United States v. Belin , 305 F. App'x 68 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4176
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER BELIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:06-cr-00063-FDW-DCK-1)
Submitted: December 11, 2008 Decided: December 15, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Randolph Marshall Lee, LAW OFFICES OF RANDOLPH M. LEE,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Belin appeals his 60-month sentence
imposed upon his guilty plea to possession with intent to
distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b) (2006). Belin’s sentence was the
statutorily mandatory minimum term. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Appellate counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
concluding there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether the statutory mandatory minimum sentences
under 21 U.S.C. § 841 create unconstitutional disparities
between offenses involving crack cocaine and those involving
powder cocaine. Belin was advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but did not file such a brief. We affirm.
We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness,
using the abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 586, 594-97 (2007). Reasonableness review requires
appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence. Id.Here, the district court correctly calculated Belin’s
advisory guideline range, considered that range in conjunction
with the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (West 2006 &
Supp. 2008), and adequately explained its reason for imposing
sentence. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th
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Cir. 2007). We recently held that “a statutorily required
sentence, . . . is per se reasonable.” United States v.
Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in
original). Moreover, the recent amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines have no effect on the constitutionality of the
statutory mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine
offenses. As the Supreme Court observed in Kimbrough v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 573 (2007), after the amendments,
“sentencing courts remain bound by the mandatory minimum
sentences prescribed [by statute].” We conclude that Belin’s
sentence is reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Belin’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing,
of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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