United States v. Moore , 273 F. App'x 291 ( 2008 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-5039
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    BOBBY GENE MOORE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief
    District Judge. (1:07-cr-00170-JAB)
    Submitted:   March 31, 2008                 Decided:   April 14, 2008
    Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury,
    Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
    for Appellant. Paul Alexander Weinman, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Bobby   Gene     Moore     pled    guilty,    pursuant       to   a   plea
    agreement, to bank robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2113
    (a)
    (2000).    The district court sentenced Moore to seventy-seven
    months’ incarceration, to be followed by three years of supervised
    release.   Moore timely appealed.
    On   appeal,     counsel     has    filed    a     brief   pursuant    to
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), stating there are no
    meritorious     issues    for     review,     but   questioning       whether    the
    presentence     report    was     calculated    correctly       and   whether    the
    sentence was reasonable. Moore separately argues that he agreed to
    a sentence of thirty-seven to forty-six months, not seventy-seven
    to eighty-four months; the sentence was unreasonable because he had
    never before been convicted of a violent crime; he did not possess
    a firearm during the commission of the bank robbery; and the
    presentence     report    added     “unfair”     misdemeanor      points.        The
    government declined to file a responding brief.                 We affirm.
    To    the     extent    Moore     claims     his    guilty    plea     was
    involuntary and the district court erred in accepting it, any error
    committed during the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed for plain error
    because Moore did not move to withdraw his guilty plea.                  See United
    States v. Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 524-26 (4th Cir. 2002).                           A
    defendant’s statements at a guilty plea hearing are presumed true.
    See Blackledge v. Allison, 
    431 U.S. 63
    , 73-74 (1977).                   Unsupported
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    subsequent allegations are insufficient to overcome representations
    at the hearing.           
    Id. at 74
    ; see also Via v. Superintendent,
    Powhatan Corr. Ctr., 
    643 F.2d 167
    , 171 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding
    statements made at plea hearing that facially demonstrate plea’s
    validity conclusive absent compelling reason why they should not
    be, such as ineffective assistance of counsel). Under the totality
    of the circumstances and in light of Moore’s testimony at his plea
    hearing,     the    district   court   did     not    abuse    its   discretion   by
    accepting Moore’s guilty plea.
    To any extent Moore claims ineffective assistance of
    counsel, such claims must be brought in a collateral proceeding
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     (2000) unless such ineffective assistance
    conclusively appears from the face of the record.                       See United
    States v. DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 120-21 (4th Cir. 1991).                    Because
    ineffective assistance of counsel does not appear conclusively from
    the   face    of    the   record,   Moore      must    pursue    any   ineffective
    assistance claims through a § 2255 motion.
    Regarding      Moore’s     sentence,        the     district     court
    appropriately treated the Guidelines as advisory, considered the
    advisory Guidelines range, and weighed the relevant 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2000) factors.           See United States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005).             A sentence that falls within a
    properly calculated advisory Guidelines range is presumed to be
    reasonable.        Rita v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2462 (2007).
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    Appellate courts review all sentences, including those outside the
    advisory Guidelines range, for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United
    States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597 (2007).
    Our review of the record reveals that the Guidelines
    range   was    properly   calculated.        Moore’s       seventy-seven   month
    sentence was at the low end of the Guidelines range and well below
    the statutory maximum sentence.        The district court considered the
    Guidelines as well as both parties’ arguments regarding Moore’s
    criminal history, his age, and the nature of his crime.                        We
    conclude   the    district   court   did     not   abuse    its   discretion   in
    imposing the seventy-seven month sentence.
    Finally, although Moore complains on appeal that he did
    not agree to the higher sentencing range, the plea agreement
    provided only that if Moore’s base offense level was sixteen or
    higher and he qualified for a two-point decrease in his offense
    level   under    the   sentencing    Guidelines,      the    Government    would
    recommend that the district court apply an additional one-level
    reduction. The plea agreement also noted Moore’s sentence would be
    within the discretion of the district court, which would take the
    Guidelines into consideration.             Therefore, the plea agreement
    referenced the Guidelines generally but did not attempt to bind the
    parties to a specific sentencing range.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
    this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.                     We
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    therefore affirm Moore’s conviction and sentence.       This court
    requires that counsel inform Moore, in writing, of the right to
    petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
    If Moore requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
    that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
    this court for leave to withdraw from representation.    Counsel’s
    motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Moore.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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