Mbecha v. Gonzales , 157 F. App'x 605 ( 2005 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-1668
    NGEBWUNG ATEM MBECHA,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals. (A96-271-342)
    Submitted:   November 14, 2005            Decided:   December 6, 2005
    Before MICHAEL, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Edwin K. Fogam, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D.
    Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, James A. Hunolt, Senior
    Litigation Counsel, C. Alexander Hewes, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
    JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Ngebwung Atem Mbecha, a native and citizen of Cameroon,
    petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”)
    order affirming the immigration judge’s decision to deny his
    applications for asylum and withholding from removal.                The INA
    authorizes the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee.
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a) (2000).          It defines a refugee as a person
    unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of
    persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
    race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion.”        
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A) (2000).
    An applicant can establish refugee status based on past
    persecution in his native country on account of a protected ground.
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1) (2005).        “An applicant who demonstrates
    that he was the subject of past persecution is presumed to have a
    well-founded fear of persecution.”          Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 
    371 F.3d 182
    , 187 (4th Cir. 2004).      This presumption can be rebutted on a
    finding of a fundamental change of circumstances so that the alien
    no longer has a well-founded fear, or a finding that the alien
    could   avoid   persecution   by    relocating    within    the   country    of
    removal.   
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1)(i)(A), (B) (2005).
    Without   regard   to     past    persecution,    an   alien     can
    establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground.
    Ngarurih, 
    371 F.3d at 187
    .         The well-founded fear of persecution
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    standard contains both a subjective and an objective component.
    “An applicant may satisfy the subjective element by presenting
    ‘candid, credible, and sincere testimony demonstrating a genuine
    fear of persecution.’”       Chen v. INS, 
    195 F.3d 198
    , 201-02 (4th Cir.
    1999) (quoting Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 
    955 F.2d 1251
    , 1256 (9th
    Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).             The objective
    element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would
    lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution.
    Huaman-Cornelio v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 
    979 F.2d 995
    , 999
    (4th Cir. 1992).
    An   applicant    has   the   burden   of   demonstrating   his
    eligibility for asylum.       
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a) (2005); Gonahasa v.
    INS, 
    181 F.3d 538
    , 541 (4th Cir. 1999).            Credibility findings,
    relevant to the subjective component, are reviewed for substantial
    evidence.   A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony on
    credibility grounds must offer specific, cogent reasons for doing
    so.   Figeroa v. INS, 
    886 F.2d 76
    , 78 (4th Cir. 1989).          We accord
    broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings
    supported by substantial evidence.          Camara v. Ashcroft, 
    378 F.3d 361
    , 367 (4th Cir. 2004).
    To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an
    alien must show a clear probability that, if he was removed to his
    native country, his “life or freedom would be threatened” on a
    protected ground. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(A) (2000); see Camara, 378
    - 3 -
    F.3d at 370 (4th Cir. 2004).       A “clear probability” means it is
    more likely than not the alien would be subject to persecution.
    INS v. Stevic, 
    467 U.S. 407
    , 429-30 (1984).           “The burden of proof
    is on the applicant for withholding of removal . . . to establish
    that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed
    country of removal” on account of a protected ground.               
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b) (2005).     A showing of past threat to life or freedom
    on such a ground creates a rebuttable presumption that the threat
    would recur upon removal. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(1)(i); Camara, 
    378 F.3d at 370
    .      Withholding of removal is mandatory if the alien
    meets the standard of proof.      Stevic, 
    467 U.S. at 429-30
    .
    A    determination   regarding    eligibility     for   asylum   or
    withholding of removal is conclusive if supported by substantial
    evidence   on    the   record   considered     as     a   whole.     INS    v.
    Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992).           Administrative findings
    of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
    compelled to decide to the contrary.           
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B)
    (2000). We will reverse the Board “only if ‘the evidence presented
    was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find
    the requisite fear of persecution.’”         Rusu v. INS, 
    296 F.3d 316
    ,
    325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Huaman-Cornelio, 
    979 F.2d at 999
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).        We find the evidence was not
    so compelling as to warrant reversal.
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    With   respect    to    the     Board’s   affirmation     of   the
    immigration judge’s finding regarding the lack of corroborating
    information where some should have been available, we find the
    evidence does not compel a different result. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)
    (2000), as amended by § 101(e) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L.
    No. 109-13, 
    119 Stat. 231
    , 305.
    Accordingly,     we   deny    the   petition   for   review.    We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED
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