Luzma Martinez-Ceron v. Loretta Lynch ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2211
LUZMA KENIDA MARTINEZ-CERON, a/k/a Luzma Kenide Ceron,
a/k/a Luzma K. Ceron, a/k/a Luzma Kenida Martinezceron,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: May 28, 2015 Decided: July 10, 2015
Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chester Smith, SMITH LAW GROUP, PLLC, Virginia Beach, Virginia,
for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Julie M. Iversen, Senior Litigation Counsel, James A.
Hurley, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Luzma Kenida Martinez-Ceron (“Martinez”), a native and
citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) order dismissing her appeal from
the immigration judge’s denial of her applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). * We have thoroughly reviewed the
record, including the evidence presented to the immigration
court and the transcript of Martinez’s merits hearing. We
conclude that the record evidence does not compel any factual
findings contrary to those made by the immigration judge and
affirmed by the Board, particularly as to the finding that
Martinez failed to satisfy the requisite nexus element, see 8
U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012); Hernandez-
Avalos v. Lynch, No. 14-1331, 2015 WL 1936721, at *3 (4th Cir.
Apr. 30, 2015) (“[A]n asylum applicant . . . must demonstrate
that [membership in a particular social group was] more than an
incidental, tangential, superficial or subordinate reason for
[the] persecution . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)),
*
Martinez did not substantively challenge the denial of her
application for protection under the CAT. Accordingly, Martinez
has waived appellate review of this issue. See Suarez-
Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2013)
(failing to raise a challenge to the Board’s ruling or finding
in an opening brief waives the issue).
2
and that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision to
uphold the denial of Martinez’s applications for relief. See
I.N.S. v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (“The BIA’s
determination that [an applicant is] not eligible for
asylum . . . can be reversed only if the evidence
presented . . . [is] such that a reasonable factfinder would
have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution
existed.”).
Further, we reject Martinez’s claim that the immigration
judge erred in failing to continue her removal proceedings. At
the master calendar hearing prior to the merits hearing, counsel
for Martinez informed the immigration judge that the state post-
conviction proceeding had not been successful, and counsel did
not pursue a continuance at any point thereafter.
Finally, we are not persuaded that the Board should have
remanded this case to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) because of an error in the USCIS’s decision
to withdraw Martinez’s temporary protected status (“TPS”). To
be sure, the USCIS ruling referred to a felony conviction that
Martinez does not have. But the USCIS also detailed Martinez’s
two misdemeanor convictions, which were conceded, and this is a
proper basis for withdrawing TPS. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (an alien “convicted of any felony or
2 or more misdemeanors committed in the United States” is not
3
eligible for TPS); 8 C.F.R. § 244.4(a) (2014) (same); 8 C.F.R.
§ 244.14(a)(1) (2014) (authorizing the USCIS to withdraw TPS
granted to an alien who “at any time thereafter becomes
ineligible for such status”). We thus agree with the Board that
there was no basis for a remand in this case.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the
reasons stated by the Board. See In re: Martinez-Ceron (B.I.A.
Oct. 9, 2014). We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
PETITION DENIED
4