Robert Marcellus v. Virginia State Board of Elections ( 2017 )


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  •                                     PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 16-1331
    ROBERT G. MARCELLUS; DAVID WILLIAMS; BARRY HODGE;
    TIMOTHY    GRESHAM; POWHATAN   COUNTY   REPUBLICAN
    COMMITTEE,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; JAMES B. ALCORN, in his
    official capacity as a member and Chairman of the Virginia State Board of
    Elections; CLARA BELLE WHEELER, in her official capacity as a member and
    Vice Chair of the Virginia State Board of Elections; SINGLETON B.
    MCALLISTER, in her official capacity as a member and Secretary of the Virginia
    State Board of Elections,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
    Richmond. M. Hannah Lauck, District Judge. (3:15-cv-00481-MHL)
    Argued: December 7, 2016                                 Decided: February 21, 2017
    Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge
    Traxler and Judge Harris joined.
    ARGUED: Patrick Michael McSweeney, MCSWEENEY, CYNKAR &
    KACHOUROFF, PLLC, Powhatan, Virginia, for Appellants. Joshua D. Heslinga,
    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for
    Appellees. ON BRIEF: Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Cynthia
    Hudson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, John W. Daniel II, Deputy Attorney General,
    Heather Hays Lockerman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Anna T. Birkenheier,
    Assistant Attorney General, Stuart A. Raphael, Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
    2
    NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
    The Powhatan County Republican Committee and four individuals nominated by
    the Committee to be candidates for election to the Board of Supervisors for Powhatan
    County, Virginia, commenced this action against the Virginia State Board of Elections to
    challenge the constitutionality of the portion of Virginia Code § 24.2-613(B) that
    provides that only candidates in elections “for federal, statewide, and General Assembly
    offices” may be identified on the ballot by the name of the political party that nominated
    them or by the term “Independent.” The plaintiffs allege that providing political party
    identifiers for candidates for federal, statewide, and General Assembly offices, while
    denying such ballot identifiers for candidates for all local offices, violates their right of
    association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and their right to equal
    protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
    On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court entered judgment in
    favor of the Virginia State Board of Elections, upholding the constitutionality of the
    challenged portion of § 24.2-613(B), and we affirm. We conclude that the burden on
    associational rights imposed by Virginia’s regulation of the use of party identifiers on
    official ballots is at most minimal and is amply justified by Virginia’s important interests,
    which include minimizing partisanship at the local government level, promoting impartial
    governance, and maximizing the number of citizens eligible to hold local office under the
    Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326. We similarly conclude that § 24.2-613(B)’s different
    treatment of local candidates and federal, statewide, and General Assembly candidates
    3
    with respect to party identifiers on the ballot does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
    because such treatment is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests.
    I. Statutory Scheme
    In Virginia, candidates for elected office can generally qualify to be placed on an
    election ballot either by filing a declaration of candidacy and a petition signed by the
    requisite number of qualified voters, see Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-506, or by receiving the
    nomination of a “political party,” as defined by statute, see 
    id. §§ 24.2-101,
    24.2-511.
    The only organizations that currently qualify under the statute’s definition are the
    Republican Party and the Democratic Party. See Libertarian Party of Va. v. Alcorn, 
    826 F.3d 708
    , 712 (4th Cir. 2016).
    The form of ballots used in Virginia elections is tightly regulated by statute and by
    standards prescribed by the Virginia State Board of Elections. See Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-
    613(A). For example, every ballot, whether printed or presented through an approved
    electronic voting system, contains a header with the words “Commonwealth of Virginia”
    and “Official Ballot.” And Virginia’s regulation of the ballot extends to details such as
    font size and the number of characters per line. Localities are required to submit ballot
    proofs to the Virginia Department of Elections for verification and approval.
    The ballots’ content is also strictly regulated. In 1870, when Virginia formally
    adopted the use of written ballots, the General Assembly specified that the ballot be “a
    white paper ticket . . . containing . . . the names of the persons for whom the elector
    intends to vote, and designating the office to which each person so named[] is intended
    4
    by him to be chosen.” An Act to Provide for a General Election, ch. 76, § 31, 1869-70
    Va. Acts 78, 85. Not until 1970 did the General Assembly amplify the content to include,
    in connection with candidates for President, a party identifier for each candidate. See Act
    of April 3, 1970, ch. 462, § 2, 1970 Va. Acts 826, 853 (“No names of political parties
    shall appear on the ballot, except in presidential elections . . .”). In 2000, the General
    Assembly again expanded the list of offices for which party identifiers are to be used to
    include “federal, statewide, and General Assembly offices,” but those offices “only.” Act
    of April 6, 2000, ch. 514, § 1, 2000 Va. Acts 915, 915. While bills have been introduced
    since to expand further the list of offices for which identifiers are used, none has been
    enacted.
    Thus, in its current state, Virginia Code § 24.2-613(B) provides that party
    identifiers are used on the ballot only in connection with candidates for President of the
    United States, members of the U.S. Senate, members of the U.S. House of
    Representatives, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General of Virginia, members
    of the Senate of Virginia, and members of the Virginia House of Delegates. Conversely,
    § 24.2-613(B) prohibits party identifiers for candidates for all local offices, including
    candidates for county boards of supervisors and city and town councils; local school
    boards; mayors; clerks of court; Commonwealth’s attorneys; sheriffs; revenue
    commissioners; treasurers; and soil and water conservation district directors.        This
    restriction is imposed even though candidates for most local offices are allowed to
    qualify for placement on the ballot by being nominated by the local chapter of one of the
    major political parties. See Va. Code Ann. §§ 24.2-509(A), 24.2-511.
    5
    When including identifiers, the State Board of Elections uses the name of the
    political party that nominated the candidate. If the candidate qualified for the ballot by
    petition, the Board uses the term “Independent,” unless the candidate produces “sufficient
    and appropriate evidence” that he or she was nominated by a “recognized political party.”
    Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-613(B). The Board represents these identifiers on the ballot using
    capital letters — (D) for Democrat, (R) for Republican, (L) for Libertarian, (G) for
    Green, (IG) for Independent Green, (C) for Constitution, and (I) for Independent.
    There is no restriction on any candidate’s advertising his or her party nomination,
    association, or endorsement.     Moreover, voters can learn which candidates were
    nominated by political parties on the “What is on my Ballot?” section of the Virginia
    Department of Elections’ website.
    II. Facts
    In May 2015, the Powhatan County Republican Committee nominated Robert
    Marcellus, David Williams, Barry Hodge, and Timothy Gresham to be Republican
    candidates for positions on the Powhatan County Board of Supervisors during the
    November 2015 general election. As provided by Virginia Code § 24.2-511(B), each of
    those candidates qualified to have his name appear on his local ballot after the Chairman
    of the Committee certified his nomination to both the Virginia State Board of Elections
    and the General Registrar of Powhatan County.          Accordingly, the ballots for the
    November 3, 2015 general election included their names but not any party identifiers next
    to their names or, indeed, next to the names of any candidate for local office. The ballot
    6
    did, however, include party identifiers for candidates seeking seats in the General
    Assembly. Even though the 2015 general election is now passed, these four candidates
    state that they intend to run for local office in the future as political party nominees.
    In their two-count complaint, filed in August 2015, the plaintiffs alleged that they
    have the right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments “to be associated on the
    general election ballot with the political party that nominated them to the same extent as
    federal, statewide, and General Assembly candidates” and that § 24.2-613(B), which
    denied them “the benefit of party identification,” was “arbitrary, unreasonable and
    discriminatory” and therefore impermissibly burdened their right of association. They
    also alleged that § 24.2-613(B) violated their right to equal protection under the
    Fourteenth Amendment because they were “similarly situated” to candidates for federal,
    statewide, and General Assembly offices and yet were treated disparately by the statute.
    The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that § 24.2-613(B) is invalid and an
    injunction requiring the Commonwealth to include party identifiers on the ballot for
    candidates for local offices.
    On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the court entered an order
    and memorandum opinion dated March 4, 2016, granting judgment to the Virginia State
    Board of Elections. With respect to its jurisdiction, the court concluded that even though
    the 2015 election had already taken place, the case was not moot, as the challenged action
    was capable of repetition, yet evading review. On the merits, the court concluded that the
    plaintiffs’ “constitutional challenges falter no matter which test applies.”
    This appeal followed.
    7
    III. Associational Rights
    The plaintiffs argue that even though “neither political parties nor their nominees
    have an absolute right to placement of a party identifier on the ballot, they [do] have a
    First Amendment associational right to nondiscriminatory treatment when the
    government grants a privilege or benefit related to the election ballot.” They claim in this
    case that it is the “unjustified discrimination between the statute’s classifications” that
    defines the impermissible burden on them and their associational rights under the First
    Amendment. Thus, while the plaintiffs locate their claim within the First Amendment
    and accept the required analysis of balancing a statute’s burden against its justification,
    they rely on equal protection principles to argue that the statute’s disparate regulation of
    party identifiers burdens their associational rights.
    The government argues that the Virginia statute imposes no burden on plaintiffs’
    associational rights and, alternatively, that any burden that might be identified is “easily”
    justified by the legitimate governmental purposes served by the statute.
    It is well established that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right of citizens to
    associate and to form political parties for the advancement of common political goals and
    ideas,” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 
    520 U.S. 351
    , 357 (1997), and that this
    component of the First Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth
    Amendment, see NAACP v. Alabama, 
    357 U.S. 449
    , 460 (1958). “It does not follow,
    however, that . . . the right to associate for political purposes through the ballot [is]
    absolute.” Burdick v. Takushi, 
    504 U.S. 428
    , 433 (1992) (emphasis added). Rather,
    “[c]ommon sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government
    8
    must play an active role in structuring elections,” 
    id., even though
    election laws
    “inevitably affect[] — at least to some degree — the individual’s right to vote and his
    right to associate with others for political ends,” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
    460 U.S. 780
    ,
    788 (1983). Indeed, “[t]he States possess a ‘broad power to prescribe the “Times, Places
    and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1,
    which power is matched by state control over the election process for state offices.’”
    Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 
    552 U.S. 442
    , 451 (2008) (quoting
    Clingman v. Beaver, 
    544 U.S. 581
    , 586 (2005)). Nonetheless, state regulation must be
    exercised in a way that does not violate other specific provisions of the Constitution. 
    Id. When analyzing
    whether a state election law impermissibly impinges on
    associational rights protected by the First Amendment, we apply the framework
    developed by the Supreme Court in Anderson and Burdick. See 
    Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358
    .
    In Anderson, where the Supreme Court was considering an early filing deadline
    for independent candidates, the Court articulated the applicable analysis:
    [A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
    injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that
    the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the
    precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
    imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only
    determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must
    consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
    plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing
    court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is
    unconstitutional.
    
    9 460 U.S. at 789
    . And in Burdick, the Court built upon this framework, rejecting the
    argument “that a law that imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to
    strict 
    scrutiny.” 504 U.S. at 432
    . Instead, as the Court explained, the “rigorousness” of
    the inquiry “depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and
    Fourteenth Amendment rights.” 
    Id. at 434.
    Specifically, while laws imposing “severe”
    restrictions must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling
    importance,” 
    id. (quoting Norman
    v. Reed, 
    502 U.S. 279
    , 289 (1992)), “a state election
    law provision [that] imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon . . .
    First and Fourteenth Amendment rights” is generally justified by “the State’s important
    regulatory interests,” 
    id. (quoting Anderson,
    460 U.S. at 788).
    Thus, when applying the Anderson-Burdick analysis, we consider first “the
    character and magnitude” of the burden that Virginia Code § 24.2-613(B) imposes on
    associational rights. In doing so, we observe that the statute has no effect on any
    candidate’s ability to earn a place on the ballot. Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 
    393 U.S. 23
    , 31
    (1968) (“The right to form a party for the advancement of political goals means little if a
    party can be kept off the election ballot . . .”). The statute also does not have any impact
    on any political organization’s “right to choose [its] ‘standard bearer’ in the form of a
    nominee.” S.C. Green Party v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 
    612 F.3d 752
    , 756 (4th Cir.
    2010) (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 
    489 U.S. 214
    , 224 (1989)).
    While the plaintiffs agree with these observations, they argue that a burden on
    their associational rights is imposed by § 24.2-613(B)’s creation of a distinction between
    candidates seeking a federal, state, or General Assembly office, whose names on the
    10
    ballot include identifiers, and candidates for all other offices, whose names on the ballot
    appear without identifiers. This argument is not unlike the one made in Timmons.
    In Timmons, the Court was presented with a Minnesota law that “prohibit[ed] a
    candidate from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one party,” even
    though the candidate may have been nominated by more than one 
    party. 520 U.S. at 354
    .
    In holding that the law did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court
    reasoned that while a political party — there, the “New Party” — has the right to select
    its own candidate, “[i]t does not follow . . . that a party is absolutely entitled to have its
    nominee appear on the ballot as that party’s candidate.” 
    Id. at 359
    (emphasis added).
    The New Party had argued that the law impermissibly burdened “its right . . . to
    communicate its choice of nominees on the ballot on terms equal to those offered other
    parties.” 
    Id. at 362.
    While the Court accepted that the law “prevent[ed] the New Party
    from using the ballot to communicate to the public that it supports a particular candidate
    who is already another party’s candidate” and “shut[] off one possible avenue a party
    might use to send a message to its preferred candidate,” 
    id. (emphasis omitted),
    it was
    “unpersuaded” by the New Party’s “contention that it has a right to use the ballot itself to
    send a particularized message,” emphasizing that “[b]allots serve primarily to elect
    candidates, not as forums for political expression,” 
    id. at 363
    (emphasis added).
    In Washington State Grange, the Court relied upon Timmons when rejecting a
    First Amendment challenge brought by several political parties to a Washington statute
    that provided that “candidates for office shall be identified on the ballot by their self-
    designated ‘party preference,’” regardless of whether they were nominated by the party
    11
    they 
    designated. 552 U.S. at 444
    . Thus, under the challenged law, “[a] political party
    [could not] prevent a candidate who [was] unaffiliated with, or even repugnant to, the
    party from designating it as his party of preference.” 
    Id. at 447.
    As a consequence,
    political parties no longer had any ability to “indicate their nominees on the ballot.” 
    Id. at 453
    n.7. The Court characterized that feature of the law as “unexceptional,” explaining
    that “[t]he First Amendment does not give political parties a right to have their nominees
    designated as such on the ballot.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    And, as importantly, the Court
    stated that “[p]arties do not gain such a right simply because the State affords candidates
    the opportunity to indicate their party preference on the ballot.” 
    Id. The jurisprudence
    of Timmons and Washington State Grange thus makes clear that
    even though a statute such as § 24.2-613(B) may prevent political parties from indicating
    on the ballot which local candidates are their nominees, it does not impose a
    constitutionally cognizable burden on those parties’ associational rights because “[t]he
    First Amendment does not give political parties a right to have their nominees designated
    as such on the ballot.” Washington State 
    Grange, 552 U.S. at 453
    n.7. Moreover, that
    jurisprudence similarly confirms that local candidates themselves have no First
    Amendment right to use the ballot “as [a] forum[] for political expression” in which to
    communicate to voters their status as a party’s nominee. 
    Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363
    .
    The plaintiffs seem to accept much of this jurisprudence. They contend, however,
    in somewhat of a different vein, that they “suffer[ed] a detrimental effect on their
    associational rights [because] the Commonwealth of Virginia discriminate[d] against
    them and other local candidates by denying them a party identifier next to their names on
    12
    the ballot while requiring a party identifier on the ballot next to the names of party
    nominees for General Assembly, statewide[,] and federal offices.”           In making this
    argument, they rely on the Supreme Court’s oft-stated recognition that a State’s
    “important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable,
    nondiscriminatory restrictions,” 
    Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788
    (emphasis added), and reason
    that “they have a First Amendment associational right to nondiscriminatory treatment
    when the government grants a privilege or benefit related to the election ballot.” They
    argue that § 24.2-613(B) violates that nondiscrimination principle by treating them
    differently than federal, statewide, and General Assembly candidates.
    The plaintiffs, however, fail to explain why the statute’s different treatment of
    candidates based on the offices they seek imposes a burden on their right of association.
    Under the challenged provision, a Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate may receive
    a benefit from an identifier indicating that he or she is the Republican Party nominee,
    while a Republican candidate for county sheriff does not. The county sheriff candidate,
    however, is hardly affected by the fact that the Senate candidate has an identifier. The
    candidate for county sheriff is treated like every other candidate for that office, none of
    whom can have a party identifier under § 24.2-613(B). In that manner, the restriction on
    party identifiers does not burden the associational rights of any local candidate.
    Of course, if a law gives some candidates for the Senate a party identifier, but not
    other candidates for the Senate, it would impose a burden on the associational rights of
    the candidates left unidentified, even though no candidate has an absolute right to be so
    identified. See Rosen v. Brown, 
    970 F.2d 169
    , 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1992) (invalidating an
    13
    Ohio law that provided a party identifier for candidates nominated by political parties for
    an office but that prohibited a nonparty candidate for that same office from being labeled
    as an “Independent”). But one can hardly conclude that a candidate for county sheriff is
    burdened by the different treatment afforded to a candidate for the Senate.
    The plaintiffs might argue to the contrary that the presence of party identifiers next
    to the names of candidates for the Senate and the absence of such identifiers next to the
    names of candidates for county sheriff might be misleading as voters might incorrectly
    infer that none of the candidates for sheriff were nominated by a political party. But, as
    the district court noted, the Supreme Court found exactly this type of assumption
    regarding voter confusion insufficient to support a facial challenge to the election law at
    issue in Washington State Grange. 
    See 552 U.S. at 454
    (“[R]espondents’ assertion that
    voters will misinterpret the party-preference designation is sheer speculation. . . . There
    is simply no basis to presume that a well-informed electorate will interpret a candidate’s
    party-preference designation to mean that the candidate is the party’s chosen nominee or
    representative or that the party associates with or approves of the candidate”). Similarly,
    the plaintiffs might argue that a party-nominated candidate for county sheriff is denied
    the “coattails” benefit of announcing his association with the same party that is identified
    as nominating a particular candidate for the Senate. Yet, not only have the plaintiffs
    failed to demonstrate any such benefit, but conveying such an associational message is
    not an entitlement they have in connection with the content of Virginia’s official ballots.
    The plaintiffs would merely be arguing that the law prevents them from relaying the
    message that they too are party-nominated candidates. The First Amendment, however,
    14
    does not give candidates the right to use the ballot as a forum for political expression in
    which to communicate to voters their status as a party’s nominee. See 
    Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363
    .
    While party identifiers do not appear on the official ballot for Virginia’s local
    candidates, the candidates still have every other avenue by which to inform voters of this
    information. Political parties and their nominees are entirely free to publicize their
    association with each other and may even distribute sample “party” tickets on election
    day, as long as they do not do so within 40 feet of a polling place’s entrance. See Va.
    Code Ann. § 24.2-604(A). Voters can also directly access this information by visiting the
    “What is on my Ballot?” section of the Virginia Department of Elections’ website. Thus,
    if it is a burden on the associational rights of the parties, the nominees, or the voters not
    to have this information specifically on the ballot — which, it must be recognized, is not
    designed to be a public forum to convey political information — the burden is at most
    minimal. See Ohio Council 8 Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v.
    Husted, 
    814 F.3d 329
    , 338 (6th Cir. 2016) (upholding the constitutionality of an Ohio law
    that banned the use of party identifiers on general-election ballots for judicial candidates
    after concluding that the law “places at most only minimal burdens on the First and
    Fourteenth Amendment rights of political parties, judicial candidates, and voters in Ohio
    judicial elections”).
    In short, we conclude that plaintiffs’ First Amendment associational rights are at
    most minimally burdened by the fact that federal, state, and General Assembly candidates
    have party identifiers placed with their names, whereas local candidates do not.
    15
    Assuming there is some minimal burden, we must, under the Anderson-Burdick
    analysis, then weigh that burden against the governmental interests offered by Virginia as
    justifications for § 24.2-613(B). Because we conclude that the burden is not “severe,”
    Virginia’s “asserted regulatory interests need only be ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the
    limitation’ imposed on [associational] rights.”       
    Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364
    (quoting
    
    Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89
    ).
    Virginia has articulated three governmental interests that it claims justify § 24.2-
    613(B)’s ban on including party identifiers with the names of candidates for local offices.
    The law, it claims, (1) reduces partisanship in local government; (2) promotes impartial
    local governance and public confidence in local government; and (3) broadens the pool of
    citizens who may, consistent with the Hatch Act, serve in local elected offices. While the
    plaintiffs “do not dispute the legitimacy” of those interests, they challenge whether
    § 24.2-613(B)’s restriction serves those interests.
    With respect to the first two interests, which are closely related, Virginia argues
    that “[w]ithout restricting the freedom of any parties or candidates, [it] has structured the
    ballot to avoid emphasizing party affiliation above all other messages with respect to
    local office candidates,” reasoning that “Virginia’s distinction between local offices, on
    the one hand, and federal and State offices, on the other, . . . makes perfect sense” in light
    of “the different role of local and non-local office[s].” To this end, it notes that “States
    have a particular interest in reducing partisanship” — and thus to some degree enhancing
    both impartial local governance and the public perception of such — with respect to local
    elected offices like clerk of court and sheriff, as well as essential administrative positions,
    16
    including treasurer and revenue commissioner. And “[e]ven local offices that are more
    ‘political’ in nature, such as members of local governing bodies, have a different scope of
    authority under Virginia law, which supports a conclusion that ‘federal, statewide, and
    General Assembly offices’ unavoidably touch on national and highly partisan issues, but
    that local offices deal primarily with non-partisan issues of basic services and community
    management.”
    We agree that Virginia’s interests in minimizing divisive partisanship in local
    government and in enhancing, to at least some degree, the public’s confidence that the
    successful candidates will serve the local community as a whole are legitimate and
    support the form of its regulation in § 24.2-613(B). The plaintiffs argue, nonetheless, that
    “[i]f the Commonwealth were genuinely concerned about a negative effect of
    partisanship in local governmental offices, it would have legislated that all local offices
    must be nonpartisan, which it has not done.” While that approach could indeed have
    been followed, the Constitution does not, of course, require States to “address all aspects
    of a problem in one fell swoop.” Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 
    135 S. Ct. 1656
    , 1668
    (2015). Rather, rational half measures can be justified. The plaintiffs also posit that
    Virginia has taken the wrong approach to further the interests it identifies because the
    lack of a party identifier on the ballot will actually incentivize local candidates and the
    parties that have nominated them to heighten their partisan activities “to alert voters to
    the party affiliation that is not permitted to be shown on the ballot.” Whether any such
    risk is sufficient to outweigh the statute’s benefits, however, is a legislative judgment for
    Virginia to make.
    17
    Virginia also proffers as a justification for § 24.2-613(B) that it broadens the pool
    of citizens eligible to run for local offices without violating the Hatch Act, which
    regulates the political activity of federal executive branch employees.
    Although § 24.2-613(B) only marginally advances the ability of Virginians to seek
    local office without running afoul of the Hatch Act, this effect, albeit small, nonetheless
    helps justify the law. A federal employee covered by the Hatch Act “may not . . . run . . .
    as a candidate for election to a partisan political office.” 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(3). The law
    defines a “partisan political office” to mean “any office for which any candidate is
    nominated or elected as representing” a national political party. 
    Id. § 7322(2).
    But
    banning ballot identifiers still might not avoid triggering the Hatch Act’s prohibitions.
    According to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, even without the use of any party
    identifiers on the ballot, elections in which all candidates qualify by petition could
    nonetheless lose their status as nonpartisan if “partisan politics actually enter[s] a
    candidate’s campaign.” Moreover, some Virginia localities have been granted a partial
    administrative exemption to the Hatch Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 7325; 5 C.F.R. § 733.103. 1
    Thus, Virginia’s interest in permitting more citizens to serve in local government
    consistent with the Hatch Act has potential application only with respect to elected
    1
    The Hatch Act provides that “[t]he Office of Personnel Management may
    prescribe regulations permitting employees” living in communities in and around the
    Washington, D.C., metropolitan area — including some political subdivisions in northern
    Virginia — to participate in certain local political activities that would otherwise be
    prohibited. 5 U.S.C. § 7325. Pursuant to that authority, federal employees living in
    designated localities may “[r]un as independent candidates for election to partisan
    political office in elections for local office in the municipality or political subdivision.” 5
    C.F.R. § 733.103(b)(1).
    18
    offices in Virginia localities that have not been granted an exemption and for which, by
    virtue of either state or local law, candidates can only qualify for the ballot by petition, as
    opposed to by party nomination.         We therefore conclude that this interest is only
    marginally advanced by § 24.2-613(B).
    Even so, Virginia and certain of its localities continue to make an effort to require
    a nonpartisan qualification process for certain local offices, and these laws could be
    severely undermined if candidates could nonetheless require the Commonwealth to
    designate their status as party nominees on the ballot. See Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-613(B)
    (providing that candidates who qualify for the ballot by petition are to be “identified by
    the term ‘Independent,’” unless they “produc[e] sufficient and appropriate evidence of
    nomination by a ‘recognized political party’ to the State Board”).
    At bottom, we conclude that any burden that § 24.2-613(B) imposes on the right of
    association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments is outweighed by the
    important state interests advanced by the law. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
    judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to this claim.
    IV. Equal Protection Rights
    The plaintiffs also contend that § 24.2-613(B) violates the Equal Protection
    Clause. 2 A lengthy discussion of this claim is not required. The plaintiffs properly
    2
    We have previously applied the Anderson-Burdick analysis to consider equal-
    protection-based challenges to state election laws when such claims have been asserted in
    conjunction with claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Libertarian
    
    Party, 826 F.3d at 714
    , 716-17; Pisano v. Strach, 
    743 F.3d 927
    , 930, 934 (4th Cir. 2014).
    19
    concede, for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, that § 24.2-613(B)’s different
    treatment with respect to the use of party identifiers for federal, statewide, and General
    Assembly candidates, on the one hand, and for local candidates, on the other, must be
    upheld unless there is no rational basis to support it. Because § 24.2-613(B) is rationally
    related to legitimate state interests, as we discussed in our Anderson-Burdick analysis, we
    conclude a fortiori that it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
    * * *
    In sum, we hold that when Virginia amended § 24.2-613(B) in 2000 to expand the
    categories of offices for which official ballots would include party identifiers while
    continuing to ban party identifiers for candidates for local offices, it did not violate the
    right to association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments or the Equal
    Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Here, however, because of the manner in which the plaintiffs have presented their
    arguments and for analytical clarity, we find it useful to consider this claim separately.
    20