United States v. Daniel Harris , 653 F. App'x 203 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4451
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL CHASE HARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District
Judge. (2:14-cr-00076-MSD-DEM-1)
Submitted: June 10, 2016 Decided: June 28, 2016
Before KING and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory B. English, ENGLISH LAW FIRM, PLLC, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Elizabeth M. Yusi, Assistant United States Attorney,
Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Chase Harris appeals his 600-month sentence
following jury convictions for 13 counts of production of child
pornography, 6 counts of use of a facility of interstate
commerce to entice a minor to engage in criminal sexual
activity, 7 counts of receipt of child pornography, 2 counts of
transportation of child pornography, possession of child
pornography, and 2 counts of obstruction of justice. Harris
also challenges the district court’s denial of his Fed. R. Crim.
P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain two of his convictions.
Finding no error, we affirm.
First, we find no error in the district court’s denial of
Harris’ motion for judgment of acquittal. “A defendant
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy
burden.” United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir.
2007). “A jury’s verdict must be upheld on appeal if there is
substantial evidence in the record to support it.” Id. at 244.
Evidence is substantial if, in the light most favorable to the
government, “there is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact
could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion
of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 245.
Because we find that the evidence at trial was sufficient to
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support the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the district court
did not err in denying Harris’ Rule 29 motion.
We next turn to Harris’ sentence, which we review for both
procedural and substantive reasonableness “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007). We must ensure that the district court committed
no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating
the Guidelines range. Id. at 51. If there is no significant
procedural error, we then consider the sentence’s substantive
reasonableness under “the totality of the circumstances,
including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.”
Id. We presume that a sentence below a properly calculated
Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756
F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
A defendant can rebut this presumption only “by showing that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors.” Id.Harris concedes that the district court did not err in
calculating an advisory Guidelines range of life imprisonment,
but he contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that Harris has not made
the showing necessary to rebut the presumption that his below-
Guidelines sentence is reasonable.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We deny Harris’ motions to appoint counsel and for leave to file
a pro se supplemental brief. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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