United States v. Berry ( 2011 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4811
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    STACY LAMONT BERRY,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.    Norman K. Moon,
    Senior District Judge. (3:09-cr-00019-nkm-1)
    Submitted:   April 28, 2011                   Decided:   May 3, 2011
    Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Charles L. Weber, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant.
    Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Ronald M. Huber,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Elliott J. Casey, Special
    Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant           Stacy     Lamont            Berry      challenges           his
    convictions       of    Hobbs    Act    robbery       in    violation      of    
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
     (2006).          Berry contends the district court erred when it
    denied   his    motion      for    a    judgment       of    acquittal         and   when    it
    instructed the jury.            For the reasons explained below, we affirm
    Berry’s convictions.
    This court reviews de novo the district court’s denial
    of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.                         United States v.
    Reid, 
    523 F.3d 310
    , 317 (4th Cir. 2008).                      This court will uphold
    the jury’s verdict “if, viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable    to    the     government,      it    is       supported      by    substantial
    evidence.”        
    Id.
           “Substantial         evidence       is    evidence        that    a
    reasonable      finder      of     fact    could        accept       as    adequate         and
    sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond
    a reasonable doubt.”              
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    In reviewing for substantial evidence, this court considers both
    circumstantial and direct evidence and allows the government all
    reasonable inferences from the facts shown to those sought to be
    established.           United States v. Harvey, 
    532 F.3d 326
    , 333 (4th
    Cir. 2008).
    A     conviction       under        the    Hobbs        Act    requires         the
    government to prove “(1) the underlying robbery or extortion
    crime, and (2) an effect on interstate commerce.”                          United States
    2
    v. Williams, 
    342 F.3d 350
    , 353 (4th Cir. 2003).                                However, “the
    impact on commerce [may be] small, and it may be shown by proof
    of probabilities without evidence that any particular commercial
    movements were affected.”                    United States v. Brantley, 
    777 F.2d 159
    , 162 (4th Cir. 1985).                     The interstate commerce requirement
    has been broadly interpreted and courts have found it “satisfied
    even       where       the    effect    on    interstate         commerce      is     indirect,
    minimal      and       less    than    certain,”      although      the      effect    must     be
    “reasonably probable.”                 United States v. Buffey, 
    899 F.2d 1402
    ,
    1404       (4th    Cir.       1990).     Moreover,        this    court      has    held      that
    “[d]rug dealing . . . is an inherently economic enterprise that
    affects interstate commerce.                   For this reason, the robbery of a
    drug dealer has been found to be the kind of act which satisfies
    the ‘affecting commerce’ element of the Hobbs Act.”                                   Williams,
    
    342 F.3d at 355
     (internal citation omitted). *
    We    conclude       the     Government’s         evidence        at        trial
    established            that    the     robbery       victims     were     engaged        in    the
    marijuana trade during the relevant time and that Berry obtained
    both       marijuana          and     money    as     a   result        of    his      actions.
    Accordingly, the Government presented sufficient evidence from
    *
    Although Berry argues this court should overrule or ignore
    our decision in Williams, we cannot “overrule or reconsider a
    precedent set by another panel.”    United States v. Najjar, 
    300 F.3d 466
    , 486 n.8 (4th Cir. 2002).
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    which the jury could determine Berry’s crimes had the required
    effect on interstate commerce.
    We     also     conclude        the     district       court       correctly
    instructed the jury.               Berry argues the United States Supreme
    Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 
    514 U.S. 549
     (1995),
    requires proof in Hobbs Act prosecutions of a substantial impact
    on     interstate       commerce.         We       conclude       Berry’s    argument    is
    foreclosed by this court’s decision in Williams.                                There, this
    court specifically held that the Supreme Court’s decision in
    Lopez    did     “not       disturb   our      continued      application         of   [the]
    minimal effects standard” in Hobbs Act cases.                               Williams, 
    342 F.3d at 354
    .        Thus,     the   district          court’s    jury      instruction
    correctly stated the law.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.       We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions         are   adequately        presented       in     the   materials
    before    the       court    and   argument        would    not    aid    the     decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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