Ronnie Long, Jr. v. James Vaughan , 652 F. App'x 176 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-6035
RONNIE K. LONG, JR.,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
JAMES VAUGHAN, Superintendent; CHAPLAIN BETTY BROWN,
Director of Chaplaincy Services; OLIVER WASHINGTON; JOHN
MORGAN; W. DAVID GUICE; GEORGE T. SOLOMON; FRANK L. PERRY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:14-ct-03117-BO; 5:14-ct-03198-BO)
Submitted: May 27, 2016 Decided: June 14, 2016
Before DIAZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ronnie K. Long, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Joseph Finarelli, Special
Deputy Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronnie K. Long, Jr., appeals the district court’s order
granting the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Long, a
North Carolina inmate, filed claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that: (1) his religious rights were violated by a North
Carolina Department of Correction (“NCDOC”) policy that required
Wiccans to use a styrofoam cup and bowl in place of stone, wood,
or metal chalices and bowls when worshipping in their cells; (2)
his equal protection rights were violated, in that Native
American and Catholic practitioners were allowed to use objects
made of natural materials in their worship; and (3) NCDOC
policies denied him access to the courts.
We “review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, applying the same standard as the district court . . .
[and] construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
. . . the non-movant.” Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775
F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2014). “The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Long first argues that NCDOC substantially interfered with
his right to practice his religion by forcing him to use a
styrofoam cup and bowl in place of a metal or stone chalice and
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bowl. Long asserts that use of man-made materials in Wiccan
worship is blasphemous.
Prisoners maintain their constitutional rights to freedom
of religion, and therefore “reasonable opportunities must be
afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendment without fear of
penalty.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972).
Consequently, states may not adopt “policies that impose a
substantial burden on a prisoner’s right to practice his
religion.” Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 2014). A
substantial burden “is one that puts substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the district court correctly ruled that
Long failed to establish that NCDOC’s policies imposed a
substantial burden upon his practice of the Wiccan religion.
Although styrofoam may be anathema to Wicca, Long produced no
evidence demonstrating that a chalice and bowl were required to
practice Wicca. Long averred that a chalice and bowl aided him
in his worship, but he never asserted that they were required
for worship. To the contrary, the evidence submitted by both
Long and the Defendants demonstrated that such items were not
required.
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Long next alleges that NCDOC violated his equal protection
rights by treating Wiccans differently from Catholics and Native
Americans. Long also argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on this
claim because the “[D]efendants intentionally refused to turn
over [NCDOC’s] Catholic Policy for 2000,” which would have
demonstrated that Catholics were allowed to use objects made of
metal, stone, or wood. Long therefore argues that further
discovery was required.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 439 (1985). We have held that
To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff
must first demonstrate that he has been treated
differently from others with whom he is similarly
situated and that the unequal treatment was the result
of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Once this
showing is made, the court proceeds to determine
whether the disparity in treatment can be justified
under the requisite level of scrutiny.
Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001).
The district court did not err in determining that Long
failed to establish that he was similarly situated to other
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prisoners who had received religious accommodations. There is
no evidence that a chalice and bowl are essential to practice
Wicca, whereas the use of a sacred pipe “is an essential
religious activity for the American Indian religious
practitioner.” Furthermore, Long presented no evidence
demonstrating that Catholics in North Carolina prisons conduct
worship with objects made of metal, stone, or wood but are not
required by their religious precepts to do so.
Turning to Long’s next argument, we review for abuse of
discretion a district court’s denial of an opportunity to engage
in further discovery prior to entry of summary judgment.
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244
(4th Cir. 2002). We “will not reverse a denial unless there is
a clear abuse of discretion or, unless there is a real
possibility the party was prejudiced by the denial of the
extension.” Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d
191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Generally speaking, ‘summary judgment must be refused where the
nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover
information that is essential to his opposition.’” Harrods, 302
F.3d at 244 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 n.5 (1986)) (brackets omitted). We have reviewed
Long’s argument and the record and perceive no abuse of
discretion on this point.
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Finally, Long argues that NCDOC denied him effective access
to the courts. To prevail on a claim of denial of access to the
court, prisoners must demonstrate actual injury. Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 434, 350-51 (1996). Thus, a prisoner must show
that the prison policies “hindered his effort to pursue a legal
claim.” Id. at 351.
Long argues that without legal assistance, he was unable to
effectively oppose summary judgment. However, the Supreme Court
has explicitly rejected any notion that denial of legal
assistance alone may form the requisite injury needed to pursue
an access to courts claim. See id. at 354. Aside from this
purported injury, Long has not demonstrated that he was unable
to pursue his claims. To the contrary, Long was able to
successfully file complaints, motions, briefs, and other
documents before both the district court and this court, and
effectively pursued every avenue of redress available to him.
Long therefore has not established a cognizable injury and his
claim was properly denied.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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