United States v. Elver Manuel Campos ( 2018 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4776
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ELVER MANUEL CAMPOS, a/k/a Ricardo Geronimo-Angeles, a/k/a Ricardo
Geronimo Angeles, a/k/a Elver Manuel Campos-Bernal, a/k/a Elber Campos
Bernal, a/k/a Elver Campos Brenal, a/k/a Jose Garcia Campos, a/k/a Eucario
Garcia Perez, a/k/a Elbert Manuel Campos,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:17-cr-00041-WO-1)
Submitted: May 23, 2018 Decided: June 4, 2018
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KEENAN, Circuit Judge, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew G.T. Martin, United States Attorney, Randall S.
Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney, Benjamin J. Corcoran, Third Year Law
Student, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Elver Manuel Campos pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C) (2012), and illegal reentry of an aggravated felon, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a), (b)(2) (2012). The district court sentenced Campos to 210 months’
imprisonment, and Campos appeals, arguing that the sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We affirm.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard,” assessing a sentence’s substantive reasonableness under
“the totality of the circumstances.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007).
Any sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
substantively reasonable, a presumption rebutted only “by showing that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” United
States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357-58 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Campos first argues that sentencing disparities between high- and low-purity
methamphetamine * is unwarranted and not justified by any legitimate sentencing
purpose. The district court considered Campos’ argument but ultimately rejected it,
*
Campos was sentenced for possessing “Ice,” which the Sentencing Guidelines
define as “a mixture or substance containing d-methamphetamine hydrochloride of at
least 80% purity.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 n.*(C) (2016). The
Guidelines further “provide[] that one gram of a mixture or substance containing
methamphetamine is equivalent to two kilograms of marijuana, whereas one gram of
actual methamphetamine [(Ice)] is equivalent to twenty kilograms of marijuana,” a 10 to
1 ratio. United States v. Molina, 469 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2006).
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reasoning that purity levels may be accounted for in sentencing, as high-purity
methamphetamine reflects the work of a more sophisticated organization that possesses
the resources and ability to manufacture large quantities of high-grade methamphetamine.
We discern no abuse of discretion in that determination. See United States v. Munjak,
669 F.3d 906, 907 (8th Cir. 2012) (“That a district judge . . . may be permitted to deviate
from the guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission . . .
does not mean that the judge is required to do so.”).
Campos also argues that mitigating factors outweighed any aggravating factors
relevant to his sentencing. But the district court reasonably applied the § 3553(a) factors
to determine that a 210-month sentence, the bottom of the properly calculated Guidelines
range, was appropriate. The court, while recognizing the presence of certain mitigating
factors, determined that those were outweighed by aggravating factors. The district court
primarily cited Campos’ lengthy and serious criminal history—which included prior
convictions for felony drug trafficking, assault with a deadly weapon, felony fleeing to
elude law enforcement, possession of a firearm, and multiple illegal reentries—in
determining that deterrence, promoting respect for the law, and protecting the public
necessitated the sentence imposed. In light of these considerations, the mitigating
circumstances that Campos cites, and even his citation of reports and statistics concerning
deterrence and recidivism, do not overcome the presumption of reasonableness that is
afforded to his within-range sentence. Vinson, 852 F.3d at 357-58.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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