United States v. Benjamin Blue , 877 F.3d 513 ( 2017 )


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  •                                      PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 16-4537
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    BENJAMIN CORNELIUS BLUE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
    Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:15-cr-00223-JAB-1)
    Argued: October 24, 2017                                   Decided: December 12, 2017
    Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
    Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in
    which Judge Floyd and Judge Harris joined.
    ARGUED:         Wayne Dillard Inge, LAW OFFICE OF WAYNE D. INGE,
    Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Kyle David Pousson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
    Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    GREGORY, Chief Judge:
    Defendant-Appellant Benjamin Cornelius Blue appeals his 272-month sentence,
    which the district court imposed after Blue pled guilty to armed bank robbery and
    brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. Blue argues that his sentence is
    unreasonable because the district court failed to address his nonfrivolous arguments in
    favor of a downward departure from the sentencing range. We agree. For the reasons
    that follow, we vacate Blue’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
    I.
    Blue pled guilty to armed bank robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2113
    (a), (d)
    (“Count 1”), and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(ii) (“Count 2”). The probation officer prepared a presentence
    report (“PSR”), stating that Blue pointed a firearm at a bank teller and customer during
    the course of a bank robbery. Blue’s co-defendant provided Blue with the firearm that
    Blue brandished during the robbery and drove the getaway vehicle.        The PSR also
    designated Blue a career offender because of two predicate North Carolina convictions
    for robbery with a dangerous weapon and federal armed bank robbery. Due to his status
    as a career offender, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines recommended a range of 188 to
    235 months’ imprisonment for Count 1.           See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
    §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2, ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2015)
    (“U.S.S.G.”).
    2
    In addition, Blue faced a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 84 months’
    imprisonment on Count 2.       
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(ii).      Thus, Blue’s aggregate
    advisory Guidelines range was 272 to 319 months’ imprisonment. J.A. 83; see U.S.S.G.
    §§ 4B1.1(c)(2)(A), 5G1.2(e).
    At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR as written. Blue requested that
    the court impose a sentence of 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment on Count 1, to be
    followed by the mandatory 84-month consecutive sentence on Count 2. In support of his
    request, Blue raised several arguments: he was influenced by his older brothers, who
    pressured him to commit the previous robbery offenses; he committed the instant offense
    to support his opiate addiction; he had successfully found employment and was a hard
    worker; he was a good father to his child and his wife’s children from a previous
    relationship; his co-defendant received a sentence of 63 months’ imprisonment; the
    career offender Guidelines range was overly harsh and failed to deter offenders; he
    accepted responsibility for his conduct; and he attempted to provide substantial assistance
    in the prosecution of others, but his attempts were frustrated by factors outside of his
    control. The Government did not request a specific sentence but suggested that a low-
    end sentence would be appropriate.
    The district court imposed a 188-month sentence for Count 1 and an 84-month
    sentence for Count 2 to run consecutively. In its statement of reasons, the sentencing
    court first stated that it had considered the Guidelines range for Blue’s offenses. The
    court found that an aggregate 272-month imprisonment sentence, the low-end of Blue’s
    3
    Guidelines range, was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the sentencing
    objectives of [§] 3553.” J.A. 49. The court explained that it had
    [C]onsidered arguments on behalf of [Blue] with respect to history and
    characteristics. The Court notes [Blue]’s substantial criminal history
    category and the seriousness of the offense. The Court notes [Blue], with
    respect to his history and characteristics as well, was influenced a great deal
    by an older sibling who had a history of engaging in similar criminal
    activity. The Court notes as well Defendant has experienced a substantial
    opiate addiction which has contributed to some of his conduct in this case.
    J.A. 49.
    Blue filed a timely notice of appeal. He challenges the procedural reasonableness
    of his sentence based on the district court’s failure to address his non-frivolous arguments
    for a downward departure from the Guidelines range.
    II.
    We “review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside
    the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
    States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007). Under this deferential standard, we first review for
    procedural reasonableness. 
    Id. at 51
    . If the district court’s decision is procedurally
    sound, we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.                 
    Id.
    Reasonableness, however, “is not measured simply by whether the sentence falls within
    the statutory range, but by whether the sentence was guided by the Sentencing guidelines
    and by the provisions of § 3553(a).” United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 456 (4th Cir.
    2006).
    4
    For a sentence to satisfy the procedural prong of our review, the district court must
    begin its sentencing proceeding “by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range
    . . . . [T]he Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.” Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 49
    . “The court must thereafter give the parties the opportunity to argue for
    whatever sentence they deem appropriate and consider those arguments in light of all of
    the factors stated in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).” United States v. Hernandez, 
    603 F.3d 267
    ,
    270 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Gall, 
    552 U.S. at
    49–50). The district court must then conduct
    an “individualized assessment” of the facts and arguments presented and impose an
    appropriate sentence. Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 50
    . Finally, the court must “adequately explain
    the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the
    perception of fair sentencing.” 
    Id.
    Blue contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district
    court failed to adequately explain the sentence imposed in light of his nonfrivolous
    arguments for a downward departure. 1       “[W]e have held that for every sentence—
    whether above, below, or within the Guidelines range—a sentencing court must place on
    the record an ‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular facts of the case before
    it.” United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 576 (4th Cir. 2010); see also United States v.
    Montes-Pineda, 
    445 F.3d 375
    , 380 (4th Cir. 2006) (“District courts are obligated to
    explain their sentences, whether those sentences are within or beyond the Guidelines
    1
    Blue concedes that the Guidelines range was properly calculated and that the
    district court properly treated the Guidelines as advisory. Further, Blue does not contest
    the accuracy of the PSR.
    5
    range . . . .”). This individualized assessment requires that district courts consider the
    defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for a downward departure, impose an individualized
    sentence based on the characteristics of the defendant and the facts of the case, and
    explain the sentence chosen. Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 50
    . Therefore, a perfunctory recitation of
    the defendant’s arguments or the § 3553(a) factors “without application to the defendant
    being sentenced does not demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking or provide an adequate
    basis for appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 329 (4th Cir. 2009).
    The adequacy of the sentencing court’s explanation depends on the complexity of
    each case.    There is no mechanical approach to our sentencing review.              “The
    appropriateness of brevity or length, consciousness or detail, when to write, what to say,
    depends upon the circumstances.” Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007). “The
    sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has
    considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
    decision-making authority.” 
    Id.
    On one end of the spectrum, some cases require only a brief explanation of the
    sentencing judge’s conclusions, such as when a judge “appl[ies] the Guidelines to a
    particular case” because the case is typical and “the Guidelines sentence is a proper
    sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional mandates) in the typical case.”
    Rita, 
    551 U.S. at
    356–57. Blue’s sentencing record does not state whether the district
    court found this case to be typical or squarely addressed by the Guidelines. The district
    court mentioned the Guidelines but it did not explain whether the Guidelines incorporate
    Blue’s particular circumstances or the arguments he raised. Even if the court had actually
    6
    found that the Guidelines squarely addressed Blue’s individual characteristics, it failed to
    state so on the record.
    On the other end of the spectrum, in cases where, as here, “the defendant or
    prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence” the judge
    “will normally go further and explain why he has rejected those arguments.” Rita, 
    551 U.S. at 357
    . “Sometimes the circumstances will call for a brief explanation; sometimes
    they will call for a lengthier explanation.” 
    Id.
     A sentencing court’s explanation is
    sufficient if it, “although somewhat brief[ly], ‘outline[s] the defendant’s particular history
    and characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis of the
    statutory factors and in response to defense counsel’s arguments for a downward
    departure.’” Lynn, 
    592 F.3d at 584
     (quoting United States v. Johnson, 
    587 F.3d, 625
    , 639
    (4th Cir. 2009)). However, “‘where the district court could have made precisely the same
    statements in support of’ a different sentence,” we have found the explanation to be
    inadequate and have remanded for resentencing. Id. at 585 (quoting Carter, 
    564 F.3d at 329
    ).
    Here, the sentencing court provided no such explanation. 2 Instead, the court stated
    that it had considered Blue’s arguments, the § 3553(a) factors, and the Guidelines. But
    the sentencing court’s statement of reasons only referenced two of Blue’s arguments at
    sentencing—the influence of his older brothers and his opiate addiction—and left six
    arguments unaddressed. Thus, we must consider whether the sentencing court’s failure to
    2
    The Government does not dispute that Blue’s arguments are nonfrivolous and
    conceded as much at oral argument before this Court.
    7
    acknowledge or address those six nonfrivolous arguments for a downward departure
    renders Blue’s sentence procedurally unreasonable. We find that it does.
    This Court previously addressed a similar scenario in United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
     (4th Cir. 2010). There, we found Lynn’s within-Guidelines sentence to be
    procedurally unreasonable because the sentencing court failed to explain why it rejected
    Lynn’s nonfrivolous arguments for a downward departure. 
    Id. at 583
    . The sentencing
    court made only a passing reference to one of these arguments, an “explanation” we
    found “inadequate because it failed to address Lynn’s specific § 3553 arguments or
    explain why the sentence imposed on him was warranted in light of them.” Id. at 584.
    Our decision in Lynn makes it clear that a sentencing court must address the parties’
    nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence, and if the court rejects those
    arguments, it must explain why in a sufficiently detailed manner to allow this Court to
    conduct a meaningful appellate review.
    Here, the district court failed to acknowledge or explain six additional arguments
    that Blue raised in his sentencing briefs and at his hearing: 1) the career offender
    Guideline range was overly harsh and failed to deter offenders; 2) a within-Guidelines
    sentence was too severe in light of his co-defendant’s 63-month sentence; 3) he had a
    positive employment record; 4) his family relationships had developed since his prior
    robbery convictions; 5) he had accepted responsibility; and 6) he had attempted (albeit
    unsuccessfully) to assist in the prosecution of others. J.A. 35–44. Therefore, the district
    court’s failure to address Blue’s arguments, as well as its failure to explain whether and
    why it rejected them, render Blue’s sentence procedurally unreasonable.
    8
    The Government presents three arguments in defense of the sentence imposed.
    First, the Government argues that Blue’s sentence is entitled to a presumption of
    reasonableness because it is within the Guidelines range. This argument is misguided.
    While sentences that fall within the Guidelines range are entitled to a presumption of
    substantive reasonableness, we typically do not apply that presumption to the procedural
    prong of our reasonableness inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 
    773 F.3d 519
    ,
    528 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Yooho Weon, 
    722 F.3d 583
    , 590 (4th Cir. 2013);
    United States v. Susi, 
    674 F.3d 278
    , 289 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Evans, 
    526 F.3d 155
    , 161–62 (4th Cir. 2008).      Applying the presumption to the first prong of our
    reasonableness inquiry would effectively eliminate the requirement that sentencing courts
    adequately explain all sentences, even those within the Guidelines, and would be
    inconsistent with this Court’s precedent.
    Second, the Government argues that the sentencing court gave Blue ample
    opportunity to present arguments, both through his briefs and during the sentencing
    hearing. Indeed, Blue submitted three briefs to the sentencing court and raised the same
    arguments orally.    But providing the defendant with ample opportunity to present
    arguments and properly considering those arguments are separate requirements of
    procedural reasonableness. Hernandez, 
    603 F.3d at 270
     (“The court must . . . give the
    parties the opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate and
    consider those arguments in light of all of the factors stated in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).”).
    Our inquiry here focuses on whether the sentencing court addressed and explained the
    defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments prior to sentencing. See Lynn, 
    592 F.3d at 585
    .
    9
    Third, the Government argues that the district court’s explanation for Blue’s
    sentence was sufficient to demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking and provided an
    adequate basis for appellate review. In support, the Government points to several lines
    from the sentencing court’s statement of reasons, in which it “considered arguments on
    behalf of the defendant with respect to history and characteristics,” “note[d] the
    Defendant with respect to his history and characteristics as well, was influenced a great
    deal by an older sibling who had a history of engaging in similar criminal activity,” and
    “note[d] as well Defendant has experienced a substantial opiate addiction which has
    contributed to some of his conduct in this case.” J.A. 52. The Government renewed this
    argument in its supplemental authorities letter, arguing that the district court’s
    explanation is “brief but legally sufficient.” Gov’t Ltr. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j)
    at 2. The Government relies on the dissent in United States v. Slappy, 
    872 F.3d 202
     (4th
    Cir. 2017), which, in turn, cites our decision in Montes-Pineda, 
    445 F.3d 375
     (4th Cir.
    2006).
    In Montes-Pineda, the defendant argued that his sentence was procedurally
    unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain his sentence. 
    Id. at 380
    . This Court found that the sentence was procedurally reasonable for three reasons.
    First, “although the district court did not expressly mention § 3553(a), it clearly invoked
    three of the § 3553(a) factors” by discussing the application of the statute’s principles to
    the defendant’s case. Id. at 380–81. Second, the undisputed record strongly supported an
    inference that “a shorter prison term was inappropriate for a defendant who had
    repeatedly committed a serious offense and who had already proven immune to other
    10
    means of deterrence.”     Id. at 381.   Third, the district court “engaged counsel in a
    discussion about the disparities between ‘fast track’ and non-‘fast track’ districts,” one of
    the defendant’s arguments for a downward departure. Id.
    Montes-Pineda stands for the proposition that we “will not vacate [a] sentence
    simply because the [district] court did not spell out what the context of its explanation
    made patently obvious. . . .” Id. at 380 (emphasis added). We recognized that “[t]he
    context surrounding a district court’s explanation may imbue it with enough content for
    us to evaluate both whether the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and whether it did
    so properly.”    
    445 F.3d at 381
    .       For instance, reviewing courts may infer such
    consideration where the sentence imposed is explicitly tailored to address a defendant’s
    individual characteristics, such as requiring substance abuse treatment for defendants
    who struggle with drug and alcohol abuse issues.          See Johnson, 
    445 F.3d at 346
    .
    Reviewing courts may also infer that a sentencing court gave specific attention to a
    defendant’s argument for a downward departure if the sentencing court engages counsel
    in a discussion about that argument. See Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 599
     (“[I]t seems that the judge
    gave specific attention to the issue of disparity when he inquired about the sentences
    already imposed by a different judge on two of Gall’s codefendants.”). Absent such
    contextual indicators, however, we have declined “to guess at the district court’s
    rationale, searching the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or
    for any other clues that might explain a sentence.” Carter, 
    564 F.3d at
    329–30.
    The Government argues that there is enough context here for this Court to conduct
    a meaningful appellate review of Blue’s sentence. But we cannot “imbue” the district
    11
    court’s explanation “with enough content for us to evaluate” the reasonableness of the
    sentence because nothing in the context of Blue’s sentence makes it “patently obvious”
    that the district court found Blue’s arguments to be unpersuasive. Montes-Pineda, 
    445 F.3d at 381
    . First, the district court did not explain how the § 3553(a) factors or their
    principles shaped its sentencing decision. Second, the record does not show that Blue
    was immune to other means of deterrence. Finally, the district court did not engage
    counsel in a discussion about the merits of Blue’s arguments for a downward departure; it
    simply heard those arguments. Thus, faced with the absence of contextual support in
    Blue’s record, we lack the necessary information to conduct a meaningful appellate
    review and we decline to speculate how the sentencing court disposed of Blue’s
    arguments for a downward departure.
    Although we must give sentencing courts adequate deference, our review of
    sentences for procedural reasonableness relies on statements contained in the sentencing
    record.   We cannot assume that a sentencing court truly considered a defendant’s
    nonfrivolous arguments or his individual characteristics when the record fails to make it
    “patently obvious.” Id. Likewise, we cannot fashion an explanation for the district
    court’s sentencing decision merely because it falls within the Guidelines range. Our prior
    cases make abundantly clear that “[d]istrict courts are obligated to explain their
    sentences, whether those sentences are within or beyond the Guidelines range . . . .” Id.
    Any other outcome would erode the standard set by the Supreme Court in Rita and Gall
    and effectively compromise this Court’s ability to conduct a meaningful appellate review.
    12
    This decision does not limit the discretion district court judges may exercise in
    tailoring a sentence.   We are not asking district courts to curb their judgment or
    “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection” when explaining a sentence. Cf.
    Johnson, 
    445 F.3d at 345
    . Rather, we are reminding district courts of their duty to
    explain their sentencing reasoning on the record.
    Having concluded that Blue’s sentence is procedurally unreasonable, “we cannot
    review the sentence for substantive reasonableness.” Carter, 
    564 F.3d at
    330 n.4 (citing
    Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    ). Here, the district court’s procedural errors alone are grounds for
    resentencing. Id. at 329.
    III.
    For these reasons, we vacate Blue’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-4537

Citation Numbers: 877 F.3d 513

Judges: Gregory, Floyd, Harris

Filed Date: 12/12/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

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