., 449 U.S. at 281; see
also 33 U.S.C. § 904(b) (“Compensation shall be payable
irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury.”).
To be entitled to benefits under the LHWCA, a claimant must
have sustained an injury within the meaning of the Act. See 33
U.S.C. § 903(a) (“Compensation shall be payable under this [Act]
in respect of disability . . . of an employee, but only if the
disability . . . results from an injury.”); see also Metro.
Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 294 (1995) (stating that
the LHWCA “is a comprehensive scheme to provide compensation in
respect of disability or death of an employee . . . if the
disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States”). Section 902(2) of the
LHWCA provides,
The term “injury” means accidental injury or
death arising out of and in the course of
employment, and such occupational disease or
infection as arises naturally out of such
employment or as naturally or unavoidably
13
results from such accidental injury, and
includes an injury caused by the willful act
of a third person directed against an
employee because of his employment.
33 U.S.C. § 902(2).
Injuries are presumed to be work related under 33 U.S.C.
§ 920 after the claimant establishes a prima facie case that the
injury not only was caused by the employment, but that it also
arose during employment. See U.S. Indus. Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc.
v. Dir., OWCP, 455 U.S. 608, 615 (1982) (“Not only must the
injury have been caused by the employment, it also must have
arisen during the employment.”). “Once the presumption is
invoked, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut it through
facts - not mere speculation - that the harm was not work
related.” Conoco, Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 194 F.3d 684, 687-88 (5th
Cir. 1999). “If the ALJ finds that the employer rebutted the
presumption, then the ALJ must weigh all of the evidence to
determine whether the harm was caused by the claimant’s
employment.” Ramsey Scarlett & Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 806 F.3d 327,
331 (5th Cir. 2015).
IV.
In its petition for review, CMT makes two primary
arguments. First, CMT argues that Jackson did not suffer a
compensable injury within the meaning of the LHWCA because he
14
was not in the zone of danger; that is, only those who suffer a
physical injury or were within the zone of danger of physical
impact can recover for a work-related psychological injury.
Because Jackson was outside of the zone of danger, CMT asserts,
he did not suffer any compensable injury under the LHWCA.
Second, CMT contends that the ALJ committed error by failing to
give Dr. Mansheim’s opinion dispositive weight. The Director
maintains, on the other hand, that it is well established that
psychological injuries – with or without physical injury or the
threat of physical injury – are compensable under the LHWCA.
The Director further contends that Dr. Mansheim’s opinion was
not entitled to dispositive weight and is not binding on the
factfinder. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the
Director on both issues.
A.
CMT does not dispute that Jackson can recover for a
psychological injury under the LHWCA. Rather, CMT contends that
Jackson cannot, under the LHWCA, recover for a psychological
injury unless he sustains a physical injury or was placed in
immediate risk of physical harm. In support of this argument,
CMT relies exclusively on the zone-of-danger test set forth by
the Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail – a case that did not
involve the statute at issue in this case. CMT’s contention is
not only inconsistent with the statute’s text, the structure of
15
the statute, and precedent but is also contradicted by the very
reasoning of the case on which it relies so heavily –
Consolidated Rail.
The LHWCA plainly does not encompass such a limitation by
its express terms. The LHWCA does not distinguish between
psychological and physical injuries – the statute simply says
“injury.” See 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (defining “injury,” without
limitation, as any “accidental injury or death arising out of
and in the course of employment”). Nowhere in the statute is
there a requirement that psychological injuries be accompanied
by actual or threatened physical harm. To be sure, Congress
could have easily written the statute to contain such a
requirement, but it did not. We therefore refuse to “amend
[the] statute under the guise of statutory interpretation, a
task we are not at liberty to perform.” Newport News Shipbldg.
& Dry Dock Co. v. Hall, 674 F.2d 248, 251 (4th Cir. 1982). For
good reason. The zone-of-danger test is, after all, a “well-
established common-law concept of negligence.” Consolidated
Rail, 512 U.S. at 555 (quotations and alterations omitted). The
rules of the common law for tort actions, however, generally do
not apply to cases arising under LHWCA – a “no-fault workers
16
compensation scheme.” 3 See Newport News Shipbldg. and Dry Dock
Co. v. Brown, 376 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 2004).
Further, courts interpreting § 902(2) of the LHWCA have
held that claimants can recover for a work-related psychological
injury, and have never mandated actual or threatened physical
harm to be a prerequisite for coverage. See, e.g., Pedroza v.
Dir., OWCP, 624 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (“It is well
settled that a psychological impairment, which is work related,
is presumed to be compensable under the Act. Therefore, to
receive the benefit of this § 920(a) presumption, the claimant
must prove not only that he has a psychological impairment, but
that an accident occurred, or working conditions existed, which
could have caused the impairment.” (citation omitted)); Dir.,
OWCP v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 607 F.2d 1378, 1385 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. Hagen, 327 F.2d 559, 561 (7th Cir.
1964). Nor has the Board endorsed such a limitation. See,
e.g., J.A. at 9-10 (“[I]t is well established that a work-
related psychological impairment, with or without an underlying
physical harm, may be compensable under the Act.”).
3 We recognize that, under certain limited circumstances,
the longshore worker may seek damages in a statutory negligence
action from the owner of the vessel on which he was injured
under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). This case does not present such
circumstances.
17
Moreover, CMT’s reliance on Consolidated Rail is wholly
misplaced. In Consolidated Rail, a case in which a railroad
worker experienced severe psychiatric problems after witnessing
the death of a fellow worker while on the job and was required
to continue working within sight of the coworker’s body, the
Supreme Court held that claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress are cognizable under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (“FELA”). 512 U.S. at 550. But to curtail what
it believed might otherwise be “unpredictable and nearly
infinite liability for defendants,” id. at 552, the Court
adopted the zone-of-danger test developed as common law in many
jurisdictions. Id. at 554-55. The Court expressly stated that
FELA was not a workers’ compensation statute and emphasized that
the basis of an employer’s liability under FELA is its
negligence, which turns on common-law principles. Unlike the
statute at issue here, FELA “does not make the employer the
insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty.
The basis of his liability is his negligence, not the fact that
injuries occur.” Id. at 543 (quoting Ellis v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947)). Thus, by its terms,
Consolidated Rail is inapposite to a claim for workers’
compensation benefits under the LHWCA.
18
Because we are not free to engraft on the statute a
requirement that Congress did not place there, we decline to
adopt the zone-of-danger test.
B.
CMT next contends that the ALJ erred in failing to give the
report of Dr. Mansheim, an independent medical examiner
appointed pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 907(e), dispositive weight.
We disagree, as there is nothing in the plain language of the
statute that indicates that Congress intended to give the
opinion of an independent medical examiner dispositive weight or
to make the examiner’s opinion binding on the parties.
Section 7(e) provides in part,
In the event that medical questions are
raised in any case, the Secretary shall have
the power to cause the employee to be
examined by a physician employed or selected
by the Secretary and to obtain from such
physician a report containing his estimate
of the employee’s physical impairment and
such other information as may be
appropriate. Any party who is dissatisfied
with such report may request a review or
reexamination of the employee by one or more
different physicians employed or selected by
the Secretary. The Secretary shall order
such review or reexamination unless he finds
that it is clearly unwarranted.
33 U.S.C. § 907(e) (emphasis added). Were we to read the
statute as CMT does, we would nullify the second clause of
§ 907(e), which provides the opportunity for further review by
another physician if a party is dissatisfied with the
19
independent medical examiner’s opinion. We therefore decline
CMT’s invitation to do so, as the second clause clearly
indicates that the independent medical examiner’s opinion is not
binding on the ALJ or the parties. Rather, the independent
medical examiner’s opinion must be weighed along with the other
medical opinions of record, as the Board has repeatedly held.
See Cotton v. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 23 B.R.B.S.
380, 387 (1990); Shell v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 14
B.R.B.S. 585 (1984).
Our interpretation of this provision is not only consistent
with other circuits but is also consistent with the position
advanced by CMT in a separate case. In Ceres Marine Terminal v.
Hinton, 243 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2001), CMT argued, “an opinion of
a Department of Labor IME is entitled to great weight. This is
not to say that the Department of Labor IME’s opinion is
dispositive.” Compare Br. of Pet., Ceres Marine Terminal v.
Hinton, 243 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-60171), 2000 WL
34004373, at *46, with CMT’s Br. at 40 (“Dr. Mansheim’s opinion
should have been dispositive. . . . Indeed, isn’t the whole
purpose of a section 7(e) evaluation to resolve the case?”).
The Fifth Circuit rejected CMT’s argument, holding that the
ALJ’s conclusions – after weighing all the medical evidence,
including the independent medical examiner’s report - must only
20
be “supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.”
Hinton, 243 F.3d at 225.
CMT further argued in Hinton that if the ALJ “is going to
reject the Department of Labor IME’s opinion, the [ALJ] needs a
very good reason for doing so.” Br. of Pet., Hinton, 2000 WL
34004373 at *46. Here, CMT should take solace in the fact that
the ALJ provided several “good reason[s]” in giving less weight
to Dr. Mansheim’s opinion. One reason, among many, was
Dr. Mansheim’s unsubstantiated statement that the traumatic
event experienced by Jackson – the prime actor in this incident
– would not meet the criteria for PTSD because, if Jackson
qualified, then more than half the population would meet the
diagnosis, as that population has seen an image of a mangled
body. The ALJ concluded that “Dr. Manshiem’s estimates on
population experience raise concerns that his report is not
well-reasoned and well-documented.” J.A. 49. Indeed.
Because the statute clearly does not contemplate an ALJ
giving dispositive weight to an independent medical examiner’s
opinion, we decline to “amend [the] statute under the guise of
statutory interpretation.” Hall, 674 F.2d at 251.
C.
In weighing the evidence as a whole, the ALJ found the
opinions of Jackson’s treating psychologist, Dr. Newfield, and
CMT’s expert psychiatrist, Dr. Thrasher, credible; both
21
physicians diagnosed Jackson with PTSD and concluded that this
diagnosis was causally related to the work accident. The ALJ
further found that those opinions outweighed Dr. Mansheim’s
opinion that Jackson did not meet the criteria for a diagnosis
of PTSD. CMT’s arguments on appeal, in effect, seek a
reweighing of the evidence, which we are not empowered to do.
Thus, the ALJ’s conclusion that Jackson suffered a work-related
psychological injury is amply supported by substantial evidence
when the record is considered as a whole.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, CMT’s petition must be denied.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED
22