Schwartz v. Blum ( 2009 )


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  •                                  UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-1948
    DAVID SCHWARTZ,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    KENNETH BLUM; KENNETH BLUM, II; WILLIAM A. RICHTER,
    Defendants – Appellees,
    and
    GRANT THORNTON LLP; SHULMAN, ROGERS, GANDAL, PORDY & ECKER,
    Non-party recipient of Subpoena Duces Tecum,
    Respondents.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore.    Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
    (1:06-cv-02851-RDB)
    Argued:   October 30, 2008                     Decided:   January 29, 2009
    Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed in part and vacated in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    ARGUED: Brian M. Maul, GORDON & SIMMONS, Frederick, Maryland,
    for Appellant.    George W. Shadoan, SHADOAN, MICHAEL & WELLS,
    LLP, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellees.     ON BRIEF: Roger C.
    Simmons, GORDON & SIMMONS, Frederick, Maryland, for Appellant.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    David    Schwartz        appeals      the        order    of    the    district       court
    dismissing      his     action        against       his     former      business        partners
    stemming       from    the      sale    of     their       company,          Rent-A-Wreck        of
    America, Inc., and its 2006 merger with MBFG, Inc.                                      For the
    reasons    that       follow,    we    affirm        the    decision         of   the   district
    court.     We vacate as moot the district court’s order granting
    summary judgment.
    I.
    Schwartz founded Rent-A-Wreck of America (“RAWA”), a low-
    budget    car     rental     company         that       traded    on    the       NASDAQ     stock
    exchange until 2002.             At the time of the 2006 merger, Schwartz
    was a major RAWA shareholder, but RAWA’s day-to-day operations
    were overseen by CEO Kenneth Blum, Sr. (“Blum”), and Blum’s son,
    Kenneth Blum II (“Blum II”), who served as president of RAWA
    until 2004.        William Richter, who owned a controlling interest
    in    RAWA’s    preferred       stock     and       a    substantial         interest      in   the
    common shares, sat on the Board of Directors.
    Schwartz alleges that, from approximately 1994 until “the
    early 2000s,” J.A. 372, the Blums mismanaged the company and
    engaged in a pattern of self-dealing with Richter’s acquiescence
    and    occasional        active        assistance.              Schwartz          alleges,      for
    example, that RAWA hired companies owned by Blum II to develop
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    software that was unnecessary; that the Blums leased property to
    RAWA   through        their     own    real       estate      company;       that      the   Blums
    caused    RAWA     to     pay    excessive            fees     for    management         services
    performed by K.A.B., Inc., a company controlled by the Blums;
    that   Blum      II     and     Richter      purchased          cars       through      RAWA    but
    retained the profits from resale for themselves; that the Blums
    diverted company funds for their own personal use and misused
    company   credit        cards;        and    that       the    Blums       and    their      family
    members used company cars without compensating RAWA.
    According to Schwartz, Mitra Ghahramaniou, RAWA’s financial
    controller,       became       concerned          about       this   alleged          pattern    of
    misconduct and financial improprieties and its effect on RAWA’s
    mandatory SEC filings.                 Ghahramaniou communicated her concerns
    to   Richter,     who    allegedly          permitted         the    Blums       to   “cover    up”
    their activities.             J.A. 13.        Schwartz claims that, because the
    Blums feared the activities reported by Ghahramaniou subjected
    them to potential individual liability under the Sarbanes-Oxley
    Act, see Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 
    116 Stat. 745
    , 801 (2002),
    codified in part at 
    28 U.S.C. § 1658
    (b), the Blums caused RAWA
    to delist its shares from the NASDAQ exchange so that Sarbanes-
    Oxley would no longer apply.                       The complaint alleges that the
    delisting resulted in a significant drop in the value of RAWA
    shares and eventually lead to the resignation of Blum II as
    president.        According           to    the       complaint,       a    subsequent         audit
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    revealed numerous financial irregularities, forcing the Blums to
    repay RAWA for “improper and undocumented expenses.”                    J.A. 14.
    Schwartz alleges finally that Richter and Blum, in order
    “to   extract         themselves   from   the    problems     created”    by    their
    conduct, began looking for a company that would purchase RAWA.
    J.A. 14.        Ultimately, RAWA entered into a Merger Agreement with
    MBFG.      Schwartz alleges that Richter, who held a controlling
    interest in RAWA, and Blum approved the proposed merger even
    though another buyer produced a more favorable tender offer.
    Schwartz claims that Richter and Blum settled on MBFG because,
    unlike    the    other     bidder,   MBFG      agreed   to   grant,     among   other
    things, “a waiver and release of all claims arising from the
    facts contained in the Audit Report.”               J.A. 16.
    The Merger Agreement offered RAWA shareholders the option
    of tendering their shares for the price being offered by MBFG or
    dissenting from the proposed merger and pressing their appraisal
    rights.     Schwartz opted to accept MBFG’s offer and redeem his
    400,000 shares of RAWA stock.                  Schwartz concedes that at the
    time he tendered his shares to MBFG, he was fully informed as to
    all material facts related to the merger, including defendants’
    alleged self-dealing, which occurred years before the merger.
    Based    on    these   factual    allegations,       Schwartz    asserted   a
    breach-of-fiduciary-duty             claim       against       all      defendants,
    contending that RAWA shareholders did not receive a fair price
    5
    for the merger.        According to Schwartz, RAWA’s “value included
    claims against the Defendants” that were waived in the merger
    transaction and, therefore, MBFG paid less than it should have
    for the merger.        J.A. 16.        Furthermore, Schwartz alleged in his
    complaint that the value of RAWA’s stock dropped significantly
    when   RAWA   delisted     from     the   Nasdaq         exchange       as    a    result    of
    defendants’       failure         to      adhere              to      their        fiduciary
    responsibilities.
    Defendants   moved    to     dismiss        the    complaint,          arguing   that
    Schwartz,     having     tendered      his       RAWA    shares       and    accepted       the
    consideration offered in the merger proposal, was barred from
    challenging the fairness of the merger price.                          While the motion
    to dismiss was pending, defendants filed a motion for summary
    judgment asserting that, to the extent Schwartz was pursuing a
    claim based on defendants’ alleged self-dealing and wrongdoing
    as directors or officers of RAWA, such a claim was barred by
    Maryland’s three-year statute of limitations.
    The    district     court       granted          the        motion     to    dismiss,
    concluding that under Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 
    535 A.2d 840
     (Del. 1987), Schwartz could not challenge the fairness of
    the merger after tendering his shares and accepting the benefits
    of the 2006 merger.         Noting that the nature of Schwartz’s claim
    was “difficult to discern from the Complaint,” J.A. 377, the
    district court decided to address defendants’ motion for summary
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    judgment even though it had granted the motion to dismiss.                     The
    court granted summary judgment, agreeing with defendants that
    any claim based on the allegations of wrongdoing was barred by
    the statute of limitations.             Schwartz challenges both rulings on
    appeal.
    II.
    A.
    The lack of clarity and precision in Schwartz’s complaint
    complicated the district court’s task in this case.                       Even on
    appeal with the aid of counsel’s post hoc characterizations of
    the claim asserted by Schwartz, it is indeed difficult to pin
    down Schwartz’s theory.           That said, we conclude that the heart
    of Schwartz’s claim is a challenge to the price of the merger.
    This conclusion is confirmed by language in the complaint and
    Schwartz’s opening brief:             “The gravamen of Schwartz’s Complaint
    is that [defendants] breached their fiduciary duties . . . which
    resulted in a lower price term being realized from the 2006
    Merger    than    would    otherwise       have   been   obtained.”    Brief      of
    Appellant    at   22;     see   id.   at    23    (“Schwartz’s   Complaint   is   a
    challenge to the terms of the 2006 Merger.”).
    As     we    understand      the       claim,    the   allegations      about
    defendants’ improper conduct go to Schwartz’s theory about why
    the merger price was unfair.               He believes that defendants feared
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    liability     as    a     result      of     their    alleged        misconduct           and    thus
    “bought”      protection        by    agreeing       to    a   lower        merger        price    in
    exchange for a waiver from MBFG.                     On the face of the complaint,
    however, such a theory is simply not apparent.                                 Nevertheless,
    even   if   we     were    to   superimpose          this      theory       onto     the    actual
    complaint,       Schwartz’s          basic    claim       would    remain          the    same     --
    defendants       negotiated        or      otherwise      caused       an    unfair,       lowball
    merger price.
    Accordingly, although we appreciate the dilemma created by
    the pleadings and understand the district court’s reasons for
    ruling   on    a    second      dispositive          motion,      we    conclude          that    the
    motion for summary judgment was essentially duplicative of the
    motion to dismiss and that it was unnecessary for the court to
    address it.        For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district
    court’s dismissal of Schwartz’s complaint and vacate as moot the
    order granting summary judgment.
    B.
    Schwartz      argues          that     the     district         court        erroneously
    concluded that, by accepting consideration from MBFG in exchange
    for his RAWA stock, he essentially acquiesced to the proposed
    merger and could not subsequently challenge the fairness of the
    price MBFG paid for the shares.
    Federal      courts       sitting        in     diversity            must     apply        the
    substantive        law    of    the     forum       state,     see     Erie        R.R.    Co.     v.
    8
    Tompkins, 
    304 U.S. 64
    , 78 (1938); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
    Cities/ABC, Inc., 
    194 F.3d 505
    , 512 (4th Cir. 1999), including
    its choice of law rules, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
    Co., 
    313 U.S. 487
    , 496 (1941).                  The parties agree that Delaware
    law applies to Schwartz’s claim; accordingly, we look to the
    corporate law of Delaware as determined by the highest court of
    that state.         See Ellis v. Grant Thornton LLP, 
    530 F.3d 280
    , 287
    (4th Cir. 2008) (“As a federal court sitting in diversity, we
    have an obligation to apply the jurisprudence of West Virginia’s
    highest court, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.”).
    The district court relied upon the Delaware Supreme Court’s
    Bershad       decision,       which       considered     whether        an     informed
    stockholder -- and Schwartz concedes he was fully informed --
    can challenge the fairness of the merger price after “vot[ing]
    in    favor    of    a   merger     or    accept[ing]        the    benefits    of   the
    transaction.”         Bershad, 
    535 A.2d at 842
     (emphasis added).                     The
    Bershad court answered this question in the negative, holding
    that a stockholder who has “tendered his shares and accepted the
    merger    consideration”       has       “acquiesced    in    the    transaction     and
    cannot [subsequently] attack it.”                
    Id. at 848
    .
    Despite the apparent death-knell sounded by Bershad for his
    claim, Schwartz contends that numerous Delaware Chancery Court
    decisions have narrowed the scope of Bershad.                       Representative of
    the   decisions       cited    by    Schwartz      is   In    re    Best   Lock   Corp.
    9
    Shareholder Litigation, 
    845 A.2d 1057
     (Del. Ch. 2001), in which
    the court concluded that Bershad precludes a stockholder from
    challenging the merger price only when he tenders his shares and
    affirmatively     votes      to   ratify        the    merger.          
    Id. at 1079
    (observing that “[t]he result in Bershad would . . . have been
    different . . . if there had not been a ratifying vote of the
    minority    shareholders”).         Moreover,         according    to    In       re    Best
    Lock, even if the shareholder votes for the merger and accepts
    its benefits, he may still challenge the fairness of the merger
    in an equitable action.           See id.; see also In re JCC Holding
    Co., 
    843 A.2d 713
    , 722-23 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[A] stockholder who
    casts a vote in favor of, or later accepts the consideration
    from,   a   merger    effected    by   a    controlling       stockholder          is   not
    barred by the doctrine of acquiescence, or any other related
    equitable doctrine such as waiver, from challenging the fairness
    of the merger.”).
    There     are   some    circumstances           under      which        a    federal
    diversity court, in determining the applicable state law, can
    consider the decisions of a lower state court.                      If the highest
    state court has not addressed the issue or the law is unclear,
    the   federal    court    must    “forecast      a    decision     of    the       state’s
    highest court” in light of “canons of construction, restatements
    of the law, treatises, recent pronouncements of general rules or
    policies by the state’s highest court, well considered dicta,
    10
    and the state’s trial court decisions.”                           Wells v. Liddy, 
    186 F.3d 505
    , 528 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Private Mortgage Inv.
    Servs., Inc. v. Hotel & Club Assocs., 
    296 F.3d 308
    , 312 (4th
    Cir. 2002) (considering, in the absence of decision by the state
    supreme court, a decision by the state’s intermediate appellate
    court    to    be    “the    next     best    indicia   of    what    state     law    is”)
    (internal       quotation      marks     omitted).           No    such   circumstances
    present       themselves     here.       In    Bershad,      the    Supreme     Court    of
    Delaware directly addressed this issue.                   Since that decision, as
    Schwartz concedes, the Delaware Supreme Court has not fashioned
    an   exception       to     Bershad    or     otherwise      narrowed     its   holding,
    either explicitly or implicitly.                    Accordingly, we believe that
    Bershad remains controlling and it is dispositive of the claim
    raised by Schwartz.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
    dismissal       of   Schwartz’s       complaint.        To    the    extent     that    the
    district court also granted summary judgment, we vacate that
    order.        Having reviewed and carefully considered the remaining
    issues raised on appeal by Schwartz, we reject these arguments
    as well.
    AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART
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