United States v. Blake Charboneau ( 2019 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-7306
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
BLAKE CHARBONEAU,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:15-hc-02287-D)
Argued: November 1, 2018 Decided: February 6, 2019
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Judge
Motz and Judge Duncan joined.
ARGUED: Jaclyn Lee DiLauro, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Gordon James, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Louis C. Allen, Acting Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United
States Attorney, G. Norman Acker III, Civil Chief, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:
The district court found Blake Charboneau to be a “sexually dangerous person”
under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the “Act”). 1 18 U.S.C.
§ 4247(a)(5). As a result, the district court committed Charboneau to the custody of the
Attorney General. In this appeal, Charboneau challenges the district court’s determination
that he met the criteria for a sexually dangerous person. In doing so, Charboneau raises a
legal and a factual question. The legal question is whether Charboneau must be diagnosed
with a paraphilic disorder 2 to be committed under the Act. The factual question is
whether the record supported the district court’s findings under the clear error standard of
review. Finding that the Act does not require a diagnosis with a paraphilic disorder and
that the district court’s findings were amply supported by the record, we affirm.
I.
Before turning to the facts of this case, we summarize the pertinent provisions of
the Act. The Government commences a proceeding under the Act by filing a certification
that an inmate is a sexually dangerous person. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a). The proceeding is a
1
The Act is named after Adam Walsh, who was abducted from a Sears department
store in Florida in 1981 and brutally murdered.
2
A paraphilic disorder diagnosis is appropriate under the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders where a person has an “intense and persistent
sexual interest” that does not involve “physically mature, consenting human partners”
and “is currently causing distress or impairment to the individual” or “personal harm, or
risk of harm, to others.” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 685−86 (5th ed. 2013).
2
civil, not criminal, proceeding. See id. § 4248. The Government then bears the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the individual has previously
“engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation” (the
prior conduct element), id. § 4247(a)(5); (2) the individual currently “suffers from a
serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder” (the serious mental illness element), id. §
4247(a)(6); and (3) as a result of such condition, the individual “would have serious
difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released”
(the serious difficulty element), id.
If the Government prevails, the individual is ordered into the custody of the
Attorney General. Id. § 4248(d). The Attorney General must then make reasonable efforts
to transfer the individual to the State in which the person is domiciled or was tried if the
State will assume responsibility for his custody, care and treatment. Id. If the State will
not assume such responsibility, the Attorney General must place the individual in a
suitable facility until the State assumes responsibility or the individual’s condition is such
that he is no longer sexually dangerous. Id. The Act also provides a mechanism for relief
from an order of commitment. A respondent may file a motion with the district court
asking for his discharge from commitment at any time 180 days after his original
commitment. Id. § 4247(h). In addition, the director of the facility must prepare annual
reports concerning the respondent’s mental condition and his need for continued
3
commitment. Id. § 4247(e)(1)(B). In sum, an order of commitment means that, even after
an individual has served his entire criminal sentence, he remains in custody. 3
II.
A.
Turning now to the background of this case, Charboneau lived on the Devils Lake
Sioux Reservation in Fort Totten, North Dakota 4 his entire life, with the exceptions of
mental health treatment, school and prison placements. Around the time he turned twelve,
Charboneau began abusing alcohol and inhalants. He dropped out of school in the ninth
grade. Charboneau has had frequent contact with the criminal justice system over the
course of his life. Since 1978, law enforcement officers arrested or took Charboneau into
custody over thirty times for various crimes ranging from disorderly conduct to sexual
assault. Virtually all those offenses occurred while Charboneau was under the influence
of alcohol. Among those crimes were four arrests for sexually violent conduct, all of
which occurred while Charboneau was intoxicated. 5
In 1982, Charboneau sexually assaulted his twenty-three-year-old female cousin.
Charboneau claimed to be so intoxicated at the time of the offense that he was unable to
3
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in United States v.
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129 (2010).
4
The Devils Lake Sioux Reservation, established in 1867, is now known as the
Spirit Lake Reservation. The largest community on the reservation is Fort Totten, where
Charboneau lived.
5
The details of this conduct, some of which are graphic, are contained in the Joint
Appendix (“J.A.”).
4
remember the assault when he was questioned by the police the following day.
Charboneau pled guilty for this offense and was sentenced to prison.
In August 1987, Charboneau committed his second sexual offense. Charboneau
entered a woman’s home, forcibly removed her clothes and attempted to have sexual
intercourse with her on the kitchen floor. Law enforcement officials on Charboneau’s
reservation who investigated the matter did not formally charge Charboneau with sexual
assault. However, Charboneau admitted to these actions at the commitment hearing held
before the district court.
In July 1988, Charboneau committed his third sexual offense. After a family
picnic, Charboneau, while intoxicated, took his ten-year-old daughter to an area obscured
by bushes and sexually assaulted her. Charboneau was found guilty in federal court of
aggravated sexual abuse by force and sentenced to 168 months in prison followed by five
years of supervised release. Charboneau began his period of supervised release in
October 2000.
While on supervised release in 2003, Charboneau committed his fourth sexual
offense. Charboneau, again intoxicated, sexually assaulted his niece. Charboneau pled
guilty in state court to sexual contact with a person incapable of consenting. The state
court sentenced him to ten years of imprisonment. In addition, because Charboneau was
on supervised release pursuant to his previous federal sentence at the time, the federal
court found that Charboneau violated the terms of his supervised release and sentenced
him to thirty-six months of confinement and twenty-four months of supervised release to
commence after Charboneau completed his term of imprisonment at the state level.
5
B.
In December 2015, while Charboneau was in federal prison at Federal
Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Butner serving his sentence for his 2003 supervised
release violation, the Government initiated the civil commitment proceedings by filing a
certification alleging Charboneau was a sexually dangerous person under the Act. At that
time, Charboneau’s anticipated date of release was February 21, 2016. On January 27,
2017, the district court held a commitment hearing on the Government’s certification.
Because of its relevance to our review, we will summarize the testimony at the
commitment hearing.
The Government called Dr. Kara Holden, a clinical psychologist who works in the
Commitment and Treatment Program at FCI Butner. Dr. Holden testified about her
treatment of Charboneau. She remarked that Charboneau had cognitive and
communication difficulties and initially was very reserved. She reported that Charboneau
blamed the victims for his crimes and even saw himself as a victim. She testified that
although Charboneau received treatment for alcohol abuse in the program at FCI Butner,
he denied that he had an alcohol problem. Dr. Holden also testified that Charboneau
became more comfortable communicating with her as treatment progressed. In December
2016, Charboneau admitted to Dr. Holden for the first time that he had a sexual deviance
problem, needed treatment and felt that he was sexually dangerous.
Next, the Government called Dr. Christopher North, Dr. Heather Ross and Dr.
Gary Zinik as expert witnesses. Dr. North is a clinical psychologist appointed by the
district court to conduct an evaluation of Charboneau. Dr. Ross is a sex offender forensic
6
psychologist at the Bureau of Prisons. Dr. Zinik is a forensic psychologist with a private
practice in California.
All three of the Government experts opined that Charboneau was a sexually
dangerous person under the Act. As to the prior conduct element of the Act, the
Government experts agreed that Charboneau had engaged in sexually violent conduct in
the past based on his prior sexually violent conduct.
Regarding the serious mental illness element, the Government experts agreed that,
while he did not suffer from a paraphilic disorder, Charboneau suffers from alcohol use
disorder which satisfied the serious mental illness element of the Act. In addition to
alcohol use disorder, Dr. Zinik found that Charboneau suffers from mixed personality
disorder based on multiple schizotypal and schizoid characteristics.
As to the serious difficulty element, the Government experts all opined that,
because of his alcohol use disorder, Charboneau would have serious difficulty refraining
from future sexually violent conduct. Dr. Zinik further opined that because of
Charboneau’s mixed personality disorder, combined with his alcohol use disorder,
Charboneau would have serious difficulty refraining from future sexually violent
conduct.
Charboneau also testified at the commitment hearing. Charboneau testified that he
has difficulty expressing how he feels and that others have difficulty understanding him.
Charboneau maintained that despite the presence of alcohol in prison, he has remained
sober. He testified that he also has not committed any sexually violent acts in jail. He
testified that he attends weekly Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings and was in the
7
second of four phases of the Commitment and Treatment Program at the time of the
commitment hearing.
Last, Charboneau’s expert forensic psychologist, Dr. Joseph J. Plaud, testified. Dr.
Plaud agreed that Charboneau met the criteria for the prior conduct element of the Act.
As to the serious mental illness element, Dr. Plaud opined that Charboneau did not have a
personality or paraphilic disorder. Without one of those two conditions, Dr. Plaud did not
believe that Charboneau’s alcohol use disorder met the second requirement under the
Act. Dr. Plaud noted that Charboneau struggled with alcohol use disorder for most of his
adult life. Based on Charboneau’s history, Dr. Plaud testified he would expect more than
four instances of sexually violent conduct if alcohol use disorder caused Charboneau to
sexually reoffend. Because Charboneau had abused alcohol on many occasions that did
not result in sexually violent conduct, Dr. Plaud opined that Charboneau’s alcohol use
disorder did not constitute a serious mental illness under the Act. As for the serious
difficulty element, Dr. Plaud believed that it is impermissible to assume that Charboneau
will experience an alcohol relapse and then assume that, if he relapses, he will commit a
sexual offense. Therefore, Dr. Plaud concluded Charboneau did not qualify as a sexually
dangerous person under the Act.
C.
On September 28, 2017, the district court recited its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The district court correctly set forth the required elements under the
Act and stated that the Government was required to prove those elements by clear and
convincing evidence. The district court found that Charboneau previously engaged in
8
sexually violent conduct or child molestation. It further found that Charboneau had a
serious mental illness, abnormality or disorder in the form of a mixed personality disorder
working in conjunction with alcohol use disorder, as opined by Dr. Zinik and,
alternatively, in the form of alcohol use disorder as opined by the Drs. Zinik, Ross and
North. Finally, the district court found that based on his mental illnesses, Charboneau
would have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct due to his serious
mental illness, abnormality or disorder.
In summary, based on the facts presented at the commitment hearing, the district
court concluded that the Government met its burden to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that Charboneau is a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of the Act.
As a result, the district court ordered Charboneau committed to the custody of the
Attorney General until he is no longer a sexually dangerous person.
Charboneau filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III.
Before considering Charboneau’s grounds for appeal, we describe our standard for
review. “The purpose of standards of review is to focus reviewing courts upon their
proper role when passing on the conduct of other decision-makers.” Evans v. Eaton Corp.
Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2008). “Standards of review are
thus an elemental expression of judicial restraint, which, in their deferential varieties,
safeguard the superior vantage points of those entrusted with primary decisional
responsibility.” Id. at 320−21. The key characteristic of standards of review is that they
9
designate a primary decision-maker other than the reviewing court and designate the
instrument−deference−with which that primacy is to be maintained. Id. at 321.
In this case, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2014).
The clear error standard serves to protect the district courts’ primacy as triers of fact.
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573−575 (1985). A court reviewing for clear
error may not reverse a lower court’s factual findings simply because it would have
reached a different decision in the case. United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 451 (4th
Cir. 2012). Instead, a reviewing court must ask whether, based on the entire body of
evidence, “it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Id. (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in
light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even
though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the
evidence differently.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573−74) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Furthermore, when a trial judge makes a finding “based on his decision
to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent
and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if
not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575.
IV.
On appeal, Charboneau does not challenge the district court’s findings on the
prior conduct requirement of the Act. Charboneau raises two challenges to the district
10
court’s finding on the serious mental illness element. First, he claims the district court
erred in concluding the requirement of a serious mental illness, abnormality or disorder
can be met without a paraphilic disorder. Second, he contends the district court erred in
crediting Dr. Zinik’s opinion that Charboneau suffered from a mixed personality disorder
which, combined with his alcohol use disorder, satisfies the Act’s serious mental illness
requirement because that opinion was against the weight of the evidence.
Charboneau also makes two challenges to the district court’s findings regarding
the third requirement under the Act, the serious difficulty element. First, Charboneau
argues the district court erred in concluding that there is an adequate causal connection
between any serious mental illness in his case and sexually violent conduct or child
molestation. Second, Charboneau contends the district court erred in failing to give
adequate credit to the last fifteen years of his life in which he neither consumed alcohol
or committed a sexual offense while incarcerated.
We address each argument in turn.
A.
We first consider whether a paraphilic disorder is required to fulfill the serious
mental illness element. The Act provides that a person is “sexually dangerous to others”
if he or she “suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of
which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or
child molestation if released.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6). Generally, if the statute’s
language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce the statute according to its
11
terms, unless the disposition required by the text is absurd. Crespo v. Holder, 631 F.3d
130, 133 (4th Cir. 2011).
The plain language of the statute does not require a respondent to be diagnosed
with a paraphilic disorder to satisfy the serious mental illness element of the Act.
Likewise, no controlling precedent requires such a diagnosis. Congress could have easily
added language requiring a paraphilic disorder if that was its intent. But the Act as
written does not require any specific mental illness, abnormality or disorder to satisfy the
serious mental illness element. As this Court has observed, “one will search § 4247(a)(6)
in vain for any language purporting to confine the universe of qualifying mental
impairments within clinical or pedagogical parameters.” United States v. Caporale, 701
F.3d 128, 136 (4th Cir. 2012).
In Caporale, this Court held that the Act’s reference to a serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder is not limited to those disorders specifically delineated in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Id. at 136−37. This Court also
noted that the statute could have been drafted to follow certain clinical norms or
definitions, “but inasmuch as Congress chose not to do so, it has been left to the courts to
develop the meaning of ‘serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder’ as a legal term
of art.” Id. at 136.
Consistent with our precedent, we find the Act does not require a diagnosis of a
paraphilic disorder to meet the serious mental illness element of the Act. And contrary to
Charboneau’s assertion, this ruling does not dramatically expand the reach of the Act. In
all cases, the government must also show by clear and convincing evidence that an
12
individual “would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or
child molestation if released.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6). In the absence of a paraphilic
disorder diagnosis, the government surely faces a steeper climb in establishing the causal
link between an individual’s serious mental illness and their ability to refrain from
sexually violent conduct in the future. We hold only that the Act does not preclude the
government from making this showing.
B.
Having determined that the Act does not require a paraphilic disorder, we turn to
the district court’s finding on the serious mental illness requirement. As set forth below,
we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Charboneau suffers
from a serious mental illness.
Charboneau claims that the district court erred in finding that the Government
carried its burden to establish the serious mental illness element based on Charboneau’s
diagnosis of mixed personality disorder and alcohol use disorder. Charboneau takes issue
with this finding because Dr. Zinik was the only expert to conclude that Charboneau
suffered a mixed personality disorder that, when taken together with his alcohol use
disorder, met the serious mental illness element of the Act. Charboneau also argues that
Dr. Zinik’s opinion that he suffered from mixed personality disorder conflicted with the
other two Government experts that testified at his hearing.
To address this argument on appeal, it is important to remember our standard of
review. As set forth above, a factfinder is entitled to great deference in judging the
credibility of witnesses and in weighing the evidence. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. We are
13
especially reluctant to set aside a finding based on the trial court’s evaluation of
conflicting expert testimony because “[e]valuating the credibility of experts and the value
of their opinions is a function best committed to the district courts, and one to which
appellate courts must defer.” United States v. Bell, 884 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2018)
(quoting United States v. Heyer, 740 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, the question for the district court was not how many expert
witnesses supported the respective diagnoses. Instead, the question was which witnesses
provided the most credible and compelling testimony. “[T]he ultimate measure of
testimonial worth is quality and not quantity.” Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 574−75
(2000) (quoting Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608 (1945)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The district court was in the best position to analyze the expert opinions offered at
the commitment hearing and, from the record, it is evident that it did. The district court
explained in detail why it was persuaded by Dr. Zinik’s diagnostic finding that
Charboneau met criteria for a mixed personality disorder with schizotypal and schizoid
features. The district court acknowledged that Dr. Zinik was the only expert to offer that
diagnosis but found Dr. Zinik’s explanation of Charboneau’s mental condition
compelling and consistent with the record in Charboneau’s unique case. While the other
witnesses did not come to the same conclusion, the district court observed that Dr.
Zinik’s opinion was consistent with the diagnosis of other medical providers that treated
Charboneau in the past. The district court also noted that Dr. Zinik persuasively
14
explained that Charboneau’s diagnoses with alcohol use disorder and mixed personality
disorder with schizotypal and schizoid features are interrelated and additive.
The district court based its finding that Charboneau suffered from a mixed
personality disorder on the facts in the record and careful consideration of the opinion
and reasoning of Dr. Zinik whose credentials are not at issue. We therefore defer to the
district court’s decision to credit Dr. Zinik’s opinion that Charboneau’s mixed personality
disorder together with his alcohol use disorder satisfies the serious mental illness element
under the Act.
C.
We now turn to the third element required by the Act–the serious difficulty
element. Charboneau argues the district court erred in concluding the Government met its
burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is an adequate causal
connection between Charboneau’s serious mental illness and future sexually violent
conduct or child molestation. To address this challenge, we will first examine the district
court’s analysis of the serious difficulty element. Second, we will address Charboneau’s
claims that the district court erred in its analysis.
1.
On this issue, the district court again found Dr. Zinik’s testimony, which included
his opinion about Charboneau’s mixed personality disorder, most compelling. As detailed
above, Dr. Zinik testified that Charboneau would have serious difficulty refraining from
sexually violent conduct due to his mixed personality disorder combined with his alcohol
use disorder. The district court noted the Dr. Zinik reviewed the pertinent records,
15
interviewed Charboneau, considered the other expert opinions and synthesized the
evidence in a persuasive manner in his report. The district court considered and found
persuasive Dr. Zinik’s analysis that concluded Charboneau had a high risk of future
sexually violent behavior and found an absence of protective factors 6 against such future
behavior. The district court found Dr. Zinik’s testimony regarding the serious difficulty
prong to be the most persuasive expert testimony among all the experts.
2.
Charboneau claims that the district court erred by failing to consider evidence
indicating Charboneau would not have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent
conduct as well as inconsistencies in the opinions of the Government’s experts. First,
Charboneau claims the district court failed to consider evidence that Charboneau, at the
time of the commitment hearing, had started participating in sex offender treatment and
AA meetings. However, the record reveals that the district court did consider this
evidence. Specifically, the district court noted that up until the commitment hearing on
this matter, Charboneau persistently denied that he had any alcohol problem even
considering his numerous arrests for alcohol related offenses, both sexual and nonsexual.
The district court further noted that Charboneau was in sex offender treatment and under
the close supervision of U.S. Probation officers when he committed his last sexual
offense. The district court also cited its consideration of actuarial risk assessments,
6
Protective factors are considered in a recidivism risk assessment and decrease the
risk for future sexual reoffense. J.A. 410.
16
Charboneau’s impulsiveness when not in a custodial setting and his historical offenses as
support for its finding that the serious difficulty element of the Act was met.
Second, Charboneau claims the district court failed to consider Dr. Plaud’s
opinion that if Charboneau lacked volitional control because of his alcohol use disorder,
then Charboneau would have had many more instances of sexual violence. Once again,
however, the district court considered this evidence. The district court found that
testimony of Dr. Plaud was not as credible as Dr. Zinik’s explanation that Charboneau
would have serious difficulty refraining from sexual violence based on the risk
assessment Dr. Zinik conducted and the absence of protective factors. Thus, we find no
clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Charboneau’s alcohol use and personality
disorders were inextricably linked with his acts of sexual violence.
Third, Charboneau argues the district court failed to consider the absence in the
record of continued deviant thoughts by Charboneau. But the district court did, in fact,
consider the testimony of Dr. Plaud and Dr. Zinik on this point. The district court found
Dr. Zinik the most compelling in explaining how Charboneau can have serious difficulty
in refraining from further sexually violent conduct in the absence of continued deviant
thoughts. 7
The record reveals that the district court adequately considered Dr. Plaud’s
testimony and the evidence Charboneau argues merits reversal. While Charboneau claims
7
Charboneau also argues the district court erred by failing to adequately consider
Charboneau’s good behavior while in prison. Because Charboneau raised this issue as a
separate ground for appeal, we address it in Section IV., D. below.
17
the district court overlooked evidence, he does not direct this Court to any evidence that
the district court failed to consider or any error in the reports or opinions of Dr. Zinik, Dr.
North or Dr. Ross that would require reversal. 8 In reality, Charboneau simply argues that
the district court should have reached a different result. But it is not this Court’s role to
re-weigh the evidence and impose a different result when the district court does not
commit legal error and bases its decision on evidence in the record. Accordingly, we find
no clear error in the district court’s ruling.
D.
In his final assignment of error, Charboneau contends the district court erred in
failing to give adequate credit to the last fifteen years of Charboneau’s life in which he
neither consumed alcohol or committed a sexual offense while incarcerated. Charboneau
contends that our prior opinion in United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 2014),
requires reversal. In Antone, this Court reversed an order of commitment under the Act
because the district court failed to adequately consider the recent conduct of the
respondent while incarcerated. 742 F.3d at 165.
However, while both Antone and Charboneau behaved appropriately in prison,
this case is factually distinguishable from Antone. Unlike in Antone, the district court
here specifically acknowledged that it “must fully consider and account for why a
8
The factors and evidence considered by the district court regarding the serious
difficulty prong are consistent with the prior decisions of this Court. See United States v.
Bell, 884 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 462 (4th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 464 (4th Cir. 2012).
18
detainee’s positive incarceration conduct is overshadowed by other factors” that would
warrant civil commitment. J.A. 301. The district court then proceeded to analyze
Charboneau’s conduct while incarcerated. 9
The district court first acknowledged that all the experts agreed Charboneau had
generally acted as a model prisoner while incarcerated. But the district court considered
Charboneau’s behavior during his current prison term along with his behavior during and
after his incarceration resulting from his 1982 conviction. Then, Charboneau also
behaved in an exemplary fashion while in prison. However, once released, Charboneau
abused alcohol and reoffended violently and sexually, even after acting as a model
prisoner. Antone had no similar history of violently reoffending upon release. Therefore,
the district court’s consideration of this evidence distinguishes the current case from
Antone.
Moreover, the district court considered and found persuasive Dr. Zinik’s report
and testimony that “explain[ed] why Charboneau comports himself well in a controlled
institutional environment but reverts to drinking alcohol, lawbreaking, and sexual
violence in the community.” J.A. 302. The district court also acknowledged that Dr.
North and Dr. Ross provided persuasive explanations on this point.
9
Significantly, this Court recently affirmed a district court’s order of commitment
under the Act where there were temporal gaps in the respondent’s sexual offenses. This
Court affirmed that such gaps do not preclude a finding that the respondent would have
serious difficulty refraining from future sexually violent behavior. United States v. Bell,
884 F.3d 500, 509−10 (4th Cir. 2018).
19
Further, the district court noted Charboneau’s persistent denial that he has an
alcohol use problem and the results of actuarial risk assessments indicating his difficulty
in refraining from future sexually violent conduct. To the district court, this evidence
outweighed Charboneau’s recent good conduct. Based on this analysis, the district court
found that the Government met its burden in establishing that Charboneau would have
serious difficulty in refraining, even considering his good behavior while incarcerated.
In summary, the district court adequately considered Charboneau’s conduct while
incarcerated and made the determination that other factors outweighed his good behavior
in prison. Reversal is only appropriate if we are left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made after we review the district court’s mixed findings. Antone,
742 F.3d at 165. Here, we are left with no such definite and firm conviction. Therefore,
we affirm the district court’s order.
V.
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the appellate record supports the
district court’s conclusion that Charboneau is a sexually dangerous person within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5). 10 Based on the record before it, the district court did
not clearly err when it found that the Government established the criteria for commitment
10
Of course, this does not mean that Charboneau will be sexually dangerous
forever. The Act, as set forth above, provides a path by which Charboneau may seek
discharge. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(e)(1)(B), 4247(h). In determining whether Charboneau
should be released and reintegrated into society in the future, the district court should
consider Charboneau’s behavior in prison and his progress in treatment, as well as the
rest of the record before the district court at the time of any such request for discharge.
20
by clear and convincing evidence and ordered Charboneau committed to the custody of
the United States Attorney General. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
21