Morrall v. Gates ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1277
ANGELA MORRALL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ROBERT M. GATES,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:07-
cv-02097-RWT)
Submitted: March 16, 2010 Decided: March 19, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David A. Branch, LAW OFFICES OF DAVID A. BRANCH, P.C.,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Melanie L. Glickson, Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Angela Morrall, an African-American female, appeals
from the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment and
dismissal of her action alleging that her former employer,
Robert Gates, Secretary of the Department of Defense,
discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(2006) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006), when it terminated her
employment allegedly based upon her race. Our review of the
record and the district court's opinion discloses that this
appeal is without merit.
We conclude that the district court correctly
determined that Morrall failed to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 485
(4th Cir. 2005). Specifically, relevant to the third prong of
her prima facie case, the undisputed evidence established that
Morrall, who was employed for less than one year and was
terminated during her probationary period, was not performing
her job duties at a level that met her employer’s legitimate
expectations at the time she was terminated. The record
demonstrates that she demonstrated disrespectful and disruptive
conduct. Her relationship with her supervisors was difficult,
and her employment was fraught with her written and verbal
2
complaints about a broad variety of subjects. 1 Whether an
employee is performing at a level that meets legitimate
expectations is based on the employer’s perception, and
Morrall’s own, unsubstantiated assertions to the contrary are
insufficient to stave off summary judgment. King v. Rumsfeld,
328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003). Plus, even if Morrall had
established a prima facie case of race discrimination, she
failed to establish that her employer’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment, namely
her insubordination, was pretextual. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Conkwright v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1991). 2
1
While Morrall attempts to argue that other similarly-
situated employees were treated more favorably than she
following episodes of insubordination, as the district court
correctly held, the two individuals identified by Morrall were
not similarly-situated because there was no evidence that they
were probationary employees at the time of their alleged
misconduct. See, e.g., George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 415
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
2
Nor did Morrall establish viable claims of retaliation or
hostile work environment under Title VII, even assuming,
arguendo, that such claims were properly exhausted. Her claim
of retaliation fails because her first EEO contact occurred
after her termination, such that any claim of alleged
retaliatory conduct based upon that contact fails as a matter of
law, see Anderson v. G.D.C., Inc., 281 F.3d 452, 458 (4th Cir.
2002), and because she failed to demonstrate that any other
complained-of conduct by the employer was retaliatory for any
other protected activity, see King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d at 150-
51. Nor has Morrall established that the employer’s conduct was
sufficiently extreme to establish an actionable hostile work
(Continued)
3
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s
denial of Morrall’s request for additional discovery prior to
granting summary judgment. See Strag v. Bd. of Trs., 55 F.3d
943, 952-53 (4th Cir. 1995). Here, the district court permitted
Morrall to obtain certain additional discovery, some, but not
all, of which Morrall did. It is evident that, prior to ruling
on the employer’s summary judgment motion, the district court
considered and granted some of Morrall’s requested discovery,
and reviewed the extensive factual record fully developed at the
administrative level, as well as the additional discovery
provided by both parties. We cannot say that there was any
abuse of discretion by the district court in its limitation on
Morrall’s requested discovery. See id.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
environment claim. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 788 (1998). Moreover, we agree with the district court
that, while Morrall established the existence of
misunderstandings relating to the proper classification of her
job, she failed to establish racial discrimination related
thereto.
4