United States v. Breedlove , 7 F. App'x 268 ( 2001 )


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  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                No. 98-4861
    STEPHEN MICHAEL BREEDLOVE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                No. 99-4207
    HILDA I. C. MICHAELS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
    Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge.
    (CR-96-154-MU)
    Submitted: October 26, 2000
    Decided: April 20, 2001
    Before MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    2                    UNITED STATES v. BREEDLOVE
    COUNSEL
    Paul Pooley, Durham, North Carolina; Randolph M. Lee, Charlotte,
    North Carolina, for Appellants. Mark T. Calloway, United States
    Attorney, Brian Lee Whisler, Assistant United States Attorney, Char-
    lotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Stephen Michael Breedlove and Hilda I.C. Michaels pled guilty to
    conspiracy to possess Dilaudid with intent to distribute, in violation
    of 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 846
     (West 1999). On appeal, Breedlove challenges
    the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
    and Michaels contends that the district court misperceived its author-
    ity to depart based on a combination of factors. We affirm
    Breedlove’s conviction and dismiss Michaels’ appeal.
    I.
    Breedlove argues that the district court erred in denying his motion
    to withdraw his guilty plea. He contends that he was not required to
    articulate a fair and just reason for withdrawal because he moved to
    withdraw his plea after the magistrate judge conducted his plea hear-
    ing, in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, but before the district
    court accepted his plea. Because Breedlove did not rely on this argu-
    ment below, we review the district court’s denial of his motion to
    withdraw for plain error. United States v. Bowens, 
    224 F.3d 302
    , 314
    (4th Cir. 2000) (providing standard).
    At the conclusion of the Rule 11 hearing, the magistrate judge rec-
    ommended accepting Breedlove’s plea but deferred acceptance of the
    UNITED STATES v. BREEDLOVE                       3
    plea and plea agreement to the district court. In United States v. Hyde,
    
    520 U.S. 670
     (1997), the Supreme Court held that, when the defen-
    dant sought to withdraw his guilty plea after the district court had
    accepted the plea but before the district court had accepted the plea
    agreement, the defendant could not withdraw his plea unless he had
    shown a "fair and just reason" for doing so. 
    520 U.S. at 673-74
    ; see
    United States v. Grant, 
    117 F.3d 788
    , 790-92 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding
    that defendant must show fair and just reason for withdrawal of plea
    where district court conducts Rule 11 colloquy but defers acceptance
    of plea and plea agreement until it reviews presentence report);
    United States v. Ewing, 
    957 F.2d 115
    , 119 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding
    that once guilty plea is accepted by court, regardless of whether plea
    agreement is accepted, defendant is bound by his choice and may
    withdraw plea only by showing either fair and just reason or by with-
    drawing after rejection of plea agreement).
    Given that Breedlove consented to have the magistrate judge pre-
    side over his Rule 11 hearing and tendered his plea at that time, the
    magistrate judge’s recommendation to accept his plea is binding. See
    Hyde, 
    520 U.S. at 677
     ("Were withdrawal automatic in every case
    where the defendant decided to alter his tactics and present his theory
    of the case to the jury, the guilty plea would become a mere gesture,
    a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the defendant’s
    whim.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United
    States v. Dees, 
    125 F.3d 261
    , 266-69 (5th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases
    holding that magistrate judge’s taking of guilty plea does not violate
    Article III guarantees). We therefore find no plain error in requiring
    Breedlove to articulate a "fair and just reason" to justify the with-
    drawal of his plea. We also agree with the district court’s analysis of
    the factors enunciated in United States v. Moore, 
    931 F.2d 245
    , 248
    (4th Cir. 1991), and its ultimate determination that Breedlove did not
    present a "fair and just reason" to warrant the withdrawal of his guilty
    plea. See United States v. Ubakanma, 
    215 F.3d 421
    , 424 (4th Cir.
    2000) (stating standard of review).
    II.
    Hilda I.C. Michaels contends that the district court erred in finding
    that it did not have the authority to depart based on a "combination
    of factors" theory. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
    4                    UNITED STATES v. BREEDLOVE
    the district court recognized its authority to depart but chose not to
    exercise its discretion to do so. When the court recognizes its author-
    ity to depart but chooses not to, the decision is not reviewable on
    appeal. See United States v. Edwards 
    188 F.3d 230
    , 238-39 (4th Cir.
    1999), cert. denied, 
    120 S. Ct. 968
     (2000); United States v. Bayerle,
    
    898 F.2d 28
    , 31 (4th Cir. 1990). We therefore dismiss Michaels’
    appeal.
    III.
    For the reasons stated, we affirm Breedlove’s conviction and dis-
    miss Michaels’ appeal.* We dispense with oral argument because the
    facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
    before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART
    *We have considered the effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000), and find that, because Breedlove’s and Michaels’ sentences
    of imprisonment and terms of supervised release do not exceed the statu-
    tory maximums set out in 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
    (b)(1)(C) (West 1999), their
    sentences are permissible under Apprendi.